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MOULDING MEN FOR BATTLE

By
Major General
Hanson E. Ely
U. S. Army, Retired

In comparing our own with the armies of other nations that may one day become our enemies, it is easy enough to count our regiments, brigades, and divisions, our airplanes, tanks, and ships, our progress in modernization, mechanization and motorization, and to use these as our basis for comparison. Yet one thing seldom receives enough consideration in such comparisons: that is the element of morale.

High morale is the state of mind that makes the soldier—and the units made up of soldiers—exhibit the highest of courage, moral and physical; makes them withstand the toughest of hardships and privations and endure the heaviest fatigue—enables them, despite all adverse circumstances, to force their will upon the enemy.

You will find it recounted in history how some organizations attacked without hesitancy an enemy three times their size, with the idea firmly in their minds that they were going to win. And they did win. Why was it—why *is* it—we often wonder. Yet the answer is simple. It is because the winner had morale in the fullest sense and a corps of leaders that inculcated and used it. We must remember that always morale and leadership are inseparable. They are military twins.

The waging of war is most complicated and comprehensive. True, warfare is both an art and a science. But the science—despite our scientific age—is only ten per cent. The art is the ninety per cent that carries the power—puts over the punch. The big part of this art is morale and the building of morale.

Yet there is so little written about this thing we call morale that we are at a loss when it comes to studying it. There is nothing definite to study. True, there are a lot of surmises and a lot of well-known, cut-and-dried "principles" laid down—such as, the one to the effect that a leader must be unselfish, must have courage, energy, loyalty, and the confidence of his men. But all that is simple. It is the application of impalpable human qualities—dozens perhaps—all focused on a definite decision. Yet it is this very dealing with intangibles of the human mind that we find nowhere explained. We can study reports and histories of armies, corps, and divisions, and read the recorded successes—though often the mistakes and failures are passed over—in full detail. From these records of actual warfare, though they may contain no clear key to what morale is and how it is produced, we can find incidents in which morale was plainly all-important, and examples of good and bad leadership in building or lowering morale.

Battles are won or lost by remnants

The incidents and examples recounted in this article are things that came under my personal observation or came to me as first-hand information, mainly during the period of the World War.

It is basic to an understanding of morale to know what it counteracts. It is necessary to have at least an elementary knowledge of the psychology of the battlefield. It must be recognized that man in battle is a being in whom the instinct of self-preservation dominates, at certain moments, all other sentiments. Thus, discipline has for its aim the fullest possible control of that instinct. At the same time, discipline cannot dominate it completely nor

continually. I do not deny the glorious examples of discipline and devotion that have elevated man above himself. But if these examples are glorious, it is mainly because they are rare; if they are admired, it is because they are exceptions.

Whatever the science of the superior commander, the genius of his strategic combinations, the precision of his concentrations, whatever numerical superiority he may have, however rigid his discipline, victory will escape him if his soldiers do not properly conduct themselves without being watched, and have not the resolution to conquer—in short, morale. In the armies of today the tide of battle is in the hands of the fighting soldier, and never has his individual steadfastness—his morale—been of more fundamental importance. For today the soldier no longer has the intoxication of ancient attacks *en masse* to sustain him. Once, the terrible anxiety of waiting made the soldier wish for the violent blow, dangerous but soon passed. Now, his mental and physical powers are tried for long hours and days, and in such a test, he has but the resoluteness of his own heart to sustain him. For man is incapable of withstanding more than a given degree of fear without giving way. Today he must swallow in five minutes the dose that he took in an hour in the time, let us say, of Turenne. Firearms, tanks, airplanes, gas, long-range cannon, all have increased the distances of mutual aid and support between the various arms, and between the fighting men of those arms. The more men think of themselves as isolated, the more they need a high morale to bolster them. If they don't have it, all is lost.

Soldiers are mainly abnormal during battle. Strong as the soul often is, it cannot dominate the body to the point where the flesh will not revolt and the mind will not waver in the face of destruction. Man has the weakness of flesh and blood.

Man is abnormal in war because the conditions of war are abnormal. The abnormal, it can be said, is the military normal. Wise commanders have concluded that it is normal for orders to miscarry or arrive too late, or for them to be misinterpreted, or not to be fully executed; that it is normal for information to be delayed or to be insufficient; for units to be late, or to lose their sense of direction, or to become mingled with neighboring units; that it is normal for material means to be inadequate, for a worthy enemy to do the unexpected, for troops to be exhausted, staffs overworked, commanders harassed, roads congested, and traffic interrupted, and for supply to

"You will find it recounted in history how some organizations attacked without hesitancy an enemy three times their size."

falter at critical moments. Yet those who enter combat for the first time—no matter what their studies or observations may have told them about it—are astonished to find how troops get out of hand; to find that you seldom know where they all are, or where to put your artillery down, and are otherwise at a loss. In war all things are different—including men.

In the World War even in our best outfits, hundreds would try to avoid action. Some would say they got lost, some would give other reasons. It is a thing always to be expected. It has been said that about one man out of ten has little fear of death; if they get killed or not, it is fate, luck. Perhaps about eight in ten are what we might call normal men; to them we can apply the principles of building morale. But there is at least another tenth who will run away or never reach the fight, if they possibly can. They want to run no chances of getting hurt. Thus, in war it is this human material that we must take and make the most of. Good leadership here takes on a great rôle.

The Quality of the Leaders

It made very little difference in the quality of troops, in the World War, what part of the country they came from, though different divisions were often spoken of as made up of splendid personnel, or the opposite. From observation of at least half of the AEF fighting divisions, it is my conclusion that in some cases there may have been a five per cent difference. But the great difference between success and failure lay not in the supposed quality or lack of quality of the troops but in the quality of their leadership and of the morale that flows from that leadership.

Napoleon said, "Morale is to the physical as three is to one," and Foch said, "Execution is to all planning as nine to one." They are both correct, surely; for the best-laid plans, unless there is somebody up front to give punch to those plans and put them through, are of little value. With the poorest-made plan—other things being about equal—you can generally win, if only you have company and battalion commanders you know will carry out orders and command their men—command them with such ability that they will all have supreme confidence in one another. Then they will get their objectives!

But subordinate units of a large command are seldom all of such quality. You may say that this regiment or battalion, or that division, can always be depended on to reach its objective—other ones seldom. In France, whenever certain divisions were to attack, it was said, "They will go until they get fifteen per cent losses and then they will want to be relieved and that will be the end of them"—and it was. Of a few other divisions it was said, "They will get what they go after, even if it costs half of the command, and they will keep what they get." Of course, a certain amount of experience and baptism of fire makes a difference, for when troops are used to shells and bullets they are more liable to stick when they go in. But with anything like the same amount of training and experience, you can be sure that a "good" fighting unit, as compared to a "poor" one, has a leader in command who made the difference. Again, Napoleon truly said, "It isn't the men; it is the man."

In modern warfare where staffs have been so largely increased, where command has become so scientific, where coördination and communications are so necessary because of dispersion, it is still "the man" who wins battles. Staff officers have their importance, and must themselves have certain qualities of command, because the commander must delegate in battle a certain amount of command. Nevertheless, the personality of the commander must be felt clear down to the last man in line. This necessity for leadership and the morale that springs from it makes us realize that in this machine age machines cannot win alone. Their direction and control must be human. As always, it will be the army with the best leaders, and therefore with the most courageous, loyal, and devoted men, that will be victorious.

It is the Morale of the Group More than of the Individual

The mass may and always will cower at the sight of the phantom Death. But the discipline of the leader dominates that horror by creating a still greater horror—of disgrace. For it is the morale of the group—of the company, the battalion, and even of the higher units—that is the real morale. In the group you can inculcate an *esprit de corps*, a dash, that you cannot in the individuals. A man will do more for Company A than he will for himself; he will do more for the group that knows and banks on him, for those who will know him for a brave man or a coward, than he will as a lone fighter or as a fighter among a group of strangers. That is why it takes time to reconstitute a command to anything like its former efficiency after heavy losses. When a unit receives thirty or forty per cent replacements, it takes quite a while for it to get back anything like its old group feeling.

But once morale is strong within a unit it will carry it far. When they have been in battle for days and nights, when the enemy has dealt out heavy casualties, men, if only they have morale, will yet go on again when the signal comes. They will go to the very limit of their endurance.

And that is another thing that should be writ in large letters on the walls of our schools: It is the last five per cent of exertion that often wins the battle. In France, it was not the first attack, or the second, or the third, but that last straggling fourth attack which did the work. True, that last push made only two or three hundred yards and it was only made by a tenth of the command. But it made the enemy believe we still had a punch left and he withdrew. It was thus at Blanc Mont when the 2d Division attacked the Germans east of Reims. It was the last effort of all that did the work. Most men thought it uncalled for and impossible to make but they drove forward just the same.

We must remember what was known ages ago. It is this: *Battles are won or lost by remnants—remnants of*

units, remnants of material, remnants of intellectual effort—and victory goes to the side whose remnants have the will to hold out one gasp longer than the remnants of the other side. It takes a genuine morale to produce such remnants.

Morale Runs Through all Grades

Some have thought that this thing we call "morale," and the ablity of a leader to instil it in his troops, goes no higher than the battalion. To be sure, when the corporal or the lieutenant or the captain can get his men together and talk to them, they become impressed with the things that constitute morale, and morale is ingrained in them and the unit becomes efficient. But personal leadership does not stop with the battalion commander. Before the 1st Division made its first attack, General Pershing came down and called its officers together. In his fine talk, he transmitted the spirit with which he was himself imbued. The regimental commanders then talked to their field officers, the field officers to their battalion commanders, the battalion commanders to their company officers, on down the line. General Pershing, in his account of the war, says:

"It is never difficult to discover the attitude of a commander, as it is almost certain to be reflected in his unit. If the commander lacks aggressiveness or is disloyal, there will be grumbling and criticism of orders from higher authority among his officers and men. If he is aggressive and loyal his command will show it.

"I recall one incident which illustrates the point. In conversation with one division commander he was asked the condition of his unit, to which he replied that the men were very tired. Whereupon I remarked that there could be no reason for that, as they had been in the line only a short time. I added with some emphasis that it was probably the division commander who was tired.

"Not long afterward his division lost its cohesion in battle and became much disorganized and he was relieved. Another commander was appointed who was tireless and efficient, and under him the division served with exceptional distinction."

The truth of this I can best bring out by recounting a few actual occurrences among American troops in France. They will not only illustrate the point, but may also somewhat surprise many readers.

One of the best divisions we had was repulsed again and again until its troops became discouraged. But the whole thing came from topside. Early in the game, this division had lost many men taking an objective. Then it was pulled back, by order, and lost as many men or more falling back over the same ground as in taking it originally. After that, what could be expected?

The soldier is the one who finally advances or not, who wins fights or not, and unless he feels that he gets a square deal and has leaders who know their jobs, there is no use expecting much from him. If you do, you won't get it. The following is an excellent illustration of this:

In a division near Bantheville, a flank patrol was being sent out under a sergeant from a battalion attack into a woods. The battalion had failed twice to take the woods. The colonel said to the sergeant, "You're going to take it this time."

"No," replied the sergeant, "the men will quit."

"What do you mean by that, sergeant?"

"Well, sir, this battalion has been in twice, they have suffered heavy casualties, they haven't had much sleep, they haven't had enough food. Those things don't matter so much, but back there a ways is a battalion that hasn't been in at all, and our battalion thinks the reserve battalion should do its part."

Those men had practically agreed among themselves, perhaps even without talking about it, that they weren't going to stay in that woods, and within half an hour they began to come back. That wasn't mutiny. It was probably not even a concerted action. It was just a feeling among the men that they had stood all they could stand, at least compared with other organizations in that particular outfit; and they simply quit. They had lost confidence in their superiors. And as soon as troops do that, they are done. They should have been told clearly that the reserve battalion would have its full share of fighting to do later on.

About that same time, a brigade commander ordered one of his regiments to attack the next morning. Along in the evening about ten o'clock all the field officers of that regiment came to the CP to see the brigade commander. They said their men were tired and used up, that they had been in battle about four days without much sleep and with a good many casualties. They had not had many casualties, as an actual matter of fact. Casualties are a comparative thing; some think that ten or fifteen per cent is high, while others go up to fifty per cent.

These particular officers said, "The regiment is in no condition to fight; but we, the field officers of the regiment, in order to show that we are not afraid, will follow the barrage when it is laid down." "I know something about your regiment"; said the brigade commander. "it is not so badly off; our casualties have only been about twelve per cent—small compared to what some have stood. Your troops haven't had much sleep, but there are a lot of others who haven't had much sleep. The regiment will go in tomorrow notwithstanding what you gentlemen say. You have said it because you are tired or perhaps because you are over-sympathetic for the men under you. Think it over and come back in about an hour. The regiment is going in. There are enough captains in it who can act as field officers, and if they act as such in one battle they will probably act as such in all the rest. So you come back in a while and tell me what you think."

In an hour they had decided to make the try. They led their battalions next morning and the regiment did very well.

Here, a knowing leader read his battalion commanders aright, saw that their sympathies had outrun their judgment of what their men were still capable of doing. All good leaders take care of their men, but at the crisis of a

"In France, it was not the first attack, or the second, or third, but the last struggling fourth attack which did the work."

battle the sympathy of a man for himself and everybody under him has to be put aside, unless conditions actually are so bad that his unit is incapable of the job it is ordered to do.

But when the troops have given all that you could expect of them and more, they should be relieved if it can possibly be done. And here we have the other side: At Cantigny, half the officers of one regiment were killed or wounded, and about one-third of the men. The available enemy opposing us was many times our number. We had the wounded and dying among us and there was little to eat or drink. The men were getting shaky from fighting and fatigue. The colonel told the brigade commander that the regiment should be relieved that night because there were three other regiments that had suffered comparatively small losses. Things had become normal and the men needed sleep, food, and rest. They had accomplished what they went after, they had been in three days and nights, and there were those three other regiments that could go in. The general sent a staff officer down to look around.

"How many men have you?" he asked.

"About sixteen hundred," said the colonel. "My losses are eight hundred or so."

"You are pretty well off," said the staff officer.

"What do you mean, I'm pretty well off! Let me tell you one thing, and you put it right down in your notebook! These men have been fighting three days and three nights and they have been successful. But five of them are not worth now what one was worth when we came in. There are three other regiments that have had their sleep right along and almost no losses. It is an injustice not to relieve my men tonight."

They were relieved that night.

Morale Means Building Solidarity and Confidence

Solidarity and confidence, essential to morale, cannot be improvised. They are born of mutual trust between leader and led, which makes for pride and unity in an organization. And from unity comes in turn the feeling of force, the force that gives to the attacking men the courage and confidence, the domination of the will over instinct, even

in the greatest danger. It is this which finally leads to victory.

Confidence means just that. Hannibal, to inspire his troops with confidence, explained to them before each battle as much of his plan of action as he could without making it possible for treachery to injure him. All commanders should do that: give enough of the plan of action so that the troops can appreciate what the whole idea is. If you tell your men what you are going to do, that the job is going to be a hard one with many losses, but that nevertheless the job is going to be done, then, when gas comes down or perhaps some airplane bombs, your men will realize that you foresaw these difficulties. So they keep on in spite of them. But if you just give them fragmentary orders without any explanation at all, their confidence will be much less and they will be much more surprised when things go hard. This is especially true if subordinate commanders are afraid to go beyond the wording of their orders.

It is also well for a commander to give some warning to his troops of what may happen in a defense. In fact, it is the best protection against infiltration and surprise. The Germans infiltrated by finding some little place more or less unguarded and sending in a company, a regiment, or maybe a brigade, often secretly during the night, to get behind our elements. Then, when fire suddenly came from the rear of the American, French, or British forces, they were inclined to escape in a hurry. In their imaginations they would often think that ten times their own numbers were in their rear. At Blanc Mont, however, we expected infiltration and it came. But the troops were told about it ahead of time, and told, too, that we would pinch the enemy out because they could not infiltrate as many men as we had. Then infiltration didn't worry anybody particularly. The division was well organized and disciplined with high morale, and we simply placed two or three organizations on the flank or rear to hold off the infiltrating enemy.

Another time, after forcing the crossing of the Meuse River near Dun-sur-Meuse, a battalion attacked up a hill. The hill was shaped something like a shoe bottom up. Three companies had a hard time getting up the main hill in the fog. The fourth company, acting as a combat patrol, got farther out than it was intended to go and went up against the heel of the hill, which was a little higher than the rest of it. This company got clear to the top of the heel against light resistance, and found itself somewhat in rear of the main German position. In the main position, the Germans facing the other three American companies heard the fighting back on the heel and immediately retreated. As a matter of fact, they had a superiority of two to one and a splendid defensive position. Here was a case of surprise by accidental infiltration, but the enemy troops lacked the morale to stand a threatened envelopment. It takes "The Xth Legion" or some other finely disciplined organization to hold its morale in such situations. Such units have confidence in each other.

All such warning orders should be issued in plenty of time for subordinates to be prepared for their parts. Failure to do this was frequent in the AEF. Troops often saw rolling barrages move off toward the enemy before they knew anything about the hour of attack or their objective. Such failures kill morale. Troops have little confidence in their so-called leaders after these things happen a few times.

Another main morale destroyer is orders to do the impossible. What could be more disheartening than to be ordered to take an objective twenty kilometers back of the enemy's line when you and your whole command know that a gain of even five kilometers will take every ounce of energy left in your troops. A leader must be reasonable in his expectations and give objectives reasonably obtainable. It is best to say, "We hope to get So-and-So [the objective twenty kilometers away]; but by tonight we will get to that ridge. You can do that, and you will do it." And they probably will. But if you say "twenty kilometers" instead of "that ridge," knowing all the time there isn't a chance of getting there in a week, or perhaps in the whole war, don't blame anyone but yourself if most of your troops are satisfied to clamber into the first big shell hole and stay there. Every front line is largely composed of individuals or groups of two or three who can get into a hole and stay there if morale fails. There aren't any second lieutenants waving their swords and urging them on in modern warfare. If your troops don't want to advance, they won't. What you have to do is to get them in an attitude of mind of wanting to advance. That attitude must be there, in their minds, beforehand. And ordering the impossible is no way to put it there.

Building Morale by Direct Contact with Men

The ways of building morale available to a leader are manifold. Some I have already indicated; many are too well known to need comment. One or two, however, stand out in my mind.

For one thing, the commander who is also a genuine leader will be certain to mingle often with his men so that he may be known to them. He must be in the front lines frequently, and particularly when there is hard fighting. He must also see that hot food and supplies reach the troops whenever possible; and he must make the most thorough preparation for every contingency he can foresee. He must continually show an interest in and sympathy for his men and for their well-being. That is the only way to build up loyalty and confidence—morale—so that his command may be proud of its reputation.

A leader must also exhibit knowledge, energy, and resolution. He must punish those who deserve it as examples, but never in anger. And he must reward those that merit reward. If he does these things, then, when the signal for an attack goes up, and later when his command is more than wearied and more than decimated, his troops will keep on attacking and the number of those who try to avoid battle will be small.

In combat itself the leader must be where he is most

needed, and this place common sense will dictate. It is always best, however, to err on the side of being well up among the troops and taking personal command in emergencies rather than staying too far back with the idea of keeping in touch with the higher command. Only by such forward contact can the commander be of any real use as a leader. This keeps morale at its highest.

One particular morale builder sadly neglected in the early stages of the World War was the value of immediate recognition after any heroic action by an organization or an individual. I had once a very nasty order to give, as commander of a regiment. We had made two or three raids but all had come back empty-handed—the Germans had been pulling back at night and putting out intelligence posts in the daytime. But down from the French Army commander came the same old order again: "Must have prisoners." High command thought the Germans were shifting troops to the British front for a drive.

So I had to tell the major in command of the advance battalion, "We are going to get prisoners tonight. You will send an officer, with not less than five nor more than fifty men, who will go into the enemy's line and not come back without prisoners."

That was a pretty hard order. The major asked for volunteers and an intelligence officer, Lieutenant George B. Redwood, volunteered. He took five men and went nearly to the enemy's third line, got four prisoners and brought them back. Within three days the French had paraded the whole division and given the raiding group the Croix de Guerre. Recommendation was immediately made for the Distinguished Service Cross. Redwood was killed at Cantigny about two months afterward, but he hadn't received his DSC. It was awarded after his death, but it was of no good to him then nor did such delay add to the morale of his organization.

These are a few of the things that leaders can do to build morale. It is also possible, though not always, to restore morale in a unit that from one cause or another has lost it. Perhaps I can best use another World War example to show this.

During the Meuse-Argonne attack progress was halted for a time. In some organizations the men were in a pretty low state and it looked as if they might have to be taken out for the rest of the war—as some whole divisions were. But it was announced instead that if they captured a certain objective they would be reinforced and that none of the units would be withdrawn. After a man has been beaten three or four times, you have to give him a taste of victory. So these troops were given a few easy jobs to restore their morale and put the idea in their minds that they weren't completely downed. One night, soon afterward, they took Aincreville and took it with bayonets and without artillery preparation. They seemed astonished that they could do it. The next day they took Doulcon, more or less by surprise, and then a few other little towns. We

"Now, his mental and physical powers are tried for long hours and days, and in such a test, he has but the resoluteness of his own heart to sustain him."

knew they could take them if they had the confidence—if they knew they were going to be backed up. Soon they began to feel they could win for sure, and you saw quite a different air about them, even within a few days. When it came time for them to get orders to cross the Meuse River, they *knew* they could do it and they did do it remarkably well.

The attempt to restore confidence must be made through a succession of little steps. As Foch says, you have to "play a new tune." If you get licked at one thing two or three times, don't try it again. At Blanc Mont, General Gouraud said, "I am going to order the AA and BB Corps to attack on the right and left of the American 2d

Division, but it is my impression that since they have been three times repulsed on the same terrain by the same enemy and are themselves unchanged, the chances are that they will not go far."

Morale of the Leader Himself

Up to this point I have written mainly of the morale of troops and not so much of the morale of the leader himself. As a general thing, of course, if an organization has high morale there is little question but that the leader has it too. The troops get it mainly from their commander. But there are a good many things that can adversely affect the morale of even high commanders, and some that can destroy it completely. Approaching or actual physical or mental breakdown is naturally a most important item in this regard.

You will find in general that when commanders were relieved in the AEF they were not relieved after the first day's attack, but after the second or third day, when they were suffering from fatigue, lack of sleep, and perhaps nervousness as to what the enemy would do next, or lack of confidence in their own troops. One division commander, talking to a corps commander, pounded on the table and said his division was not going to make an attack the next day. But it did attack the next day and did good work. The division commander had lost confidence. He didn't know how much his troops could still do or even what their condition was.

Another regimental commander was down in the mouth because he had not been made a brigadier when he had good reason to expect it. I happened to take over the brigade he was in, and the division commander called my attention to him. So I told him, "Higher authority has warned me you are in a depressed condition and that it is affecting your regiment. We are going into battle in two days and if you can't brace up and get a little more spirit into your regiment, I will relieve you and you will never get another command. But if you can buck up and put the spirit into your regiment that should be there, if I can do it, I will have you made a brigadier." That man came to himself and his regiment did splendid work. It lost nearly forty per cent in killed and wounded at Soissons. A few days later he was made a brigadier.

In the AEF commanders from corps down to regiments were relieved for various causes. Some assumed authority that belonged to higher commanders, or were improperly critical of them, or even disloyal. Others reported their commands unfit for combat because they were tired or discouraged themselves. Still others kept to their dugouts when critical conditions demanded that they be up with their troops in order to take immediate and effective action against panic or defeat. *Fearing what higher authority might think instead of using the proper common sense and initiative of a leader probably wrecked more commanders than any other one thing.*

Higher authority generally gave plenty of latitude to subordinates—but they often failed to use it. The principle to go by here is that considerable latitude should be given to commanders on the spot, according to their rank and experience, and that commanders should be perfectly willing to assume the responsibility of asking themselves (and acting in accordance with the answer): What would my superior do if he were here and knew the circumstances that I know? Of course, for not complying or delaying compliance with orders the subordinate has the burden of proof that ordinary judgment and reason dictated it. Sometimes this is a hazardous thing to do, but there are frequent cases where proper leadership requires it. Always, however, the superior issuing the orders should be at once advised. Any officer receiving an order that he believes to be given under misapprehension as to conditions with which he is himself cognizant, must immediately inform his superior of these conditions. If he is afraid to do so, he either lacks confidence in himself or in the true leadership of his superior.

A division commander in France was ordered at about 1:00 p.m. to cross the Meuse River and the Canal de l'Est at 4:00 p.m. on the same day. He had been on the spot for some time, and informed the staff officer who was issuing the instructions in the presence of the corps commander, that he had reconnoitered the crossing of the Meuse for fords and crossing places and for enemy positions with forces up to two companies in size; that the ravine was full of enemy machine guns and that the enemy's artillery was in force behind the heights of the Meuse within two kilometers of the river; that he believed the crossing might be accomplished at 7:00 p.m. after dusk; but that from his experience on the spot, he thought an attack at 4:00 p.m. would not only lack surprise but would probably fail. The staff officer, however, stated it was so important to cut the Mézières-Metz railroad that the daylight attack should be made. The time was so short that only fragmentary orders could be given. One brigade did not receive its orders because the messengers to it were killed, and did not move at all. The other brigade attacked. The commander of the leading battalion was killed and some two or three hundred officers and men were casualties by the time the troops took cover.

At 7:00 p.m. the attack was resumed as the division commander originally recommended, and it was successful. In this case, the commander on the spot was overruled by the judgment of a staff officer unfamiliar with local conditions but authorized by a higher commander—very properly—to give any necessary orders. Though this was a splendid staff officer, I do not believe, had the higher commander himself been present, that he would have taken the same action.

It does the morale of leaders great harm to be constantly feeling that the axe may fall at any time for no good reason. Mature judgment should be used in relieving commanders for inefficiency. Every commander is bound to have under him a certain number of mediocre officers who will improve reasonably under proper instruction and guidance. Besides, trading one mediocre officer for another, as may often happen, is a bad trade. Nothing is gained, much is lost.

Conclusion

Because of our slow system of promotion and the lack of real selection in our army, we will go into any future war with the higher command filled with men as a whole too old. The command of armies and even corps, and some higher staff positions, may be efficiently held by older officers—General Pershing told me he would prefer division commanders not over fifty.

Time is a vital element in war, and war is a ruthless thing. Individuals may have to be sacrificed. The sorting out to obtain the best leaders in our next war must be done early, and without fear, favor, or affection. The younger officers, both line and staff, should be selected for higher command according to their success in battle—without waiting too long. These are the men who have the confidence of their subordinates, who know how to keep their troops supplied, bring them into battle under the most favorable conditions, direct them well in battle, take greatest advantage of success, and minimize the effects of setbacks; men not afraid to take the initiative due in their position, always loyal to their superiors but not afraid of them either. Watch should be kept also for the leader who may never have had a military education but is nevertheless a natural leader. Only thus can we find the leaders that will instil a high morale.

Never for a second should it be forgotten that combat is the objective, the cause of being and the supreme manifestation of armies. Every measure that departs from that thought—that relegates it to the middle ground—is fatal. All the resources accumulated in time of peace, all the tactical evolutions, all the strategical calculations are but conveniences, reference marks to lead up to it. Fundamentally, man is the potent force. He is the incomparable instrument whose elements, character, energies, sentiments, fears, desires, and instincts, are stronger than all abstract rules; than all bookish theories. The inspirations that reveal and mark the great strategists, the leaders of men, form the imponderable element, the divine part.

It is the mind that wins battles, that will always win them, that always has won them throughout the world's history. The spirituality, the moral quality of war, has not changed. Mechanics, modern arms, all the artillery, gas, tanks, aircraft, etc., invented by man and his science, will not make an end to this thing, so lightly considered at the moment and called the human soul.

No calling other than the true military profession so excites brain activity. It is preëminently the calling of action, at the same time diverse in its combinations and changing according to the time and locality in which it is put to practice. No other profession is more complex or more difficult, since our own has for its aim and reason the instruction of men to overcome by training and endurance the fatigue and perils against which the voice of self-preservation is raised in fear—in other words, to draw from nature what is most opposed to this nature.

Our army school system is most excellent and gives all the technical and theoretical knowledge needed for a higher commander or a higher staff officer. The right kind of tactics is not improvised. It asserts itself on the battlefield in the presence of the enemy, but it is learned before the enemy is encountered. But studies of the causes of success or failure in battle, other things being approximately equal, show that true leadership was present or absent, and that resolution—not easy to teach in schools—often failed just too soon.

We must also learn to distrust mathematics and material dynamics as applied to battle principles. We must learn to beware of illusions drawn from the target range and the maneuver field. For there we deal with the calm, settled, unfatigued, attentive, obedient soldier; in short with an intelligent and tractable man-instrument, and not with the nervous, easily swayed, moved, troubled, distrait, excited, restless being, who is the fighting man from general to private in war. It is this difference that requires morale, and the true leadership that creates it. This is the thing of highest importance in the conduct of war.

"The human material is at hand; our deficiencies in weapons are now being supplied through funds provided by the last Congress. But if this nation should be called to enter war, the price in blood and tears would still be high if our training program is not completely revised, expanded and developed. A small but permanent field army, with complete staffs and proper organization should be maintained and kept concentrated in two or three large areas in the United States."—Editorial comment, *New York Times*, on First Army Maneuvers.

Staff and Combat LEADERSHIP



By Agrippa II

What, in reality, is the prime purpose of an army? That purpose, obviously and stentorianly, is to fight. What are the units of measure, the scale, by which a skeptic may evaluate the degree to which an army is prepared to fulfill that rôle? Trained combat units, immediately available reserves, organization, doctrine, modern implements of warfare, geography, resources, potential reserves, balanced forces, leadership—all and scores of other factors go to make up that scale. But again, if the purpose of an army is to fight, what is the ultimate objective of its combat? Once more, in military parlance, that objective is said to be the destruction of the hostile will to resist.

There are a multitude of factors which make up an armed force, but what in the end is the definite manner in which the power of that force is actually applied? Just what are the factors and the action which go to break down a hostile will to resist? Is it a high public morale backing a nation's armed forces? Is it the availability of endless reserves? Coming down to brass tacks, does the answer not lie in the simple proposition of applying directly to a hostile people the final accomplishment of an organized national effort in the way of hot lead, cold steel, bombs and shells?

The various channels and agencies through which the real force of a major power is finally made effective are many in scope and function. We find super planning bodies whose responsibilities and purposes are widespread over a vast network of overlapping and intertwining activities—economic, procurement, processing, production, transportation, etc. Coming closer to the real application of direct power and force in a military effort we find a higher staff whose activities cover the scope and function of both planning and operating. Eventually we come down to the actual field and combat leadership whose responsibility it is to furnish the direct force and pressure which means success or failure. Who can say which prerogative of the foregoing agencies involves the greater importance or higher responsibility? Certainly, in modern war the power of an entire nation must be organized and exerted; that power must be organized and directed but its final effect on hostile resistance is felt only upon its real application through combat.

Have we been giving to those individuals upon whom will fall the burden of combat the intangible endowments and benefits which their position demands?

The major planning agencies such as a War Resources Board do not fall strictly within the military fold. The higher staff agencies and personnel thereof do come within the full purview of the military organization. Our major schools have been founded and operated upon the premise of furnishing adequately trained personnel for those duties that fall within that echelon of the military team. So important have we considered training for that duty that attendance at our two major schools has become, impressionalistically, a paramount mark in a military career. Now arises a question which should be honestly considered. Have we raised the performance of staff duty to a pinnacle far beyond its just comparison with successful troop leadership? Have we created, inadvertently, the fetish that staff duty is the final and highest goal of military duty? Have we placed upon assignment to that duty a badge or symbol of superlative professional attainment out of all proportion to duty in connection with command or service with troops? Has service with troops been rated on the same scale as service on the staff. Some few years back when attendance at the Command and General Staff School appeared imperative to a military record the individuals who were selected for the course at that time made up a class to which others referred as the 3-A class; Aides, adjutants, and just common A's. Although the touch of humor applied to this reference, it was supported by the thought that those who had been privileged to serve on staffs had received more consideration than those whose service had been more consistently

with troops. In short, for the average mind, have we not, during the past two decades, concentrated on perfecting a highly efficient staff at the expense of overlooking or neglecting the importance that should be accorded successful command performance?

There is no intent here of reflecting on the transcendent importance of staff duty. In fact, it is readily admitted that under ordinary circumstances the good staff officer will make a good commander; and conversely, a good commander will make a good staff officer. In truth, the best commander is one who can make full use of a trained staff because of his understanding of staff procedure and function. The question, therefore, naturally arises that if we have emphasized the importance of staff duty and minimized or neglected the vital necessity of proving command capacity, from what source do we expect to draw for our field commanders? It has been said that the average military organization can function under a poor commander with a good staff, more so than under a good commander with a poor staff. No issue is taken with such a contention, but there is no reason in the American army why we should not be assured always of good commanders operating with good staffs. If it is true that a certain prestige accrues to assignment to staff duty, has the time not come to attach the same modicum of military virtue to proven command capacity? It should be acknowledged by all that the highest military attainment falls to those individuals who have exemplified ability and capacity in command of troops.

Assignment to command should involve that same intangible accolade of military attainment as is now indirectly and inscrutably paid to staff duty. Duty with troops should be regarded as an outstanding opportunity. Can it be said that any such regard is held for this type of duty under current or past conditions? Have we not reserved the pleasant features incident to post life, which goes with duty with troops, for many who have displayed little capacity in many of the rôles which present day officers must be prepared to fulfill? So long as post life is more or less synonymous with troop duty, its accompanying rewards should be considered a matter of professional compensation leading to an opportunity for the greatest military function—command duty.

In the days of hand-to-hand combat leaders sprang from the din and havoc of battle. In truth, even in our modern highly industrialized and mechanized warfare a very considerable proportion of our combat leaders will arise on the battlefield. In no wise does such a supposition lessen the fact that command is a military art. Like all arts, perfection comes only from constant practice. Able leadership in our army cannot be expected to be developed from a few scattered details with troops, frequently with intervals of ten to fifteen years between such opportunities. Proven command capacity should be held in such high regard that the same degree of effort will be found on the part of most individuals to participate in it as is now found in the tendency to seek and prefer staff duty.

The seeds of success in command leadership are many and scattered. Assuredly the knowledge of weapons, organization, administration, and other factors are important; but more important, is that indefinable touch of handling men. To handle men it is first necessary to understand men, and for us particularly, American men. It is firmly believed that in the collective American citizenship we have basically the finest combat material in the world if properly trained and led. There is, of actuality, an American psychology—the finer and better points of which are understood only through frequent and constant contact. These men ask only to be led; only to be shown how. Our task is to know primarily those essentials which should be imparted and the priority of their importance. In the citizen army of the future there will be no time nor need for barrack square methods of the Prussian type, which induce a discipline built on fear. The discipline in our armies will come through leadership based on loyalty and esprit de corps. It is this type of leadership which produces the will to close with the enemy.

It is only duty in the field which imbues one with the ability to cope with the unexpected and the abnormal. It is possible that our unexcelled school system may build up an unconscious psychosis of dealing always with complete units, perfectly trained ranks, normal weather conditions, and always an uninterrupted system of adequate supply. The future leader is entitled to encounter more frequently the absence of these school-like conveniences and to be faced more with the reality incident to the failures of the human factor and the uncertainties of weather, mechanical failures, and confusion of darkness.

It is possible that any lack of enthusiasm which exists for duty with troops may reside in the absence of facilities for any progressive or considerable training which most of our establishments provide. A few years service amid the restrictive influences of small posts may have inculcated a distaste for frequent repetition. Many may recall the legends of dry rot in small battalion posts of pre-war days. Many officers of junior rank may recount too often months of duty under local training conditions where post administration outweighed in many respects any emphasis or attention paid to training matters.

The problem of progressive and illuminating training objectives may have much to do with any lack of enthusiasm toward troop duty. Have we established a system which assures the attention to training which its importance deserves? Has our staff organization and its recognized operative functions added to that deficiency if it does exist? In what way could staff function affect progressive training? Might it be said that staff organization, liberalized to include not only planning but operations, has brought about such deficiencies? One might say that a staff confined to planning draws up ideas and prescriptions which are passed on to others for execution. If the staff in addition to planning is also operating, what is the machinery which assures subsequent check-up and insists on a proper execution? The War Department Staff is frequently accused of being too operative. When that state-

ment is made, does the assertion convey the thought that projects are prescribed for which there is no adequate check of progress? In other words, if the training section is disseminating definite directives for doctrine and methods, in what manner are final results checked and evaluated? Is any attempt being made to assure uniformity of practice? Is it true, as many contend, that training methods and doctrines are a matter of locality and arenas of instructions; that is, is there any assurance that service schools and the Command and General Staff School are in accord in teaching and insisting on approved and accepted methods and doctrines? Are the troops in the field following those principles disseminated at our schools? Have we any genuine uniformity of training methods and objectives?

Many years ago the Inspector General's Department was charged with checking and inspecting the training proficiency of combat troops. That rôle has now been taken from that department. The Corps Area Commander is now charged with this duty and obligation. In what manner is this responsibility being covered under this new system? Can a Corps Area Commander on an annual visit of one or two days to the average garrison really determine the true status of training which exists? Can the War Department, with only spasmodic visits by staff members to the field, affect any genuine control or influence on our progress in training and preparedness for combat?

If there is a lack of uniformity in training and training standards, where does the fault lie and what facilities are available which might result in remedial actions? There is set up as a part of the War Department, Chiefs of combatant arms. It would appear that their measure of responsibilities and functions lie mainly in a general supervision and distribution of personnel together with a remote control of training doctrines through supervision of respective service schools. These offices also have considerable effect in the adoption of improved matériel and also the general type organization in which their arms may be involved. To assure uniformity of training within a particular branch it would appear that these chiefs of arms could render a constructive and useful purpose if given the added responsibility of performing the rôle of Inspector General of their troops in the field. Who should know better whether a regiment of any arm is properly and reasonably trained than the Chief of that arm? In no wise would this new duty impose any restriction upon a Corps Area Commander. By the very nature of the term, a Corps Area is an administrative entity rather than a tactical unity. In the event of war the function of the Corps Areas becomes entirely administrative. In fact, the annual inspection by the Corps Area Commander is devoted in no small measure to administrative features. In no way can it be assumed that with nine Corps Areas there is any common standard of training—nor any definite goal toward training objectives. Nor can it be assumed that with the various and manifold interests involved in the administration of a Corps Area that commanders thereof should all be interested in the same factors. Construction, local repairs, routine administration, all take their toll of time and interest.

Perhaps, also, lack of appreciable units with which to operate at the average post has discouraged frequent tours of duty with troops. Housekeeping demands and overhead tend to reduce tactical ranks to the point where little is left for progressive and satisfactory results along training lines. Due to lack of general army-wide objectives there is little at which to shoot from the point of view of an active and imaginative troop commander.

Are we not still an army of battalions and regiments rather than divisions? This mental proclivity is manifested in various ways. It is told that in the recent First Army Maneuvers an infantry brigade commander with an artillery battalion attached over a period of several days was ordinarily so preoccupied with operations confined to the infantry that he overlooked repeatedly the presence and availability of his attached artillery; in fact, on more than one occasion orders for an advance or a movement overlooked entirely the artillery—on one occasion the infantry marched off leaving the artillery in position. An incident of that type is made possible only from the lack of advantages and opportunities which we have in dealing with combined arms. On the average smaller infantry and cavalry posts, how often is it supposed that the normal problem involves or considers any probable action visualizing the presence of supporting artillery or the assistance which might be rendered by friendly combat aviation? Occasional opportunities every three or four years for our troops to engage in combined efforts are not enough. Our mental attitude should widen to include those operations, which, in war, will become realities. Furthermore, the necessary control, direction, and inspection should exist to see that that type of operations are frequently and periodically developed. We speak of night marches, night assemblies, river crossings, defensive positions and a score of others; but how often do our troops actually engage in them? Delaying action presupposes foxholes and minor earthworks—but how seldom is any unit tested in its ability to demonstrate its adequacy in this vein?

Do we not continue to be a housekeeping army and not a combat army?

A foreign observer has commented that a peculiarity he noted in America was that we do not seem to pursue in peace those activities which we will be called upon to perform in war.

War is a-field in the world today. Are we training to that end? Are we producing leaders who can utilize troops and staffs for their final and definite object in being—COMBAT?

POLAND BETWEEN TWO CAMPS



EDITOR'S NOTE: *Modern Age Books of New York, has recently published a book under the title, "Military Strength of the Powers," reviewed in this issue of The* CAVALRY JOURNAL. *This volume was written under the nom de plume, "Max Werner," and translated by Edward Fitzgerald. As a foreword the publishers state, "The author of this book is a noted military authority who cannot use his own name because of the possible reflection on relatives in his native land." Certain extracts are presented herewith dealing with military affairs in Poland. These extracts furnish an illuminating light in an explanatory analysis of recent events.*

After the great continental military powers, the Soviet Union, Germany and France, Poland is next in importance for the alignment of forces and the military position in a European war. It is not so much a question of Poland's military strength as of the strategical importance of Poland's territorial position. The whole World War as far as it took place on the Eastern front was fought out within the frontiers of what is now Poland. The territorial features of Europe have not altered since the World War, and whether Poland enters the next war on the side of Germany or on the side of a European defensive coalition will make no difference to the fact that the decision in Eastern Europe will be fought out on Polish territory.

Poland's situation between Germany and the Soviet Union has become critical since she began to act as an auxiliary to National Socialist Germany. Poland's security was formerly based on German disarmament, on her alliance with France and on the League of Nations as an arbitrator in European affairs. That security no longer exists. Poland would be helpless in face of the overwhelming military strength of Germany without the military support of France and the Soviet Union. The hope of establishing a military alliance with Poland persuaded Germany to launch an active policy of conquest in Eastern Europe. The whole of Eastern Europe has been undermined, and Poland herself is directly threatened.

At the same time her military situation is steadily deteriorating. She is situated between the two strongest military powers in continental Europe, and it must be borne in mind that the difference in war strength as between the strong and the weaker powers is becoming increasingly great. Seven or eight years ago Poland's military situation between her two great neighbors was more or less tolerable. As against a Germany which had not yet re-armed Poland had her bigger effectives and her larger number of trained reserves. Germany's powerful industrial potential for war purposes was made up to some extent by Poland's freedom to arm. Before the industrialization of the Soviet Union the Polish Army was more or less on the same technical level as the Red Army; there was a possibility of comparison in equality. However, in a decade the situation has completely changed. Germany's powerful re-armament and the modernization of the Red Army make Poland's military position hopelessly weak. The more Poland's relative strength towards her two powerful neighbours declined, in 1933-38, the more ambiguous Polish foreign policy became, and in consequence the more tense the position in Eastern Europe. Poland is developing into an area of high pressure: the strongest concentrations of military strength ever seen in Europe are massing on her Western and Eastern frontiers. Poland is being encircled by steel cyclones.

Poland's army represents the usual "East European army type." General von Metzsch defines this type of army as consisting of "millions of *superficially trained men* whose technical equipment is very considerably behind that of the Western European powers."[1] "West" and "East" as a description of army types has lost its territorial significance. In this respect, the "West" now lies East of Poland as well, because the Red Army is on the same high technical level as the armies of Western Europe, and in many respects it even exceeds it. The Polish Army has had no share in the revolutionary technical developments of the past decade. Generally speaking its structure is still that of the European armies of 1930. The Polish Army has remained at a standstill; it has not kept pace with military technical development.

[1]General von Metzsch, "*Die Entwicklungstendenzen des Krieges*," published in the compendium of the Inter-parliamentary Union. Geneva 1932, p. 43.

The following features are characteristic of the "East European army type," i.e., the Polish Army and the armies of the Balkan States: they are supported by weak war potentials, and small and not very efficient war industries with backward technique. General Sikorski, the greatest military authority in Poland, never fails to stress the effects of industrial weakness on armaments, and he certainly has his own country in mind. A country like Poland with weak war industries must rapidly become exhausted in war. It is not in a position to make full use of its man-power reserves, and it is compelled to pile up large quantities of war material because it knows that in the event of war it cannot reckon with any very considerable increase in production. General Sikorski declares:

"Poland must not base her military strategy on the hope that her enemy will become exhausted, because in the event of a long war the time factor will work against her and in favour of the enemy."[2]

Weak war industries mean weakness in modern weapons: motorization, tanks and the air arm, in other words the absolute certainty of defeat against any enemy with modern equipment. A number of reliable witnesses have given evidence on the armament and supplies of the Polish Army. In 1935 *"Le Document"* of Paris, a pro-Polish organ, published a special number dealing with the armies of Europe, and supplies with a preface by General Weygand, whose name is sufficient guarantee of authenticity. General Weygand, former Chief of the French General Staff, and military adviser to the Polish General Staff during the Polish-Soviet War, can hardly be suspected of pronouncing an unnecessarily harsh verdict on the Polish Army. However, the judgement of *"Le Document"* is very pessimistic:

"Unfortunately the Polish Army suffers severely from the general financial shortage which oppresses the country as a whole. This fact influences the modernization of the army and its equipment with modern war material, and it affects its technical quality. Polish armament is weak, and it is to be feared that in the event of mobilization the equipment of the reserves will be still weaker. Polish industry has only very limited possibilities. In consequence the leaders of the army rely on the endurance, training and intelligence of their troops, and concentrate too much on the factor of manœuvre without paying sufficient attention to the factor of fire-power. This is particularly the case with regard to the Polish cavalry which seems dazzled by a glorious tradition, and apparently still expects the old-time charge and cut-and-thrust fighting. Owing to lack of finance there has been no motorization of the army, and there are very few tanks available."[3]

German military publications have expressed similar opinions, and their judgement is of particular weight because they still regard Poland as a possible ally. The *"Deutsche Wehr"* writes:

"An examination of the present state of the Polish Army reveals the fact that those modern weapons which are generally regarded to-day as decisive, the air arm and the armoured units, are only weakly represented."[4]

And the same journal refers quite openly to the "deterioration" of the Polish Army in relation to the rapid increase in military strength of Germany and the Soviet Union.

There is no doubt about the considerable numerical strength of the Polish Army. Poland takes fifth place in the military hierarchy of continental Europe. The peace-time strength of the Polish Army is 30 Infantry Divisions and 15 Cavalry Brigades. The numerical strength of the Polish Army on a war footing is given by Soviet sources as between 60 and 70 Infantry Divisions. However, the significance of these figures is reduced by two factors: the length of the front on which they will have to fight, and their insufficient fire-power. In the considered opinion of a French military publication,[5] the Polish Army would not be strong enough to man an uninterrupted front in the main theatre of war, and, in any case, it could certainly not hold its front line at a strength at all comparable with the Western front during the World War.

The technical basis for the motorization of the Polish Army is very weak. In 1937 Poland had only 20,000 motor-cars, 5,900 lorries and 900 tractors. In 1935-38 Polish industry produced only 700 light and medium tanks, and 500 tankettes. Soviet sources assume that in the event of war the Polish Army might have between 1,000 and 1,200 tanks, 1,200 tankettes, between 600 and 700 armoured cars, and about 1,000 tractors. In 1938 there were still no big moto-mechanized units in the Polish Army, and by no means all Divisions had moto-mechanized or tank units attached. Cadres had been established around which it was hoped in the event of war to form moto-mechanized units, that was all. There are plans to extend the Tank Corps and to form 2 or 3 Motorized Divisions, but there can be no question of forming any motorized shock army. Any attempts to motorize the Polish Army will be hampered by the low productive capacity of the Polish automobile industry. The *"Deutsch Wehr"* even records a tendency towards demotorization in Poland, and points out that there has been a reduction in the sum total of motor transport. A Polish government organ writes as follows:

"Apart from the splendid carriage of some detachments our military parades on May 3rd were parades of our deficiency in motorization. A few dozen small tanks and detachments of motor cyclists—that is far too little for our times."

In 1938 the Polish aero-industry produced between 800 and 1,000 aeroplanes. The quality of certain types (particularly the fighter plane) is believed to be high. Even in 1935 the Polish Army had one very good fighter plane type, the PZL24, which had a speed of over 260 miles an hour. To-day there is a light and a medium bomber of this type with a speed of almost 240 miles an

[2] General Sikorski, *"La guerre moderne,"* Paris 1935, pp. 108, 200 and 218.

[3] *"Le Document,"* November, 1935, p. 21. *"L'Europe en armes"* by Colonel X with a preface by General Weygand.

[4] *"Deutsche Wehr,"* May 7th, 1936.

[5] *"Revue d'Infanterie,"* January, 1936.

hour. However, the productive capacity of the aero-industry is limited. Reserves are low and Poland cannot reckon with any rapid increase of aeroplane production in the event of war. The Polish air arm consists of about 1,400 machines, of which, however, only between 600 and 700 are first-line planes, i.e., planes which could be used in modern air warfare. It is therefore too small to be used as an independent air army with its own strategic tasks. According to a Soviet source[6] the total bomb load of the Polish air arm is no more than 70 tons, i.e., very small indeed compared with the offensive possibilities of Western air forces, and quite insignificant compared with the bomb salvo of the Red Air Force. Thus aggressive operations in the air do not come into question at all for the Polish Army, and at the same time the weakness of the Polish fighter squadrons makes it impossible to hope for adequate defence against air attack. In a war against Germany or the Soviet Union the mastery of the air would immediately belong to Poland's enemy. Poland would be absolutely helpless against the Red Air Force, for example. This fact is recognized by German experts, and Colonel von Bülow[7] writes that Poland would fall a helpless victim to the attacks of Russian bombers.

The biggest weakness of the Polish Army is thus its lack of modern offensive weapons. The operative instructions of the Polish Army for the use of the air arm, tanks and artillery provide for norms which are on an average only one-third of the corresponding French norms.[8] Compared with the Red Army or with the German Army the weakness of the Polish Army in this respect is still more striking. It may be assumed that in aeroplanes and tanks the Polish Army has about one-tenth of the strength of the Red Army on a peace-time footing, and about one-tenth of the strength of the German Army on a war footing.

The pride of the Polish Army, and its élite corps, is the cavalry, which is the second strongest in Europe. In the opinion of Polish military leaders this arm must be particularly strengthened owing to the length of the frontiers to be defended, the lack of transport facilities, and the necessity of greater mobility. Polish military leadership professes to regard independent Cavalry Brigades as the highly mobile and independent units best suited for the purposes of mobile defence, strategic reconnaissance and attack with subsequent pursuit.[9] *The difference between Polish and Soviet cavalry is very great indeed. For the Polish Army cavalry is a substitute for motorization, whilst for the Red Army it is only a supplement to motorization.* Polish cavalry still consists of nothing but mounted men in the traditional sense, whilst Soviet cavalry has been greatly strengthened by the attachment of motorized units, and trained for combined operations in coöperation with big tank formations, air squadrons and artillery. Writing in Polish military publications Colonel Przeglovski demands the setting up of mixed cavalry formations supplemented by artillery and motorized troops,[10] but no practical steps in this direction have yet been taken. *Polish cavalry is thus numerically strong and highly mobile but weak in fire-power, and not supported by modern offensive weapons.*

Polish military strategy stresses the importance of manœuvring and offensive capacity. It cannot be denied that its ideas and plans are enterprising, but they have very little material basis. General Römer gives us the following characteristic description of Poland's war doctrine:

"Our general strategic situation at the beginning of the war will be favourable, and therefore from the very opening of hostilities we must prosecute the war as actively and rapidly as possible in order to bring it to a victorious conclusion as quickly as possible. At the beginning of the war we and our enemies will be operating in enormous areas with poor transport facilities. Our principles must be taken from the lessons of the Napoleonic wars, from the first battles of the World War (particularly on the Eastern front), and from the last Russo-Polish War. Our salvation lies in a war of movement."[11]

However, between the methods recommended by General Römer and the means at the disposal of the Polish Army there is an obvious discrepancy. Such manœuvring and offensive strategy pursued by Poland would be ineffective and aimless to-day. It might be possible against Lithuania or Roumania, but not against the Soviet Union or Germany. If such strategy is used against a numerically superior enemy equipped with modern offensive weapons, an enemy such as Poland has both in the West and in the East, *it must lead straight to a catastrophe*. Poland's two possible opponents are respectively numerically threefold (Germany) and more than fourfold (the Soviet Union) superior to the Polish Army, and technically (particularly modern offensive weapons) they are approximately ten times as strong. Against such opponents Poland's air strategy is not applicable at all. Polish strategy is one of manœuvring on foot and on horseback coupled with a deside to take the offensive, but with weak fire-power and very few modern offensive weapons. Against powerful opponents in the West and in the East such a strategy would be nothing but a helpless academic manœuvre *rapidly leading to complete collapse*. A French military publication[12] describes the principles of operative procedure according to Polish strategy as follows: the greatest possible rapidity of manœuvring, offensive action even on the part of isolated troop units, preparedness to operate even with uncovered flanks, and the organization of centres of resistance with a mere watch on the gaps between these centres. The terrible risks involved in such

[6] "*Voina i Revolutsia*," September-October, 1935, p. 101.

[7] Colonel von Bülow in the "*Militärwissenschaftliche Rundschau*," December, 1936, p. 816.

[8] Uralski, "Break-through Operations" in "*Voina i Revolutsia*," May-June, 1935, p. 97.

[9] Arsamassov, "Cavalry in Future Warfare" in "*Voina i Revolutsia*," September-October, 1935, pp. 103-112.

[10] Colonel Przeglovski in "*Bellona*," the leading Polish military publication, particularly in the November number 1934.

[11] Quoted in the Czech military organ "*Voienska Rozhledy*" 1935, Vol. V.

[12] "*Revue d'Infanterie*," January, 1936, pp. 86-91.

strategy against an enemy of superior strength are obvious. *When enemy moto-mechanized units penetrate without difficulty into these gaps between the Polish centres of resistance like steel arms, split the Polish front and exploit their superiority in mobility and fire-power to carry out flanking blows and encirclement operations,* the sudden collapse of Polish resistance is only a matter of a short time. When Pilsudski developed this strategy of "open spaces" of *"Plein air,"* as he called it, he had not the faintest idea of what a tremendous superiority the German and Red Armies would one day enjoy thanks to their modern mobile and armoured technique.

The technical backwardness of the Polish Army is irreparable, and it is becoming fatal for Polish strategy, which is now trying to make a virtue of necessity, developing into strategy pure and simple without consideration to the conditions of modern scientific warfare. Polish strategy affects to regard modern technique with contempt, as very sour grapes, and writing in *"Bellona,"* Colonel Missor declares that whoever abandons the real art of war to descend to the level of military materialism must sooner or later be defeated despite the fact that he may be well prepared technically. The art of manœuvring cannot make up for a lack of strength and technique, particularly as the higher war technique of the enemy naturally has its own art of manœuvring, and a more developed one at that. The Polish war doctrine thinks in out-of-date terms; it fails to take the technical revolution in modern warfare into account, *and it refuses to see the rapid advance of the German Army,* and the tremendous technical progress of the Red Army. Polish strategy was possible in 1920 because the Red Army was numerically weak and poorly armed, and it might have been possible against the German Reichswehr of 1920-30, which possessed no trained reserves and no modern technique, but against the Red Army and the German Army of to-day it would be the height of folly.

Polish strategy has one further organic defect: it has no political basis, and operatively it is therefore suspended in mid air. For years Polish strategy has been in ignorance of the direction in which its main preliminary blow would have to be delivered in the event of war. *Polish strategy has been unable to draw up any carefully prepared war plan* because the ambiguity of Polish foreign policy has given it no definite direction. The Polish foreign policy which facilitated the tremendous re-armament of National Socialist Germany, and was in part responsible for what the German Military publication we have quoted terms "the deterioration of the Polish Army," has also robbed Polish strategy of any solid operative basis. The decisive conditions for any war plan still remain unsettled: the theatre of war and the policy of military alliances. Criticizing the vague strategic conceptions put forward by General Sikorski in his book, the organ of the Soviet Commissariat for Defence declares succinctly:

"An operative plan must have a political basis. To have a definite plan of operation presupposes a definite foreign-political standpoint. The political ambiguity of Poland makes any precise strategical conceptions impossible."[13]

In view of Poland's weakness in war technique her strategy must reconcile itself to taking part in the coming war on the side of one of its powerful neighbors against the other. According to General Römer it appears that Polish strategy supposes the prosecution of the coming war on Soviet territory, but even then any such operations would be carried out by Polish troops according to German strategic conceptions and not according to those of the Polish General Staff.

No comparison with the Russo-Polish campaign of 1920 is at all possible to-day or could assist us in any way in estimating the comparative strengths of the two armies. Any such comparison is completely out of date and it is quite impossible to find a single point of similarity between then and now. As far as the Red Army is concerned, everything has changed completely since then: numbers, military technique and military strategy.

Let us take the question of numbers, first. The Russo-Polish War of 1920 was not fought with mass armies, and it can therefore not be compared with the World War. At no time throughout the war had either side more than 200,000 men at the front. Pilsudski trenchantly describes this angle of the war in his book:

"It was not a real war; one might call it half a war, or perhaps a fraction of a war; it was a war between children, and the classic theories of warfare turned their back on it with contempt."[14]

Pilsudski had no illusions about the value of the experience gained during the fighting or even about his own successes, and he admits it with a frankness which does him great credit:

"I was not so naïve as to repeat and copy mass strategy without masses. I was too keenly conscious of my own helplessness and of the humiliation of my own weakness caused me to think of glossing over the problems before me with such phases and expressions as were used in 1914 and backed up by real mass power."[15]

The Russo-Polish War of 1920 was waged by improvised States with improvised armies, and with very weak armies at that. A further important factor was that in 1920 the Red Army did not have the numerical superiority one would have thought likely under all circumstances. Estimations of the relative strengths of the combatants at various phases of the war vary, and even Soviet sources are not in entire agreement. However, it is possible to say with certainty that at no time during the war did the Red Army have any decided numerical superiority, not even at the time of its greatest successes. Temporarily, and for a short time only, it was about 20% stronger than its opponent. At the Battle of the Vistula, which was the decisive engagement of the war, the numerical superiority was on the side of the Poles, a fact which is admitted by Pilsudski himself.[16] How did that come about? It must

[13] "*Krasnaya Zvezda,*" September 30th, 1936.
[14] Pilsudski, "*L'Année* 1920." Paris 1929, p. 201.
[15] Ibid., p. 197.
[16] Ibid., p. 265.

be remembered that 1920 was the third year of an exhausting civil war for the Red Army. The South front against Wrangel was still in existence, and, in fact, in the summer of 1920 the situation there was particularly dangerous. The breakdown of the railway system and the rapid advance of the Red Army made replacements impossible, whilst on the other hand the Poles, operating in a more confined area, were able to concentrate all their available reserves rapidly.

The Polish Army was also better armed and equipped than the Red Army; its troops were better trained, and they were supplied by the Entente powers. Tukhachevski declares in his book on the struggle[17] that the Polish Army was better trained and better armed and equipped than the Red Army.

The strategic history of the 1920 war has been fairly thoroughly pieced together in many expert investigations. In the beginning the Polish Army had the advantage of time and initiative. It made a sudden attack, overwhelmed the weak Soviet frontier defence forces and rapidly occupied a considerable slice of Soviet territory. A vigorous Soviet counter-attack broke the Polish front in the South by an encircling movement and a break-through, and the Polish front in the North by a frontal attack. Why did the subsequent offensive break down at the gates of Warsaw? Two groups of causes determined the failure: material and strategical. The Polish historian of the campaign, General Sikorski, who commanded the Fifth Polish Army in 1920, puts down the failure of the Soviet offensive primarily to the dimensions of the Eastern European theatre of war.[18] A decisive victory was impossible in such an enormous area for an army without possibility of reinforcement, without a regularly functioning base behind it and without either technical or numerical superiority over its opponent. The forces in action on the Soviet West front were too weak and too poorly equipped to encircle and destroy the Polish Army in the huge area between the Beresina and the Vistula.

Soviet military literature declares the causes of the defeat to have been the economic exhaustion of the Russian Hinterland and the strategic errors of the Red Army leaders. Soviet criticism of the Polish campaign of the Red Army is severe and ruthless. The present Chief of the Soviet General Staff, Shaposhnikov, holds that the execution of the war plan as a whole was responsible for the Soviet defeat: the South-West wing held back and the drive against Warsaw was delivered from the wrong direction, from the North-West instead of from the South-West, where there were much better possibilities for the development of successful operations.[19] The strategy of the operations before Warsaw is similarly criticized: the launching of a frontal attack and the failure to deliver heavy blows in the flanks and rear of the retreating enemy.

On the other hand, during the course of the whole war up to the battle before Warsaw, Polish strategy showed no superiority. Up to the battle of the Vistula the Polish Supreme Command did very badly, and General Sikorski admits this frankly. The Polish attack on Kiev was folly and it was paid for by the heavy defeat on the Dnieper: and during the whole of the retreat to the West there was no attempt to carry out any active defensive manœuvring. Poland's act of aggression risked the very existence of the young Polish State, whilst Soviet Russia never at any time risked more than losing one or two far-off frontier districts. Poland's stake in the game was Warsaw; Soviet Russia's only Minsk.

The happenings of the Russo-Polish War of 1920 are no argument at all in support of Poland's military strength to-day. In the event of a Polish-German military alliance the National Socialists will find cold comfort in such military reminiscences. The change has taken place since then in the relative strengths of the combatants is very obvious today; it is one of the clearest military-political facts in Europe. Not counting the Special Far Eastern Red Army, the Red Army today is four or five times as strong as the Polish Army, and its superiority in trained reserves is just as great. The Soviet covering army on the Western frontier alone is stronger than the whole of the Polish Army. Further, the military-technical superiority of the Red Army is enormous. In aeroplanes and tanks the relation is about 10:1 in favour of the Red Army. The Polish Army is not in a position to contemplate an engagement with the Soviet shock army, which consists of a powerful air force, tank armies, motorized infantry, air infantry, motorized artillery and modern strategic cavalry. Within the first 24 hours of such a conflict the Red Army would have the mastery of the air over the whole of Poland with all the resultant advantages. Motorization and the air arm mean the easy overcoming of distances. Today they mean victory over those vast spaces of Eastern Europe which were largely responsible for the defeat of the Red Army in 1920. To-day the Red Army is technically able to cope with such enormous distances, and it can do it rapidly. Further, a change has taken place not only in numbers and military technical resources, but also in strategical methods. Even in 1920 the Red Army set a pace unknown during the World War: over 310 miles advance in 5 weeks. That is even more rapid than Franchet d'Espérey's advance on the Balkan front in 1918. General Sikorski describes the offensive of the Red Army in 1920 as "decisive, courageous and even daring." In the event of war to-day the strategic élan of 1920 would be supplemented by powerful modern military technique and efficient strategic methods, because to-day Red strategy is master of the art it lacked in 1920; the concentric blow from various directions and the offensive against enemy flanks and rear. Annihilating operations have become the main theme and subject of its studies. To-day Poland is incapable of even effective defence against a Red Army attack, and the idea of a Polish offensive is absurd.

The "miracle on the Vistula" will not, cannot, be repeated in any future campaign.

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[17] Tukhachevski, "The Vistula Campaign" (Russian), Moscow 1924.

[18] General Sikorski, *"La campagne polono-russe 1920,"* Paris 1929, pp. 285 and 288.

[19] B. Shaposhnikov, "On the Vistula" (Russian), Moscow 1924.

War Lessons

War news has been scanned eagerly by military minds for items or features which might form bases upon which to formulate battle lessons of the future. Self styled strategists have applied the chamois briskly to crystal balls in an effort to produce featured articles and sanctimonious comments. It may well be said that current events which have taken place between major powers are too young at this time to furnish any definite grounds upon which to base concrete conclusions. In considering the subject of military lessons during present days, are we not considering also events which have transpired during the past eight years? Certainly, when the battle ramparts of the entire world are brought into review over that extended period many conclusions of one nature or another will have been slowly gravitating in the minds of all commentators and military analysts.

Dubious Lessons

Unquestionably from accumulated incidents which have taken place in China, Ethiopia, Spain, and now eastern Europe, the conclusion has been drawn that the machine has proven supreme. Has it been overlooked that in each of these theaters of operations the machine has been pitted against the forces of impoverished and unprepared peoples? Has it, in reality, been so much the supremacy of the machine as the exertion of overwhelming strength against peoples completely dominated by opposing forces in every phase of modern warfare? Have not all of these operations been characterized by long, finger-like penetrations supported by over-extended lines of communications and made possible mainly through the hopelessness of the defenders' means and situation?

Also, has not every offensive action featured the presence and availability of ample and dominating air power which supported the advance? Had air power been altogether absent, would these rapid and rapier-like penetrations been feasible or possible?

Concrete Lessons

Few will contest the statement that a number of definite lessons may be gleaned from recent history.

Air power is a major factor in modern war. The domination of the air is very likely to portend success or failure.

The strength of prepared positions has in no wise been contested. Madrid, Warsaw are paramount examples of this conclusion.

A highly organized espionage system is of great aid—if it is known what is taking place behind an enemy's lines and something of his intentions, many things can be done that otherwise might prove costly ventures.

Those forces favored with the availability of well developed mechanized elements have proven successful in the face of an ill-prepared enemy. The conclusion must be apparent that the availability of these forces in strength is imperative under modern conditions.

That force which is able to maintain freedom of action is blessed with a transcendent advantage. Has not air power proven a vital instrument to this end? The extent to which mechanized forces have assisted towards this objective cannot be stated from recent history.

Lessons of the Future

In what way and in what manner will the efficacy of the antitank gun be proven? The future will furnish evidence of the necessity of available antitank weapons above and beyond those included organically in the division and lower elements. The answer here may be found in the organization and availability of highly developed antitank units assigned to G.H.Q. and the Army. Should not these antitank elements be the fastest and most mobile elements to be found on the battlefield? If these weapons are not faster than those mechanized vehicles which they are to combat can they be effectively employed? If they are not held in general reserve until hostile mechanization has been committed will they pay their highest dividends?

In rugged, difficult country, uncertain weather, and war of a guerilla nature, has the genuine value of horse elements been properly considered? Have horse elements possessing a proper increment of antitank weapons been tested in the face of highly mobile, but lightly armored, mechanized forces?

Is it to be proven that the best anti-mechanized protection is to be found in one's own mechanized forces?

Has the real strength of land-based aviation against seagoing traffic been tested or proven? Is this test probably not the paramount lesson which the current war is to prove or disprove?

Does the fear of retribution constitute a factor in the reluctant employment of great air forces? Has the inherent power of great air forces thrown a light on distant days of prolonged peace through the very potentiality of destructive powers?

If the annihilation of cities is to occur, do we face a new dimension of hand-to-hand combat underneath the surface of the ground?

Official

By PETER B. KYNE

During the Great War while I was commanding a battery of field artillery at Camp Kearny, one of my soldiers, whom I will call Private Hamestrap, approached me with the request that he be excused from drill every afternoon that week. He said he was training for a fight in San Diego the following Friday night. So it developed he was a box-fighter in civil life and was anxious to continue to pick up a few bucks to add to his army stipend. He said he was pretty good, although he had been knocked out a time or two, and added that his engagement was to fight a negro, weight one fifty-eight.

After explaining to Private Hamestrap that, since he was now my property, I was his fight-manager and must be consulted before he accepted future employment in his civilian pursuit, I pretended to be distressed at the probability that the negro might, *conceivably*, murder him and thus bring shame and disgrace upon the Army. But he begged me not to feel that way about it; he assured me he would never, *never* put a splotch on our guidon. So I agreed to permit him to fight but warned him I'd be in his corner and if the negro knocked him *out I'd send him away to* France in an infantry replacement draft where he would be certain to get killed. I do not know why I said that. It was probably purely an unconscious defense mechanism to make Private Hamestrap think I was tougher than I am—or was.

Well, on Friday night I sat in the seat nearest his corner. He gave me an owlish look as he climbed into the ring and he must have thought I was there for the sole purpose of keeping cases on him. Followed the ever mysterious confab with the referee, the bell rang and Private Hamestrap advanced to the assault. He was a straight-up boxer, like old Nonpariel Jack Dempsey. He feinted with his left, crossed with his right and sent the negro spinning across the ring. The unfortunate man hit the ropes which gave, then sprung him forward on his face, and he lay as one dead. In fact they had to carry him out of the ring.

But, having landed the blow, Private Hamestrap was not interested in watching its effect. Seemingly he knew! He turned, ran over to his corner, looked down at me and queried anxiously:

"Was that fast enough for the captain?"

Cripes, he was my boy! I immediately turned him over to Sergeant Covars, who was (in his own words) all that was mortal of the late Chicago Jack Daley, who was the *only man* who had ever fought two legitimate draws with Joe Gans. I made Covars the trainer and coach of my Private Hamestrap, and, of course, we promptly entered him in the divisional boxing tournament.

In his first fight I saw that Private Hamestrap lacked the killer instinct. He was a magnificent boxer and a terrific puncher but was content to win on points; seemingly he loathed hurting anybody. Unfortunately, I was out to make him the 158-pound champion of the division and any other division that chanced by and thought they had a fighter. I hinted to Hamestrap that it was all right with me if he played ball with the field artillery, but that it appeared slightly unethical not to give the infantry the works. I realized, too, that it would be unethical of me to order him to commit murder against his will, so I sneaked up on the blind side of him. I told him just before he entered the ring for his next fight that I'd pay five dollars for a knockout. So Private Hamestrap was merciful and made a short swift job of it and I never begrudged him the five. Thereafter, whenever he climbed into the ring and looked around for me I'd merely hold up five fingers.

Executioner

Of course he won the championship and in no uncertain manner, and I was so proud of him I made him chief mechanic because he loathed drillingly and the job gave him time to train and shadow-box, etc. I do not recall that he was remotely mechanically inclined!

One afternoon my first sergeant Snooper, a regular Army bluebird and as cagey and efficient a first sergeant as ever wore a government brogan, laid before me an order reducing Chief Mechanic Hamestrap to private. I screamed. I said: "This is no way to treat Hamestrap. Has he killed somebody?"

"No, sir," replied Snooper, "but if my plans work out he'll half kill somebody. That big bum So and So has to have special treatment. He's been in the can and he likes that, because he can sleep a lot and the colonel is so kind-hearted he permits the prisoners to smoke and play cards and do as little work as possible. I can't think of any more battery punishment and he doesn't mind that anyhow. He's the worst recalcitrant I have ever known and I'm tired monkeying with him. So I'm going to have Hamestrap explain to him the error of his ways and then lick hell out of him. The guy has to have physical punishment and the regulations forbid you ordering it. So I'm making it unofficial."

"But what," I demanded, "has this got to do with Hamestrap's reduction?"

"Everything. When I read this fake order out at retreat Hamestrap will feel disgraced, because he knows he hasn't done anything to merit the boot. So right after retreat he'll come crying to me in the orderly tent to ask me, confidentially, why the captain has disrated him. I'll say: "Hamestrap, I don't know. The captain is a very peculiar man and seldom tells me what reasons actuate him in busting a man. However, I THINK I can get you restored —provided you're willing to do something that will please the captain greatly."

"Ah," I murmured, "I begin to see the light. Well, it's a noble experiment, so let's try it."

We did and the top told Hamestrap that if he would get into an argument with So-and-So and tell him he was a bum and a no-account and a nuisance and a disgrace to the battery and an annoyance to the captain and then give him a sound thrashing, he, the top, would make it his personal business to ask me, as a favor to him, to reinstate Private Hamestrap as chief mechanic.

Hamestrap smiled a beautific smile as the tale unfolded —and five minutes later he and his victim were going to it in the battery street. The top and I remained aloof. Why not? We knew what was going to happen. And it did. When the fallen one came to Hamestrap told him that the very next bobble he made meant a trip to the hospital.

There were no more bobbles from that bird. However, the draft sent us another presently and the top called Hamestrap in and said: "Hamestrap, the captain is thinking of busting you." To which Hamestrap, who was quick on the up-take, queried eagerly: "What guy does he want licked?"

My recollection is that Hamestrap was a tower of strength in the taming of our men who thought they were tough. It was pretty nice to have an Official Executioner to spare one a lot of trouble.

We went to France. One night, in a village near Bordeaux, I was taking a pasear down a lane after dinner when clear and loud across the fields I heard an anguished voice crying: "Captain, captain, captain!" Inasmuch as I was the only captain in that village, naturally I responded on the run and presently, by following the voice, I found, in front of an inn up a side road, Private Hamestrap, a little drunk, with blood gushing from a stab in his kidneys. He was reeling around looking for trouble and all in the midst of six prone men from Headquarters company.

"Hamestrap," I shouted, "I'm here, so quit your bellowing. What's up?"

"I'm dying," he replied. "I'm stabbed. I got in a poker game with six wops from headquarters company an' they took me like Grant took Richmond. I caught one guy palmin' an ace an' socked him across the table an' the rest jumped on me. "This guy"—spurning one of the fallen with his army brogan—"slipped the knife into me and then threw the knife over the fence into that wheatfield."

A frog came down the lane in a cart, so I halted him, took the names of the fallen from their dog tags, threw the stabber and the stabbee into the cart and fled in high to our medical office. The medico probed and decided the knife had gone into the kidney cavity but had not touched a kidney. So, barring complications, Hamestrap ought to be ready for another scrap in about ten days. However, I decided to take a postmortem statement from Hamestrap, and as once in my variegated past I had been a stenographer and can still do a hundred words a minute, I got some paper and pencils and started the inquisition.

"Hamestrap," I asked, "do you identify this man as the one who stabbed you?"

Hamestrap shuddered. "I can't see him clearly, sir," he moaned. "Bring him closer, please. Oh-h-h! How I suffer!"

He drew his knees up to his chin, so great, apparently, was his agony, and I brought the wop up within range, whereupon Hamestray let fly with both hind legs, like an army mule. He landed both in the wop's midriff and knocked him across the room. The man lit unconscious and we were about ten minutes bringing him back to life, while Hamestrap grinned amiably.

"You should not have done that, Hamestrap," I said sternly. "I'll take care of this fellow. I'll see to it that he goes to the prison farm near Paris—"

"For God's sake, No," howled Hamestrap. "Leave that guy to me. Don't take him away from me, sir. I won't testify against him. I want him private-like as soon as I can get around to it."

"Very well," I agreed, "have it your own way. But do you know what you've done by getting drunk and disorderly?"

"I've put myself in hospital," he agreed.

"You've done worse," I almost moaned. "You've lost the outfit. We're leaving this country tomorrow for God knows where and when you come out of hospital they'll send you to a casual camp and in all probability they'll toss you into the infantry and send you up to the front and get you killed."

"Oh, God, don't let the sons do that, sir," Hamestrap howled, and wept bitterly.

I assured him there was nothing I could do about it, and there wasn't. Already I had abandoned Hamestrap to his fate, but when an ambulance arrived from Base Section No. 6 Hospital I hopped aboard and accompanied Hamestrap to the operating table. A nice major medico with a harsh voice cursed and growled and wanted to know why the hell I'd brought a man that only needed a patch of court plaster to send him back to duty.

Now, I have lived long enough to know that the toughest doctor is one who harbors a soft heart and is deathly afraid he'll be found out. I said to this fellow: "Who commands this poultice brigade, anyhow?" and he replied: "I do—and the hell with you. What's it to you?"

So I told him all about Hamestrap. I told him I was saving Hamestrap and two others to fight British gladiators if we ever found ourselves in a sector with the British; that if I lost Hamestrap I'd lose a fat chance to clean up on sure thing bets, and would he see to it that when Hamestrap was discharged from hospital he be not given a travel order to a casual camp but back to my outfit. I told him how Hamestrap had to lick six men to get into the hospital and the medico's hard face softened and he said: "Why, of course, captain. Wire me where you light and I'll give this hearty baby a travel order back home."

Then he took me into his office and gave me a drink of the only Bourbon I ever had in France. Hamestrap wept with gratitude and said: "I knew you'd make the grade, captain. You always do. That's what comes o' bein' a genius an' writin' books. Why, every so an' so in the world knows you!"

Hamestrap's childish pride in my civilian compliments and his faith in my power were very touching.

He reported in to me twelve days later and that very



"This guy"—spurning one of the fallen with his army brogan—"slipped the knife into me and then threw the knife over the fence."

night (it was bright moonlight) I caught him stealing a huge bundle of brambles from some frog's store of winter fuel. I looked the other way, hoping he'd send some down to my billet, where I was freezing, but he didn't.

On the way home we held a boxing tournament on the main hatch forward one day when the sea was glassy smooth. I was master of ceremonies and, of course, Hamestrap was there to hold up the honor of the army, which needed it, because those lads on the naval transports were always in shape and pretty good and had been whaling the tar out of gladiators among the homeward-bound troops.

Hamestrap fought three times that afternoon and earned fifteen dollars. I think he must have had a hunch that if he stuck around he might pick up another five, for he got into his overcoat and waited. Presently the Navy trotted out a heavyweight as big as a gorilla and I had to announce that my regiment had no heavyweight to oppose him, we having left our heavyweight behind in France to compete in the A.E.F tournament out of which, it will be recalled, Gene Tunney emerged heavyweight champion.

My speech was no sooner finished than I felt a sly poke in the ribs and Hamestrap was murmuring confidentially:

"I'll lick the big so and so for you, sir."

"Hamestrap," I said, "be yourself. This fellow may be as good in his class as you are in yours and nobody knows better than you the old prize-ring axiom that no good little man ever licked a good big man. It just isn't done."

"Oh, hell," Hamestrap pleaded, "give me a break, sir. Lemme lick him for you."

"Hamestrap," I declared, forced to a desperate device, "if you knock this bird out in four rounds I'll give you fifteen dollars."

"Sold," said Hamestrap and started climbing up into the ring, while I informed the Navy that my own Chief Mechanic Hamestrap, weight one fifty-eight, would, for the honor of the Army, take on their gladiator, notwithstanding the fact that he had already fought three fights. Some Navy shavetail called out:



"What are you paying your man for knocking our man out?"

"Fifteen bucks," I replied, "but if your man knocks Hamestrap out I'll give twenty bucks to the victor."

"Not a chance," said Hamestrap as he shed his overcoat and hopped joyously around in the rosin box. He put up his dukes in the old Nonpariel Jack Dempsey style and the big Navy lad fell into a crouch. They moved around the ring a minute feeling each other out and I saw a sweet little smile playing around the corners of Hamestrap's rather good-looking mouth. He looked over his shoulder at me as he circled past and said: "How about twenty bucks for the old chief mechanic for a knockout in the first round, sir?"

"Sold," I called back—and Hamestrap stepped in with a right cross. Ensued two minutes of murder most foul with the Navy man wabbling back to his corner on rubber legs.

Hamestrap was desolated. "Gosh," he complained, "he's tougher than I thought. He can't fight but he sure can take it. The big boob has cost me five bucks."

I fanned him with a dirty towel. "Knock him out before the middle of the next round and you still get the twenty bucks, Hamestrap," I promised and Michael Angelo never painted as sweet a smile on the face of a cherub as that announcement drew from Hamestrap. He won that extra five in fifty seconds and I was never so happy to part with money.

We came home to the Presidio of San Francisco to be demobilized. I had accumulated in the draft sent me to replace the casualty replacements sent to France long before the regiment started for the same objective, a tough German Jew. My first sergeant had found, in his civilian clothes, a card showing membership in the I.W.W., and Intelligence had sent me quite a dossier of affidavits touching on his disloyalty and general worthlessness as a citizen. He had been a subversive influence in the outfit until he and I had had a private talk and I had informed him that on the way up to the front at night, if we got under fire, I was going to bump him off and if I got bumped off first the top sergeant was to attend to the job. Thereafter he behaved.

However, it was no part of my plan to turn this fellow loose on my country with an honorable discharge, so I gave him a green ticket with character Good, which was the worst I could give him, and wrote something in red ink across the face of the discharge that was not complimentary. After the outfit had returned from the pay table where the discharges had been given them, this man came hunting me up, object murder, but upon observing I was wearing my automatic he contented himself with a stream of foul abuse.

Just then I happened to see Hamestrap emerge from one of the demobilization shacks, his gas mask and tin hat in one hand (we gave them to the lads as a souvenir) and a straw suit-case in the other.

"Hamestrap," I called, and he reported double-time. "Hamestrap," I said, "this fellow has abused your captain. As a final labor of love, will you give him a good sound commercial thrashing for me?"

"Why, with pleasure, sir," said Hamestrap and did it. Not content with that, he picked the fallen man up, waded out into San Francisco bay to water three feet deep and tossed his victim in to drown. I made him tow the fellow back to shore. So Hamestrap stood there soaked to the buttocks and smiled and said: "Well, sir, I'm a civilian now. May I shake hands with the captain?"

So we shook hands and Hamestrap said: "Sir, take a memo of my address. In case the captain should ever have occasion to use me again for one of these little private affairs I'll always be glad to accommodate him—an' if I'm sick an' can't come I'll send a friend."

I thanked him. Tears came into his eyes. He was an emotional cuss, for a fighting man, and he sensed that he was cutting a tie of sorts. So did I. He stepped back, came to attention, saluted, made a proper about face and walked away.

We have not met since.

"It was established that aerial bombardment is a most effective weapon against the preparation of counterattacks in open country and that the air strength of warring powers must be somewhere near equal if the war is to be fought on anything like even terms."—Associated Press, September 19, 1939.



Little Phil

Illustrated by
Howard Williamson

By FLETCHER PRATT

Part One

The decisive hours of the Civil War are generally considered to be those of the afternoon of July 3, 1863, when Pickett's column moved through the long grass, while 1,500 miles away flags of truce hung limp in the heat along the ramparts of Vicksburg. This is accurate if the war be thought of in the light of European precedent, and only untrue when we remember that for the Union mere victory was equal to defeat. It should not be forgotten that a soldier's work is incomplete until he has decisively influenced the political situation, and the double victory of 1863 did not achieve this result. A year after Gettysburg and Vicksburg—a year that had seen the Chattanooga battles and the better half of the titanic Atlanta campaign piled on the summit of these triumphs—the Democrats were seeking political control in the North by denouncing the war as a failure. It seemed to many intelligent men, among them Thurlow Weed, Salmon P. Chase and Lincoln himself, not unlikely that the Democrats would convince the country they were right and make a peace that left two nations.

The "decisive" battles of the Civil War thus decided nothing but that the Confederates could not win in the

A tough Mick who saw that a cavalryman was only an infantryman with 4 detachable legs

field. They might still gain their essential point by default. The task that faced the North at the opening of 1864 was infinitely more difficult than anything it had yet accomplished. It was required not only to achieve military victory (though this was an indispensable preliminary) but to achieve it in a manner that involved the extinction of Southern morale and the prevention of that guerilla conflict which most European observers considered as certain to follow the operations of the field armies.

In this sense both Vicksburg and Gettysburg were indecisive. They damaged, but did not slay the Confederate spirit. If Pemberton had been less a ninny, the one would not have been lost; if Lee had not made one of his rare errors, if Stuart had not been absent and Longstreet sulky, the other might have been won. The Southerners reasonably felt that a comparatively minor change in the conditions of either conflict would have reversed the results. They went on fighting in the expectation that the law of averages would provide both changes in another combat. The battles that broke their hearts as well as their heads did not come till later; and these were named Chickamauga, Yellow Tavern, Cedar Creek, Five Forks.

The first was Thomas' battle and affected the western theater of war alone. But the other three have four elements in common. Each took place in that Eastern piedmont on which the attention of the people on both sides of the strife was riveted, and thus yielded the maximum moral effect; each was the crowning act of a campaign; in each, cavalry, the special and favorite arm of the South, was deeply engaged; and in all, the Union commander was Philip Henry Sheridan.

With Sheridan there triumphed in these battles not only the Union army. There triumphed also an entirely new, purely American doctrine of war, of the use of the mounted arm—an idea that had been struggling dumbly for expression since Richard M. Johnson's Kentucky riflemen made razor-strops of the skin from Tecumseh's legs after the Battle of the Thames. It was a doctrine that could not possibly have been framed south of the Potomac, in spite of the fact that the Confederacy entered the war with an aristocracy habituated to the saddle and with considerably more than its proportionate share of the cavalry officers of the old army.

In fact, it was a doctrine that could hardly have been born in the mind of a cavalryman at all. For cavalry officers, North and South, were so imbued with the history and tradition of their arm as to be incapable of perceiving that the advance of mechanical science had deprived this history and tradition of all meaning. They continued to think in terms of the days when the infantryman's gun was ineffective beyond a hundred yards and could be fired at most, twice while the cavalryman was crossing that distance. They thought of Murat and regarded the charge of the gallant six hundred as an example of courage and not as one of stupidity.

The Northern cavalry service had clearly failed as a Napoleonic arm when the Mine Run campaign closed out 1863, with its demonstration that the most serious part of the war was still to be fought. The reaction of an ordinary commander to this failure was that cavalry, having become an arm useless for heavy fighting, should be turned into a kind of military police force, charged with convoying trains and doing picket duty for the rest of the army. This had been Hooker's reaction after Chancellorsville, and Meade inherited it from him. It took something more than an ordinary commander; it took, I say, a commander on the edge of genius, to throw all received ideas out the window and start afresh from the concept that a cavalryman was only an infantryman with four detachable legs.

This was Sheridan. He pronounced a bill of divorcement between the cavalryman and his horse, a thing unheard of since true cavalry was born and the Goths came riding across the steppes.

The basic doctrine was not altogether novel, and perhaps not even independently original with Sheridan. John Buford, for one, had held the idea and might have pushed it farther had he not been debarred by death from becoming more than a subordinate commander whose originality was limited to the tactical field. It was Sheridan's special merit that his precise and orderly brain evolved a harmonious and logical structure from the various elements he found already existing. It was his special accomplishment that through his treatment of cavalry, not as a separate arm with peculiar disabilities, but as a kind of fast-moving foot soldier, he achieved the only pure offensive to be found in the Civil War.

For Lee, a master of the tactical attack, always developed his successes out of the strategic defense, against enemies moving in, with lengthened communications, across ground he intimately knew. In both the battles he fought during advances he was beaten. Grant and Sherman, who might have possessed parts of the same brain under two different skulls, exactly reversed Lee by acting on the strategic attack but tactical defense. They aimed to place armies in positions where the enemy must hit out at them. Both failed (Cold Harbor, Kenesaw Mountain) when they violated this principle. Thomas was strictly a counter-puncher, waiting for an enemy advance, which he parried with one hand while knocking out his opponent with the other. Only Stonewall Jackson approached Sheridan; and there is more than a verbal coincidence in the fact that Stonewall's men were known as "the foot cavalry" while Sheridan's were cavalry who fought on foot.

At the time of the great winter conference of 1863-1864 on military affairs, with Lincoln and the army leaders present, nobody was thinking of getting a man of genius or a new doctrine of cavalry. It occurred to nobody that defeat of its mounted arm might have a ruinous effect on the morale of the Confederacy; though for both political and military reasons everyone seems to have agreed that they could not afford to have Stuart riding circles around the Army of the Potomac any more. In other words, the views of the conference were negative. The decisive

campaign of the war was approaching, and it was important to get something more than a minimum yield from the human and mechanical power the Union cavalry possessed.

The best way to do this was a change in command. For Pleasonton, then commanding the cavalry corps, had been given a thorough trial and he was simply not good enough. But who would be better? The three divisional commanders in the corps were Buford, Gregg and Kilpatrick.



"The very man!" cried Grant.

Kilpatrick was a hard fighter but a still harder rider. The men knew him as "Kill-cavalry," for he normally arrived at the scene of action with horses blown and panting, men dropping from the saddle with weariness. Gregg was just the sort of mercurial leader Grant most distrusted—perhaps the best of them all when swinging to victory, perhaps the worst when things went wrong. Custer and Wesley Merritt were too junior. Grant asked for old General Franklin, whose talents he held in an incomprehensible respect, but the others frowned him down and there was a silence till General Halleck cut the knot with the suggestion, "How would Sheridan do?"

"The very man!" cried Grant, and that night a telegram was dispatched for Sheridan.

II

Who was this Sheridan? Practically unknown in the East, he had flashed only once across the front pages of war history—when he stood in the captured rifle pits at the foot of Missionary Ridge, and lifting his whiskey flask toward the rebels on the towering summit, shouted "Here's how!" before he drank the toast. As the last drops trickled down his gullet a shot from a big gun up there threw dirt all over him. "I call that damned ungenerous!" cried Sheridan. "I'll take those guns for that!" and flinging the empty flask up the slope he started after it—the beginning of that incredible charge up a mountain like a mansard roof.

Army circles knew slightly more about him. They knew him for the hero of the fighting at Perryville where he had held his division all day against overwhelming rebel attacks, and in the evening put on a counterstroke that tore Bragg's line to pieces. He had done well at

Chickamauga where, though his division had been one of those carried from the field, he rallied it in time to come back and cover Thomas' retreat. At the dreadful battle of Stone River he had done surpassingly well; had slowed and then halted the Confederate attack of the first day and formed the anchor of Thomas' line. In the dramatic midnight council of war he stood with Thomas against retreat, and even asked permission to lead the counter that eventually won.

Most of the rest was gossip that drifted up by word of mouth through junior officers, for Sheridan was the youngest division commander in the armies of the West, belonging to a later generation than most of the high command. That gossip would tell, for instance, how he came to West Point, a tough little Mick of a store-clerk from Ohio, poor as Job's turkey, with a chip always on his shoulder; how he wrangled during drill with Cadet Sergeant Terrill, and after trying to jab that student officer with a bayonet, had challenged him to a fist fight behind the buildings, coming out of the encounter with a black eye and a year's suspension; how he had been graduated in 1853, an undistinguished thirty-fourth among fifty-two, and was ordered to Fort Duncan, Texas, as a lieutenant of infantry.

There again he fell on stormy weather, which can perhaps be traced to the fact that all his life long Sheridan was a picturesque and vivid swearer, while the colonel in command was equally noted as a God-fearing man of the Puritan type. There was as much disagreement as there can be between a very junior lieutenant and a very senior colonel, with petty persecutions on one side, petty sabotage on the other. Sheridan finally escaped via a requested transfer to the 4th Infantry, then on duty against the Yakima Indians in the Pacific Northwest.

The country was ill-explored, the Indians almost inveterately hostile, and young Lieutenant Sheridan was very much on his own in leading detachments out to deal with them. But in that hard service he found himself. He displayed a perfect passion for topography; never went out on an expedition without taking surveying instruments along and mapping every inch of the country he covered. Two other details of this period have survived, interesting in view of his later career. Lieutenant Sheridan formed the habit of requisitioning all the mules he could lay hands on and mounting his infantrymen on them for movements up to the scene of action; and in dealing with the Indians, he displayed a wonderful gift of blarney, could always talk them out of hostile intention if he could get them to pow-wow before the shooting started.

Much of this, however, was not to be dredged from memories and records till the young lieutenant was famous. The service papers lying before Lincoln, Halleck, and Grant at that winter conference would have stated only that Lieutenant Sheridan was ordered east at the outbreak of war, arrived late because of the distance, and was assigned to the Herculean labor of auditing the accounts left in confusion by the ornamental Frémont. A year after the war began he had only attained promotion to a captaincy and was quartermaster of Southwestern Missouri, that is, effectively buried. Grant and Sherman were already generals, the former already a famous general; Thomas had an independent command and McClellan more military authority than any American since George Washington.

But at this juncture Sheridan caught his tide. Quartermaster business brought him frequently to the headquarters of the western armies where he met and was liked by Gordon Granger, then a brigadier of several months' standing. Granger's old regiment, the 2d Michigan Cavalry, had gotten into bad shape since he moved upstairs. He wanted an officer to straighten the command out, and the name of the young quartermaster, who was running his department like a clock, naturally suggested itself.

Granger put the matter up to Halleck, then commanding the west. That formalist, who had already been impressed by the neat way Sheridan ran his freight schedules and his fastidious paper work, gave the promotion his blessing. This was how Sheridan, whose nearest approach to mounted action had been muleback operations in the 4th Infantry, came to be pitched into the Corinth campaign at the head of a regiment of horse. He was to be a lieutenant-general before he received his colonel's commission.

Fortune rode with him on his first mission, a detached one to hold Boonville, Missouri, with eleven companies of his own regiment and the 2d Iowa, about 759 men all told. Most might not consider it fortune, however—Confederate Chalmers came down to shoot up the place on July 1, 1862 with 4,000 men. Sheridan had chosen a position where his flanks were covered by a pair of swamps, and the attack was canalized into a narrow front where his dismounted riflemen waited, but the disparity in numbers was so great that by noon things began to look grim.

Sheridan summoned a trustworthy officer, Captain Alger; gave him ninety men, armed with Colt "revolving carbines"; told him to go by a circuit and fall on the enemy's rear, shooting for all they were worth from the saddle, making a racket whether they hit anything or not. Now, says Alger, who has told the story, he understood why his colonel had spent half the previous night poring over maps of the region. In the heat of that conflict among the ceaseless attacks, Sheridan gave him road directions as clear and precise as though he were telling a man how to find the post office. Alger rode off with his ninety; made his circuit, and charged the rebel rear with guns banging. At the same time Sheridan threw forward his own dismounted men in a countercharge against the Confederates, who were mostly still in the saddle.

There is one thing about mounted cavalry. If it once gets started going either forward or back, it is very difficult to stop. Chalmers' men had started going back when Alger struck. Sheridan's charge kept them going with doubled speed, and in half an hour the four thousand

had left the seven hundred fifty in possession of the field and the enemy wounded.

It was an outstanding feat of arms in a campaign that had very little outstanding about it. The young commander was given a temporary brigadier's rank and was sent by Grant to Buell a month later, when Bragg's invasion of Kentucky caused the Army of the Cumberland to ask for help. Sheridan was taken from his two regiments of horse to arrange the defense of Louisville, which he did so well that he was placed in charge of one of the new divisions of infantry in the campaign that led to Perryville. While ex-Cadet Sergeant Terrill was being killed at the head of his brigade in one part of the line that day, Sheridan in another was the heart of the Union defense, the best man on the field, winning his step on the ladder that had now brought him to Chief of Cavalry in the Army of the Potomac.

III

There is a certain amount of mystery in how Grant came to assent so enthusiastically to the nomination for the most important cavalry command in the nation of a young man whose ten years of active service had included only four months with cavalry, and those at the head of a single regiment. The commander-in-chief did not know Sheridan well. He had seen him in action as a general officer only during the week or two of the Chattanooga fighting, and the most favorable reports on Sheridan came from men Grant was rather inclined to distrust—Buell, Rosecrans, Halleck.

The choice is perhaps explained by a remark of Grant's long later: "No man ever had such a faculty of finding things out as Sheridan. He was always the best informed man in his command as to the enemy." This is full of illumination, not only on Sheridan, but also on Grant's own theory of the employment of horsemen in a world where they had been banished from the battlefield. He evidently thought of the arm as screen and counter-screen, whose function was to conceal the movements of one's own forces and to acquire information about those of the enemy. Sheridan's preternatural activity, physical and mental, his deep interest in and knowledge of topography, his ability at questioning prisoners ("That there man, he'll talk the eyes right out of your head," said one of them)—these things impressed Grant as the proper equipment of a cavalry leader.

Yet both Grant and Halleck had misgivings when the man arrived in Washington on April 4, too late for any change to be made before the opening of the campaign. Grant particularly, as he confessed later, "formed a very unfavorable impression." Seen in a drawing room Sheridan was a "most extraordinary figure. His chest was large and full, his legs short and small, and his arms so phenomenally long that his hands reached down below the level of his knees." Above this was a small head, bearing little bright eyes like those of a bird and a face that registered doubt both about his own ability and the wisdom of accepting the new appointment.

Sheridan was, in fact, inclined to view the cavalry command as a demotion. He was due to take over a corps in the western armies and liked service there, among the free-and-easy veterans who turned out on parade to bleat at an officer when they considered his behavior sheeplike, or offered him chewing tobacco as a special delicacy when they liked him. The Army of the Potomac, he understood, was more strait-laced in discipline. He doubted his ability to give satisfaction under the conditions. Grant eyed him ruminatively, puffing cigar smoke, and was ultimately delivered of the remark that the new Chief of Cavalry would have pretty much of a free hand on one condition—that he keep Jeb Stuart out of mischief. Sheridan's face cleared at once, and two days later he was riding down to inspect his new command.

There were 10,000 effectives in three divisions, commanded by Gregg, Torbert (a new man come up through the ranks to replace Kilpatrick, who had gone west to join Sherman), and Wilson. The last was another of Grant's surprise appointments—the youngest man so far to bear stars on his shoulders, an engineer of the West Point class of 1860, who had been a kind of secretary and personal inspector-general to Grant in the West, but who had never led troops. The men looked strong, healthy, smart—Sheridan has recorded his pleased surprise at their appearance—but the horses were the merest flea-bait. It did not take the inquisitive new commander long to discover the reason for a state of affairs that would be pardonable only at the close of a long and hard campaign.

The cavalry were doing picket duty for the entire army, round a circuit of sixty miles, besides having the standing assignment of furnishing heavy escorts for every provision train and every column of infantry that moved on the roads in back areas. Sheridan went to Meade with a demand that his corps be concentrated as a fast battle wing of the main army and relieved of drafts for the service of security.

Meade's concept of cavalry was that which had grown up in the Army of the Potomac. It was not thought out at all; it was imposed on the army from outside, by the pressure of Mosby's lightning jabs and Stuart's long rides around the rear; and it was essentially defensive. The commander was horrified by Sheridan's demand. "What will become of my trains, my flanks, my moving columns?" he asked.

Sheridan: "If you let me use the cavalry as I wish you need not worry about trains or flanks. As for the infantry, it ought to be able to take care of itself on the roads."

Meade demurred, filled with the engineer's distrust of new ideas that could not be expressed in figures and Sheridan had to develop his theme. The infantry, he said, were about to attack the enemy's infantry; why then, should our cavalry stand on the defensive against the Confederates'? If our mounted men be concentrated the enemy will dare just one more of those long raids—his last. For a concentrated cavalry corps will then face him from a prepared position across his line of retreat, or alternatively,

deliver 10,000 men at any desired spot on the enemy rear at any time desired.

"It is the business of cavalry to fight cavalry," Sheridan went on, "and if there is no cavalry there to fight, to attack the enemy's infantry in their most vulnerable point." Warming with his own logic he demanded thrice the normal equipment of artillery for his horse, as much artillery as infantry would have. Cavalry used as he meant to use it would be seizing positions behind the enemy, points vital to that enemy, which he would fight like the devil to regain. Cavalry mobility was a means to the end of arriving at an effective point for an infantry battle—

At this point Sheridan had parted company not only with Meade but with Grant also. The latter's theory of cavalry was different from that of either Meade or Sheridan, but he possessed a brain so habituated to following the essential through mazes of side issues as to resemble a mechanical instrument. The registering dial of that machine reported to him that Sheridan was proposing to submit the rebel cavalry to the novel experience of being attacked. This chimed with his own idea of cavalry as a service of information and anti-information. He decided the argument about concentration in Sheridan's favor, but as for the extra artillery—no, not at present. The decision accurately reflected Grant's questioning middle-ground attitude at the time.

IV

The inquiries and arguments took two weeks. Sheridan was granted two weeks more in which to assemble his men and to rest their horses before reveille on the third of May blew the opening of the Hammering Campaign. Two of Sheridan's divisions led the two columns of infantry across the Rapidan that morning. Division Torbert, by Meade's orders, was held back to guard the rear—a perfectly proper employment for the nimblest troops of the army by Meade's ideas. Though Sheridan could hardly have agreed, he forebore any protest at the time.

On the 5th the Battle of the Wilderness broke among the tangled thickets south of the stream. Only two of the three big Confederate corps reached the field that day. On Lee's left, Ewell, with ground and good tactics in his favor, held Warren and Sedgwick around Wilderness Tavern amid appalling losses on both sides. On the Confederate right A. P. Hill did not get his men up quite so soon, and when he did arrive, found Hancock's II Corps, with the best battle-captain in the Union army, facing him. The fighting went ill for the Confederates; Hill lost ground, men and morale, only closing night saved him from a break.

But out of that partial defeat Lee drew a battle plan for the second day as perfect as a painting by Leonardo. (Map 1.) Longstreet arrived during the night with the third big corps. While Ewell held on the Confederate left and Hill slightly retired in their center, this fresh corps was to work round Hancock's flank and strike, crushing Hancock's corps and the line behind him against the anvil of Hill and Ewell. Stuart, who had also just arrived with the rebel cavalry, was to ride round Longstreet, throw out a wing to menace the Union supply trains around Fredericksburg, then turn in behind Longstreet against the Federal rear. Like Leonardo's greatest work the plan went to pieces through the shifting of the foundation on which it was painted. As expected, Hancock attacked again the next morning, rushing Hill back till Longstreet came in on his flank. The Union division of General Mott was swept away, men coming back through the woods all disorderly, some with weapons and a few without. But they came past Hancock himself. He rallied them in person, shouting "Halt here!" till a brigade from his own reserve and a division from Grant reëstablished the line. Under the increasing pressure he took up the retrograde indeed, but slowly, in good order, with no real gain to the attackers.



Map 1: The Wilderness—May 6, 1864.

Astonishment ran through the ranks.

Longstreet, trying to press home, went down with a bad wound. His corps took losses it could afford only as the price of crushing victory, and as twilight sifted through the spring leaves, crushing victory, any victory, was still far distant, riding with Stuart.

For Hancock's stand and Longstreet's wound had left Confederate success dependent on Stuart—whether he could coax Sheridan back on the trains, break his connection with the II Corps and arrive on its rear with something over 8,000 men. And Stuart, for the first time in his career, had failed to reach his final objective, or any other objective.

He started early on the morning of May 6, in two columns, just at the flank of Longstreet, toward Todd's Tavern, at which point the columns were to pivot north. Ambling easily along, the rebel horsemen reached the pivot points without difficulty, but there found log breastworks from which they were received with so lusty a fire of musketry that they reported the presence of Union infantry. Stuart weighted his column heads and tried to drive through. He was violently repulsed while the ground shook with Hancock's struggle farther north, could not win an inch, and in the evening reported that Grant must have extended his infantry lines down that far.

But it was not Grant, it was Sheridan. Though the fact has been lost to sight in the flare of the giant duel of the infantry, he would not have been there at all had Meade's orders been carried out as that general wrote them. After crossing the Rapidan, the two cavalry divisions under Sheridan in person had been shunted aside to the left rear of the army, behind Hancock, and linking up with the third, Torbert's division, which was seeing the trains through at United States Ford and Fredericksburg. This was a perfectly normal cavalry arrangement for the Army of the Potomac, with the exception that the men were somewhat more concentrated than under earlier leaders, and apparently it was the disposition Lee counted on in making his grand attack.

But the night orders Sheridan received on May 5 were to "protect the trains" without specification of method, and the new general took the bit in his teeth. Instead of

drawing all his divisions back toward Fredericksburg, he shoved everything up, even bringing two brigades of Torbert's command ten miles forward from Fredericksburg to Todd's Tavern. One of the men in that division has left record of the astonishment that ran through the ranks that night when the order came down, "Unsaddle and go to camp," with an order to build breastworks following immediately. It was never so done in Israel before. Always in the presence of the enemy, the Union horse had kept their mounts packed and saddled, sleeping with bridles over their arms, ready for a quick getaway. This time they had reached position, the horses were out of it and they were there to fight.

They did fight; and the report of how and where they fought on the morning of the 6th reached Meade simultaneously with the news of Longstreet's blow at Hancock. Remembering other Lee offensives—Chancellorsville, the Seven Days—Meade could visualize the next step as a Confederate cavalry movement around his rear, between the army and its trains at the Rappahannock crossings. He ordered Sheridan to "draw in and protect the trains" and that night the Union cavalry were going back.

Stuart's men followed them in, and on the morning of the 7th, taking this retrograde as part of a general retreat, injudiciously tried a vigorous pursuit of Custer's brigade, the one nearest Hancock. Custer turned on them, counterattacking savagely. Sheridan learned of this almost immediately. At the same time he heard that more rebel cavalry formations had been located farther east and got some information from prisoners. The aggregated information brought into focus in his mind a full picture of Stuart's movement—a cavalry advance across a front that grew ever wider as the Confederate formations moved down the radii of a fan.

Once again he ran away with his orders, spun the divisions of Gregg and Wilson sharp round in their tracks, and attacked with all his strength. His closer concentration gave him numerical superiority at all contact points, and the repeating carbines in Wilson's division turned this into something like a two-to-one advantage of fire-power. Beside, he was counting on battle and ready for it, his men were nearly all dismounted, operating as infantry against Confederates on tall, vulnerable horses. The Union troopers hustled Stuart's men back along every road, carried Todd's Tavern, and beyond it, coming on several lines of field fortifications constructed by the rebels during their repulse of the day before, stormed them one after another. (Map 2.) By twilight of the 7th Stuart was knocked out for a good twenty-four hours, Longstreet's right was in air and Sheridan on its rear at the head of ten thousand men.

Meade and Grant missed a chance here, or rather, never realized they had one. Both were still permeated with the view of cavalry as something fluid, a force which slept with bridles over their arms. Even the fact that Sheridan's men had fought on foot seems at this time to have made no impression. The special geographical conditions of the Wilderness made dismounted action almost a necessity, it was impossible for an observer to discover that the step had been taken from choice. Moreover, on the 7th the move to Spottsylvania toward Lee's right flank by the main army, had already been decided upon; and Grant, who was beginning to grasp some concept of the use of a mobile fighting force, the motorized infantry into which Sheridan had turned his corps, had already ordered the cavalry to lead the flanking maneuver. Once again Meade played the marplot. Wilson's division, now the farthest to the left, and hence to the front of the new movement, went on to Spottsylvania with somewhere near 3,000 men. But Meade in person reached the headquarters of the other two divisions before Sheridan's orders did, and he instantly used both for purposes sharply different from those the Chief of



Map 2: The Wilderness—Morning, May 7, 1864.

Cavalry intended. Gregg was pulled out of the advance to protect trains (from what?—the whole Federal army was now between those trains and the nearest of Lee's men). Merritt, who had taken over Torbert's division, was held back to accompany and protect the movement of Warren's V Corps, guarding infantry on the roads according to the best muddled tradition of the Army of the Potomac. It was night; of course, Merritt's division became mixed with Warren's infantry and wagons on the wood roads. There was a wild traffic jam that stalled both horse and foot. Whenever Meade appeared the cavalry had to yield precedence to Warren, and Merritt emerged from the tangle well behind the infantry he was supposed to lead.

Wilson's single division was of course no match for the entire Confederate corps that presently arrived at Spottsylvania. After some hard defensive fighting it was driven out, and the whole desperate business of the Bloody Angle, with ten days and fourteen thousand men lost, had to be gone through with.

But Bloody Angle was still in the future when, on the night of the 8th, Sheridan came tearing into headquarters, red, angry and swearing, not mincing the words he shouted as he demanded to know whether he were truly Chief of Cavalry or only a rubber stamp for others' ideas. Meade snapped back the wearisome old arguments about the safety of trains and columns. Grant listened, impassive as an ox, till both men began to repeat themselves, then turning to Sheridan asked him briefly if, being allowed to write his own orders, he could guarantee the elimination of Stuart.

"Yes," flashed Sheridan.

"All right," said Grant.

V

Next morning Sheridan began concentrating back on the long lateral road that runs from Fredericksburg to Orange, behind the Union right rear. Men and horses had a good night's rest, then started early on the 9th May, riding south and east at a sober walk in a single column, thirteen miles long, to get right around the rebel army.

The men, impressed with the leadership of their Little Phil during the hard fighting of the past week, were more impressed now. Under Stoneman, Pleasonton, Kilpatrick, they had moved out on such expeditions at the trot, on parallel roads in tight bunches. When the enemy showed up for a fight, their horses were blown, themselves tired, and the nearest support, also on tired mounts, would be distant across miles of country. Or as we should put it in modern phrases, Sheridan realized that mobility is an evanescent quality, one that can be used for either strategic or tactical purposes, but not both. He was aiming to arrive at the scene of any action with full gas tanks.

Perhaps this is reading more into Sheridan's doctrine than he himself put there. Yet the proof that he had thought the matter through better than any man of his time lies in that single long column moving slowly on. "I preferred this to the combinations arising from using several roads," he himself said. "Combinations rarely



Map 3: Wilderness to Yellow Tavern and beyond.

work." With horses at a walk that column did not present the danger it appeared to. A blow at any portion of it would be subject of envelopment from the wings, all the men moving at the full tactical speed that had been preserved to them. . . .

That is, it worked. Confederate Brigadier Gordon located that serpentine column late on the afternoon of the 9th, near Chilesburg, (Map 3) already well round the Confederate flank and in the rear, but he dared attempt nothing even against its rear. It seems that Stuart had expected to find the Union cavalry off on the other wing of their army, leading the advance. He had the bulk of his men out in that direction, feeling for them till word came through from Gordon.

Now mark the soundness of Sheridan's plan, which brought him to the North Anna by night. He might turn straight north into Lee's rear, or south toward Richmond. To prevent the first move falling without warning, Stuart had to leave Gordon behind with nearly a third of his own cavalry. To fend off a stroke at Richmond, he had to expend his own mobility in a long, hard ride, round the Union head of column, leaving uncovered for some length the two vertical railroads out of Richmond along which Lee was drawing supplies.

That night the Union riders had another surprise. In-

stead of the all night "stand to" in separate little picket camps which had been the custom during raids in their army, they found themselves in one big camp astride the North Anna, with artillery placed and unlimbered, soldiers getting full bellies and a good night's rest, horses unsaddled. One who was there noted that next morning they began to sing. They were content with their Little Phil, and he was everywhere among them. "We saw him daily, whether we were in the advance, at the rear, or the center of the column, and he would as soon borrow a light from the pipe of an enlisted man as from the cigar of an officer. The common soldier's uniform was good enough for him."

That morning, the 10th May, he sent a brigade of them out east under Custer to Beaver Dam Station on one of Lee's railroad lines. A big supply magazine was burned out; it had held the whole of Lee's medical stores, doubly precious in that army which had to use medicines run in through the blockade. A batch of Union prisoners was released; the trackage ripped up for some distance.

Down in Richmond they had news of Sheridan now, the bells were tolling alarm, home guards were being called out and troops summoned all the way from the Carolinas. The Union column plodded steadily on, slanting toward Richmond. They crossed the South Anna in the afternoon and shot out another brigade, Davies', which just at twilight touched the second vertical rail line out of Richmond. Wires were torn down and tracks up; a second depot of stores went. Before midnight both forces had fallen in on the main body, bringing some prisoners.

Sheridan, now as ever his own G-2, extracted from them the information that Stuart had arrived before Richmond and was waiting in a prepared position at Yellow Tavern, just north of the Chickahominy. Gordon's brigade had been haunting the Union rear all day. Evidently some measure had been concerted to bring that also into the impending battle. Sheridan had no objections; the whole purpose of his raid was not to seize any particular point, but to bring *all* Stuart's men to action, and to handle them so roughly that they would never again dare one of their great sweeps—as Grant's purpose in the whole campaign was similarly to impose the defensive on Lee.

Merritt's division had the advance in the morning. He found the Confederate line holding a crossroads at Yellow Tavern, facing west across his front; dismounted, and punched through. It was a trap, of course. There was a second line behind the first. As soon as Merritt was involved against it, a battery of artillery opened an enfilading fire from cover, and down from a grove of trees came Jeb Stuart at the gallop into Merritt's flank.

But Sheridan had met trap with counter-trap. As Merritt's line crumpled, his men firing as they scattered to cover, George Custer, yelling "Come on, Wolverines!" flung himself into Stuart's flank. There was a violent shock, a tangle, Custer was driven off for a moment, but came on again with the whole weight of Wilson's division behind, and the Confederates went tumbling back, their great leader out of mischief forever, shot through the lungs. Wilson's men swarmed all over the rebel line, shot down the artillery's support, captured the guns, drove what was left of Stuart's cavalry right away before them.

"Combinations rarely work." Now, when Stuart was down and the defensive line gone, Gordon arrived on Sheridan's left rear in a mounted attack. The Union leader had foreseen that too. Gordon ran into a breastwork of interlaced branches with Gregg's men firing from behind it, was shot dead from the saddle and his brigade driven off northeast on an eccentric.

Sheridan moved on round the defenses of Richmond, got supplies from the fleet in the James, and shuttled back up across the rivers to the main army, which he rejoined on the 24th May. It tells the whole story to say that the Confederate cavalry never molested him again. Infantry tried to stop him once, where the fixed defenses of Richmond reached the banks of the Chickahominy near Mechanicsville. These unconventional cavalrymen rebuilt a broken bridge under fire, crossed it, and drove the infantry off in a combat of which not enough details have survived to permit an intelligent account.

It does not matter. Nothing in the story of this operation matters after the battle of Yellow Tavern, which, hidden from the sight of northern eyes by the red glare rising round Bloody Angle, inflicted upon Southern morale a heavier blow than the loss of Stonewall Jackson. For Jackson fell in the moment of victory; at Yellow Tavern the Confederacy lost not only Stuart and Gordon but also the legend of its own invincibility in the arm that was the pride of every Southerner. Says Grant: "This raid had the effect of . . . thenceforth making it easy to guard our trains."

No other praise is necessary.

VI

Yellow Tavern thus established Sheridan within the army. To the country he remained merely a corps commander who was doing well, a name among the others that appeared among the others in dispatches from the Virginia scrub-lands where the fighting was going forward with such bloody indecision. Lee seems fully to have realized the political effect of this indecisiveness on the North, and clutched though he was in Grant's embrace, found means to win minor but morally impressive triumphs in the one field where geography practically guaranteed Southern victory. Or was Early's move to the Shenandoah Valley dictated by the more narrowly military hope of forcing Grant to make large detachments from the forces around Richmond?

No matter. Early was in the Valley with a large corps. Early shuttled to and fro, defeating Federal local guards, breaking up the important supply line of the Baltimore & Ohio. Early crossed the Potomac, smashed a hastily gathered force at the Monocacy, and marched to the gates of Washington, where President Lincoln was under fire. Something would have to be done about Early.

General Wright was pulled out of the Petersburg trenches with his VI Corps and sent to Washington. His operations were sound enough, but futile. The Confed-

erate leader, moving up that fertile and friendly region where he could keep his trains to a minimum, danced away from Wright's lumbering legions. The moment Wright went back to Petersburg Early came back down the Valley. Once more he broke the Baltimore & Ohio and lanced into Pennsylvania, where he laid the town of Chambersburg under $300,000 ransom. There was not that much money in the place, so Early turned the inhabitants out into the summer fields and burned it, every stick.

Throughout the North the papers went wild. A year after Gettysburg the rebels were burning towns in Pennsylvania! In parallel columns came the news from Chicago—the Democrats had finished their convention; they were going before the electors on a platform declaring "Lincoln's war" a failure, a repetitious bloody agony. Washington telegraphed feverishly to Grant, another in the series of such telegrams that had been flashing along the wires since Early began his raids. Something would have to be done and Grant would have to decide what it was.

Already, some time before, Grant had pointed out that the trouble in the Valley was not one of forces but of commands. As things stood the Shenandoah and its neighborhood formed the boundary lines of four separate military departments, each with its own troops and officers. Washington agreed with Grant that the whole thing should be under a single head, with a concentrated army "big enough to follow Early to the death," an army particularly strong in cavalry to offset the mobility the friendly country gave to the Confederates, an army that should burn out the Valley granary to an extent where it would no more harbor rats.

But there had been a tug-of-war over leadership. Grant again wanted Franklin, a suggestion which was coldly received. Meade was offered, but the idea was politically all wrong, it would look like the demotion of the commander of the Army of the Potomac, which would be a confession of that very failure the Democrats claimed. Hunter, already in the Valley, was too old and slow; Hancock, too good a corps leader.

This was the situation when the Chambersburg raid caused Grant to react with the speed of a steel trap, as he always did when irritated. "I am sending General Sheridan," he wrote. "I want him put in command of all the troops in the field."

It was a *tour de force* in both directions on Grant's part, for Sheridan himself, approached on the project of taking over what had suddenly become the critical command of the war, was dubious about his own capacity. He would prefer, he said, to command a corps, perhaps the cavalry, under some other leader. Grant listened and smoked, his mind probing for the reason behind this unexpected diffidence on the part of an officer who had not hesitated to stand up to the testy Meade. Finally he hit it—the Valley commands were full of old, senior, respected officers—Hunter, Averell of the cavalry, "Fight mit Franz" Sigel, Wright—some of them twice Sheridan's age.

Grant remarked that this was a campaign in which seniority did not count. If the older officers objected to serving under Sheridan he was to relieve them—"Do not hesitate to give command to officers in whom you repose confidence, without regard to claims of others on account of rank." Hunter did object to serving under the junior Sheridan. He was given his walking papers, and on August 7, at Harper's Ferry, the new leader took over his army, with everything in it to do and the political campaign hurrying on.

It is important to any estimate of Sheridan to realize that his new "army" was a motley collection of units, unknown to him and to each other, units that required to be united, magnetized, stamped with the impress of a single personality, before they were fit for anything. The VI Corps, under General H. G. Wright, had a long, honorable history in the Army of the Potomac, but like its general, was distinguished for solidity rather than speed, a unit better on defense than on attack. The XIX Corps, Emory's, had been doing garrison duty and police work in Louisiana. It had never been assembled as a unit, was unfamiliar with any but guerilla operations, and could hardly be called a fighting corps. Crook's VIII Corps, the former Army of West Virginia, had seen a great deal of fighting, all of the wrong kind. The men had the hangdog, careless attitude of troops that had never known victory, were spiritless, and were no more than Emory's men used to working in big formations. Two of the four divisions of cavalry, Averell's and Duffie's were from this same army, with the same drawbacks. They had moreover, been trained in the prehistoric tradition of "living in the saddle"; regarded dismounted action as something no decent cavalryman would take if he could help it. In the whole army only the other two cavalry divisions, those commanded by Merritt and Wilson, knew Sheridan and his methods. They were a small leaven in a mass of nearly 50,000 men.

This then was the force Sheridan had to make into a fighting machine. It had some other pecularities, of which the most striking was the cavalry-infantry ratio of 1:4, higher than any before seen on the American continent. Another was that Sheridan assigned no less than nine batteries of artillery to this cavalry, or four and a half times as many guns as he had had in the Wilderness for the same number of horsemen; and this artillery was the best he had, United States Regulars.

Early discovered the significance of this in the first and perhaps the most important operation of the Army of the Shenandoah, though it was one crowned by no battle, yielding no newspaper results. When Lee learned that the VI Corps and two divisions of cavalry had been sent to the Valley, he accepted the transfer of major operations thither with evident relief. He reinforced Early with the major portion of Longstreet's Corps and Fitz Lee's cavalry division, which brought the Confederate Valley army up to a strength beyond the powers of Sheridan's rag-tag host, at least in the opinion of Grant, who warned his young subordinate to be careful.



Map 4: The Valley.

Sheridan, who had been well forward toward Winchester, accordingly retired to a position near Halltown, where he could cover both Harper's Ferry and the northbound roads that lead past it on the west, and dug himself in. (Map 4.) There was a river on either wing, when Early came up, he inspected the place, and decided it was too strong to be forced, too good to be flanked.

There is more than one way to handle such a situation, and Early worked out an excellent method. He left a division on Sheridan's front, strongly fortified; moved the main body of his infantry up to Shepherdstown, and flung Fitz Lee out ahead to see what he could do about passing the Potomac. If Sheridan advanced against the fortified division Early would come back and fight the Union leader on ground of his own choosing, but he considered it more likely Fitz Lee's threat would force the Army of the Shenandoah to retreat.

Nothing of the kind happened. Sheridan remained coolly within his lines. Wilson's cavalry division held the South Mountain passes; Merritt's knifed in between the detached division and Early's rear, feeling for his communications; and Fitz Lee reported that Averell was holding the Potomac crossings in trenches, so well supplied with artillery that crossing would be a bloody business, probably could not be achieved at all without infantry support.

In short, Sheridan had used the mobility of his cavalry as he proposed before the Wilderness—to seize and fortify a series of positions that severely constricted the scope of Confederate operations. Adventures beyond the Potomac had been rendered impossible to Early. But unless his army could adventure there, it had no purpose; could not affect the main campaign physically or morally. It could only go home; and when Grant started the Deep Bottom offensive, Lee called in Longstreet's Corps. It was September when they crossed the mountains through the ripe crops, and the northern elections rushing on apace. The day Longstreet reached Richmond Grant sent his commander in the Shenandoah the famous two-word telegram:

"Go in."

(To be concluded)

"Afforded every opportunity by the rolling, dry terrain of Poland, the mechanized forces nevertheless had to be followed by cavalry and infantry and the cavalry was especially useful in moving speedily to positions already stormed by tanks and armored cars."—Associated Press, September 19, 1939.

MANEUVERS REVEAL DEFICIENCIES

EDITOR'S NOTE: *The following article appeared in the* New York Times, *August 27, 1939. It was written by Hanson W. Baldwin, military commentator of the* Times *under the caption, "Serious Deficiencies in the Army are Revealed in Plattsburg Games." This article has been quoted and misquoted to such an extent that it is considered of some purpose to reproduce it here. The appearance of this report in these columns is in no wise a manifestation of opinion pro or con. It is presented merely as an important news dispatch which has created discussion and for military men may incorporate factors upon which it is wise to reflect.*

First Army Headquarters, Plattsburg, N. Y., Aug. 26. —Grave deficiencies in army training were revealed by the First Army Maneuvers just concluded, according to observers who witnessed the exercises.

Lieutenant General Hugh A. Drum, commanding the First Army, and his principal subordinate commanders, speaking at a critique last night, were among those who pointed to mistakes made in the field problems, but their comments were mild compared to opinions many officers expressed privately.

One officer went so far as to assert that the training of the army was at its lowest ebb; another, referring to the peace routine of the army and to past maneuvers, said "they had been very instructive, because nothing was well done in them."

These were extreme views, but most officers agreed that the army—particularly the National Guard units—needed far more field training, and many who had seen little of National Guard "outfits" in recent years were shocked at what General Drum called last night a "deplorable and inexcusable" state of affairs.

Others felt that last night's critique might well have been far more frank, although it was understood that outspoken criticism was avoided lest the National Guard in particular and the Regular Army to a less extent be offended and angry. Thus, the guard was sent away with a pat upon its back, and the belief that it had "won," or was "winning," the Black versus Blue "engagement" just concluded, although neither the Guard's tactical operations nor its knowledge of the military art justified this.

All, however, joined in praising the willing spirit, relative physical hardihood and intelligent application to duty of officers and men of the Guard, particularly of the men. The human material, it was agreed, was there; what is needed is training.

The four National Guard divisions from New England, New York, and New Jersey, bolstered by a few regular officers and organized reserves and a handful of special Regular Army troops, formed the Black attacking force in the army maneuver which took place in the final three days of the First Army's fifteen-day training program.

It made the hard-bitten "doughboys" of the regulars quite angry, for they faced time after time the spectacle of young guardsmen charging excitedly across bare fields without a bit of cover into the face of withering machine gun, rifle and artillery fire from commanding terrain—and being allowed to get away with it by the umpires. For the problem called for the regulars to fall back, and when the inexperience of the guardsmen did not prompt them to try outflanking or infiltration tactics the umpires, perforce, had to make artificial decisions to keep the problem within time limits and within its predestined bounds.

In the problem just ended the Black forces were certainly harried by the regulars' mechanized cavalry and the hard-hitting "Fighting First" Division and the Eighteenth Brigade. Some observers said that had the second battle of Plattsburg been a real encounter with ball ammunition instead of blanks, the Champlain Valley quite likely would have been the scene of a Black débâcle.

This is not to say, as a number of observers pointed out, that all guard units are badly trained or that the organized reserves and regulars are perfect. Neither is true. The Regular Army needs far more training than it gets, particularly in large units. This is the first time, for instance, that the First Division has been together as a unit in four years.

The First Division, under Brigadier General Walter C. Short, acquitted itself in the various sham battles here with distinction; its staff work was excellent; its improvised anti-mechanized defense well placed and well organized; it was aggressive, hard-hitting, fast-moving and probably displayed its abilities to best advantage in the problem in which it was pitted against the Eighteenth Brigade and a portion of the mechanized cavalry brigade. It showed the value of a fighting tradition.

But even the First (perhaps, with the Second Division at San Antonio, the best trained outfit in the nation) was deficient in many respects in what General Drum terms the "mechanism of battle," the art of maneuver in the face of an enemy, the little things that distinguish a veteran of war—how to take cover, how to sight guns, how to reconnoiter, how to lead troops.

The Seventh Cavalry Brigade (mechanized) from Fort Knox, Ky., was used in the maneuver much as it might be used in actual war and it learned and taught valuable lessons. Harrying and worrying the flanks and rear of an enemy, displaying the dash and drive and *esprit* for which the "Yellow Legs" are famous, it did a good job—although because of the artificial nature of the maneuvers and the necessity of imposing limitations upon both mechanized and anti-mechanized forces, little of tactical value was learned. Nor did the problem permit the use of the mechanized brigade in one important manner in which it might well be used in war—as a distant reconnaissance force, 100, 200, 300 miles in advance of the main body.

Far below peace strength, less than half of war strength, and inexperienced, the Guard does not appear now in shape to be ready for war thirty days after mobilization day, as planned. From six months' to one year's training would be required before its units would be up to front-

line standards, it was estimated. As for the Regular Army, which operated here with but 34 per cent of the authorized peace time officer strength, it, too, could not meet the schedule now called for by our protective mobilization plan, according to observers. The regular army is supposed to be ready for action on "M-Day," but there are few here who believe, that as far as training is concerned, it now is, or soon could be, ready for such an emergency. Most officers of the organized reserves also need far more training than they are receiving, it is held.

Some of the mistakes made and the deficiencies in training noted by General Drum and other officers follow:

Inability to read certain types of maps; lack of use of maps.

Slowness in issuing and delivering orders.

Poor liaison between units; frequently flanks were left uncovered, and in at least two important instances a hole large enough to drive a division through was left in the front.

The "fog of war" seemed to bemuse and bewilder many commanders, particularly those in the Guard; many became jittery and nervous; far too many, particularly staff officers, unnecessarily lost sleep to an extent that affected their judgment and might have had fatal results in actual war.

Sanitation was satisfactory, but not completely so until several days after camps had been made.

There was no understanding of the economy of force; with the frequent result that the line was "weak everywhere and strong nowhere."

Communications were sometimes unsatisfactory (though considerably better than at Pine Camp four years ago); radio messages, often in plain language, which were intercepted by the "enemy" were too much used.

Round pegs in square holes; some officers were not fitted for their jobs; some in the Guard probably never will be.

Contact was frequently lost, both with the "enemy" and laterally with the supporting units on either flank.

Too much caution; "fear of losing the battle prevailed at times over the will to win it."

Little knowledge of how to meet mechanized attacks; the Twenty-seventh Division, with its specially created anti-mechanized battalion was best of the guard units in this respect, but even this unit did not heed the principle of the economy of force, with the result that it was often unable to stop the driving tactics of the "iron cavalry." Because of the lack of anti-tank guns and inexperience in combating mechanized forces, the guard units tended to concentrate most of their field artillery against tanks, thus leaving their infantry with little artillery support. As the most drastic example of the extent to which this went, one division used its 155-mm. howitzers as actual road blocks to guard its rear areas against the "dust-eaters."

Delays in Food Supply

Food supply in the field frequently was greatly delayed, or broke down temporarily altogether. More experience needed in caring for men in the field.

Deployments made in too close formation; battalions and regiments invariably overextended.

Lack of depth in defense lines; scouts too close to the columns they were expected to protect. Machine guns too far forward, not distributed in depth.

Colonel James P. Marley, chief umpire for the maneuvers, whose umpire force had to cope with an unprecedented problem in controlling maneuvers of this scope and speed, was one who voiced some of the above criticism, and they were made all the more forceful when he and others conceded that the same errors were made in maneuvers year after year. Not that there has not been improvement; the First Army assembled here, and at Manassas, Va., is an incomparably more powerful force than the First Army assembled at Pine Camp and in Pennsylvania four years ago; its equipment is more complete, its men on the whole better trained. But there is still a long, long way to go before the First Army or any army under the American flag becomes in truth a combat force.

Tactical lessons learned at the maneuvers were not many or unique, though the exercises did serve to illuminate a number of points. Among these were:

Both horsed and mechanized cavalry are useful to any army, essential in certain situations.

Speed is vital in a war of maneuver.

Truck reconnaissance is possible, but not satisfactory (though it was freely and artificially used here). As one general put it, "You cannot conduct a reconnaissance from the top of a moving truck."

The mechanized brigade requires effective air and ground reconnaissance if it is to be used successfully; also for an efficient artillery-cavalry (mechanized) "team" an engineer company is needed in the mechanized brigade. The mechanized brigade can force an enemy commander to watch his flanks and rear carefully.

Anti-mechanized weapons, organization and technique must be developed.

Officers do not make enough use of the air. Although the army air corps was not represented here by combat aviation (and hence the exercises assumed an unusual artificiality with troops marching casually along roads, speeding in trucks in daylight into the very heart of battle, etc.), some fifty to sixty Regular Army and National Guard observation planes based at Malone, N. Y., and Fort Ethan Allan, Vt., did excellent aerial reconnaissance work, kept the mechanized cavalry under aerial observation during most of the exercises and by use of a new radio were in constant communication by voice with the army air officer. The two autogiros here gave evidence of their abilities as artillery "observation posts" and for reconnaissance, though their vulnerability to attack makes unlikely their use over front lines.

Neither air forces nor mechanized forces alone can win battles; the man on foot is still needed to take the ground; the battle is won by the best "combat team" of all arms.

These lessons will have to be studied and rehearsed, mainly in theory, for the next four years, unless our training system is changed.

MILITARY ASPECTS OF SUDETEN CRISIS

By Colonel Conrad H. Lanza, Field Artillery

On 28 May, 1938 Chancellor Hitler of Germany held a conference with his advisors. It was of serious import. On its outcome depended peace or war and the lives and happiness of countless humble people who knew nothing about this conference. The subject discussed was: How and when shall the Sudeten, then an integral part of Czechoslovakia, be annexed to Germany?

It was realized that, regardless of theories and propaganda as to rights of inhabitants of the Sudeten to determine for themselves as to which country they preferred to belong, Czechoslovakia would object to loss of her territory. She might fight rather than agree to peaceful cession.

France had an alliance with Czechoslovakia effective if that country should be invaded. There was another alliance by which Russia bound herself to aid France if the latter went to war. Great Britain was friendly to France, for some time had supported her diplomatically, had intimated that she would probably join France in war. There was a strong possibility that if Czechoslovakia was attacked by Germany these three great Powers would come to her aid.

Germany could count on Italy and Hungary, probably on Japan. If all these countries started fighting, a new world war would be in progress, the ultimate result of which would be difficult to determine. Was it worthwhile to run such a risk?

The Army leaders did not favor risking a major war. They considered that the German force was hardly one-half of what they considered as necessary to fight France and her allies on the west, Czechoslovakia on the south, possibly Poland and Russia on the east.

The west front of Germany was open. The opposing French frontier was covered by the formidable Maginot line, the strongest line of fortifications that had ever been constructed. Germany was deficient in heavy artillery which the war in Spain had shown was necessary to attack even moderately defended positions. The same war had proved that the German tanks were too light, had small combat value, and needed to be replaced by heavier tanks.

Because of the few years which had elapsed since rearmament had begun, German organized reserves were insufficient in numbers. Owing to lack of resources in Italy and Hungary, the assistance of these nations ought not to be overvalued. Japan might aid, but, as this country was already engaged in a major war in China, her assistance would probably not be of great worth.

The situation was thoroughly discussed. It was better to prepare for all eventualities rather than risk disaster through insufficient consideration. The proposition looked dangerous. The Army was not enthusiastic.

The Chancellor was persistent. He insisted that the mission must be accomplished. He recognized that there was a shortage of materiel, that there was a lack of reserves. But he thought everything needed could be provided within a relatively short time, and that if this were done quickly, preparations might be completed before possible enemies became aware of what was to occur. He was of the opinion that four months would suffice to correct the conditions admitted to be unfavorable. It would require hard work, but he was sure German organization could do it.

Accordingly a plan was decided upon and was approved by the Chancellor. This plan provided for:

1. Military action against Czechoslovakia and her allies to be ready to start on 2 October, 1938.
2. Extension of the western frontier defenses, to ward off a possible offensive from France. Defenses to be continuous from Belgium to Switzerland.
3. The army to be increased immediately to 96 divisions, with arrangements to supplement this force in a short time by an unstated number of additional divisions.
4. All preparations to be secret. No alarm, no warning. Only the heads of government of the Axis Powers—Italy, Hungary, and Japan—were to be consulted and these only secretly. Officials to be given orders, but no information as to the plan.
5. Initiation of propaganda exploiting the fact that the Sudeten was German, and desired to join Germany; and that under the principle of the self-determination of nations they were entitled to do so. At the proper time a showing was to be made that the Sudeten was grievously oppressed, and that justice required cession to Germany to end an intolerable situation.

Thus closed an historic conference, secretly held to decide the fate of millions of people. It had been dominated by Chancellor Hitler. He made the decision against warnings of able advisers. He recognized the danger of precipitating a general war, but felt confident that he could avert it. He was willing to incur necessary risks, understood that unexpected events might occur, desired to be fully prepared. He thought he could be. He decided to go ahead swiftly.

Evidence recently uncovered indicates that the annexation by Germany of Austria and Czechoslovakia, to take effect at some future convenient date, was provided for in one or two of several protocols signed by Count Ciano, for

Italy, and by Chancellor Hitler, for Germany, at Berlin and Berchtesgaden on 25/26 October, 1936. They were annexes to a treaty of alliance signed at the same time between Italy and Germany. This agreement was the price paid by Italy to secure her new ally, believed to be necessary by reason of the sanctions imposed by the democratic Powers against Italy during her war with Ethiopia. Thus it may be seen that the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia as an independent state was envisaged and planned for by Chancellor Hitler and Duce Mussolini as early as 1936.

The leaders of Italy and Hungary appear to have been notified of the decision reached on that fateful 28 May, 1938. Italy accepted the situation. It was part of the game agreed upon. In December, 1937, Italy had warned Czechoslovakia to settle the Sudeten question by direct negotiation, rather than chance a war through which she could gain nothing, and might lose all. This suggestion was not accepted. The date upon which Japan was notified of the plan of 28 May is not known.

Germany at once took steps to provide the required additional troops and matériel. Of the 96 divisions to be ready by October, only 48 existed, including 4 mechanized and four motorized. Forty-eight new Landwehr divisions were ordered formed. The personnel for these was furnished from drafts from the Regular Army, semi-military organizations, and from cadres of reserve officers and men. The organization of these divisions had so far progressed as to enable the final complement of men to join during August. As this movement was noted by foreign observers, it was announced that a new form of training, involving use of reserve organizations at full war strength, had been decided upon, and would take place in selected maneuver areas, to include the month of September.

The supply departments provided the necessary batteries of heavy artillery and new heavy tanks. This issue was secret.

Work on the west defenses was pushed strenuously. Something had been done on this line as early as 1932. In the spring of 1938, more construction was undertaken. By May, 1938, there was a fair defensive system opposite Strasbourg, and at some other points where an enemy might try to cross the Rhine. Between the Rhine and Belgium there was nothing.

Early in June large numbers of workmen were assigned to this task. By September over 100,000 men were erecting long lines of continuous defensive positions extending from Belgium to Switzerland. The front line initially consisted largely of wire and trenches covering tank obstacles, which more properly might be classified as field fortification. To supplement this, permanent works in concrete and steel were added, distributed in depth to provide from two to five defensive lines. By October the first field line was nearly completed. Considerable work had been done also on the permanent lines, but as a whole the project was less than half completed.

In spite of attempts at secrecy, by August France and Great Britain were alarmed. They believed that Germany was preparing some kind of a surprise. They were not satisfied as to the explanation as to the reserve divisions having been mobilized for training only; they suspected there was some other reason. They consulted each other and, before what seemed to be a common danger, definitely agreed to be allies in case of war. They wished to avoid a war but were quite decidedly opposed to permitting Germany a substantial increase in territory and power.

The German propaganda department by now was in full action, making much play as to the right of the inhabitants of Sudeten to exercise the principle of self-determination. The Allies had fought for this same ideal during the World War, and, although they did not believe this to be the main reason, they found it hard to deny the proposed cession of the Sudeten when it was alleged. Still, they did not like the situation. They commenced war preparations, at first on a restricted scale. Some Allied statesmen, and much of the Allied press, believed that Germany was bluffing and would not fight. It was thought that a show of determination by the Allies not to permit Germany to annex more territory, coupled with a show of force, was all that would be necessary to stop Germany.

The Allies were encouraged by reports that there were no signs that Italy was mobilizing. It seemed certain that if Germany expected war Italy would know about it, and would have taken appropriate measures to assist her ally. Very strong moral support came from the United States, and it seemed that that country could be counted upon for unlimited supplies and probably eventually for military support.

Maybe Germany *was* bluffing. Perhaps a firm diplomatic policy, coupled with a showing of the risk that Germany incurred of becoming involved in a major war against three great democratic powers having immensely superior navies and enormous resources and wealth, would bring Germany to her senses. It was first decided to remain firm.

The general situation in Europe became tense. Germany had believed that it might be possible to commence an attack on Czechoslovakia before other nations could mobilize, but this was now no longer certain. On 22 August, a strategical estimate of the situation was made by Germany and Italy. This considered that in case of war over the Sudeten question,

a. Great Britain and France would come to the assistance of Czechoslovakia.

b. Poland was known to have mobilized several classes of reserves. She was prepared to act, but had not decided which side to join. Initially she might remain neutral.

c. Rumania had had under consideration a request to allow Russian land and air forces to cross her territory into Czechoslovakia. To date she had given an evasive answer. Apparently she was, like Poland, ready to stay out of war, or join either side according to events.

d. Yugoslavia would be definitely neutral.

e. The United States might enter a war on the side of the Allies, but this was yet doubtful.

f. Japan had advised that it would join the Axis. However, in view of her war with China, the assistance that Japan could give seemed to be of no great value.

It was certain that Great Britain and France would come to the aid of Czechoslovakia, and that the United States might. Notwithstanding this combination, it was decided to proceed with the mission as planned as of the original date of 2 October.

The estimate of the situation by Great Britain and France agreed with all items of the Axis estimate. Although they considered that they could if need be defeat the Axis in war, they sought additional allies to increase their forces on land and in the air. As to resources and reserves on land and on the sea, they had all that appeared necessary.

The Allies exerted diplomatic pressure and offered economic inducements and loans of gold to the Balkan countries and to Poland. They did not succeed in obtaining guarantees from any of them. These small countries did not want to commit themselves in advance. Russia was approached; the advantages of being connected with the Allies were explained to her. Russia was not enthusiastic; on the contrary, she was suspicious. She had an idea that the Allies wanted her to fight Germany for their benefit, and not for Russia's benefit. In September Russia did state that in view of the fact that she had in 1936 signed an alliance with France, she would, in case that country became involved in war over Czechoslovakia, comply with her agreement, and would join the French. She gave no information as to what she would do if she did go to war.

The Allies knew that there was unrest in Russia; it seemed quite possible that if Russia engaged in a major war there might be a revolution at home. Many leading generals had been executed for alleged treason. The Allies thought that if they were guilty of treason, others were probably involved, and the loyalty of the army was likely questionable. If the generals had been put to death for political reasons, as was generally believed, their successors were apparently insufficiently trained to lead large units in war. New division commanders had only a year before been captains or majors. If Russia did join the Allies, it seemed nearly certain that Japan would join the other side. If the United States then entered the war on the side of the Allies there would be a distinct net gain in strength; but if the United States did not do so, the appearance of Russia in the war was judged to be of uncertain value. All that surely could be counted on at the outset were France, Great Britain, and Czechoslovakia.

What were the actual forces available to the Allies and to the Axis should war come? The general staffs of both sides knew closely the strength of the prospective enemy. There was one exception—the Allies apparently had not identified all the new German divisions.

In the following tables, completely equipped and trained Regular Army divisions have been noted as first class; the reserve divisions as second class.

LAND FORCES

The Axis Powers

1st-class divisions		
Germany	48	(includes 4 mechanized and 4 motorized)
Italy	40	(excludes troops in Spain)
Hungary	15	
Total	103	
2nd-class divisions		
Germany	48	
Italy	20	
Hungary	5	
Total	73	
Grand total		176

The Allied Powers

1st-class divisions		
French	40	(includes 2 mechanized)
England	3	(all available for duty in France)
French Colonial	15	(after arrival from Africa, estimated at from 15 to 60 days)
Czechoslovakia	30	
Total	88	
2nd-class divisions		
France	40	
Grand total		128

Of the 128 divisions available to the Allies, as against 176 to the Axis, 30 would be in Czechoslovakia, separated from the remaining 98 in France.

AIR FORCES

The number of combat planes of the various powers cannot be determined exactly. Best available information indicates that the approximate figures are:

The Axis Powers

Combat planes	
Germany	3,500, possibly 4,000. Excellent machines, nearly all new, using noninflammable fuel. Some pilots trained in war in Spain.
Italy	2,000. Excellent machines. Pilots with war experience in Ethiopia and Spain.
Hungary	250
Total	5,750 to 6,250 combat planes.
Capacity for replacing planes	
Germany	Own report stated 1,000 per month.
Italy	No figures available. It was, however, known that the Italian plane strength had been substantially unchanged for several years, in spite of special production efforts. It seemed probable that their production about balanced ordinary losses, war losses in Spain, and sales to Spain and to Japan.
Hungary	Small.
Total	Uncertain, but well over 1,000 per month.

The Allied Powers

Combat planes

France	2,000	includes old machines.
England	2,000	
Czechoslovakia	300	
Total	4,300	

Capacity for replacing planes

France	300	actually 100, but this was considered a temporary condition due to new social laws.
England	300	actually less, but expected shortly to be increased.
Czechoslovakia	none	under war conditions.
Total	600	per month. This was expected to be increased by purchases from the United States.

SEA FORCES

Without entering into a detailed analysis of forces, their relative strengths were:

a. The British navy was greatly superior as a whole to the combined German and Italian navies. Against surface craft it could enforce a blockade of German North Sea ports, and a distant blockade of Italy by closing the Red Sea and Gibraltar entrances to the Mediterranean. It was *not* sufficiently superior to form a fleet detached at the same time to the Far East, which would be comparable to that of Japan.

b. It was agreed that the French navy would be under British direction. It was about equal in strength to the Italian navy, and was counted on to convoy troop ships from Atlantic ports in North and West Africa to France. To avoid air and submarine danger, the direct route from Algiers to south France could be discontinued at the cost of some delay in arrival of troops in France.

c. The submarine strength of Italy exceeded that of Great Britain or France. The German submarine strength has not been ascertained, but the Axis submarine strength was equal to or superior to that of the Allies. It was conceded that the Mediterranean could be blocked for important Allied movements. Having bases at both ends, and in the middle of that sea, the Allies believed that they too could interrupt movements of Italian ships in the Mediterranean.

d. Submarine war in the Atlantic was possible. The Allies recognized the seriousness of this, particularly if the Axis had access to Spanish ports, which seemed to be quite possible. They believed that their anti-submarine forces could control the situation.

e. Should Japan enter the war, the temporary control of the North Pacific and the East India regions to that country was conceded, unless the United States joined the Allies. Should this occur, it seemed probable that the United States Navy, by using Allied bases in the Far East, and with some reënforcements from the Allied fleets, could eventually overcome the Japanese.

RESOURCES

The Axis Powers

Germany—Nearly self-sustaining as to food. Surplus capacity for production of munitions. Large excess stocks of all kinds.

Italy—Nearly self-sustaining as to food. Military supplies excellent as to quality, but scanty, because of expenditures in wars in Ethiopia and Spain. Would need extensive assistance as to munitions.

Hungary—Surplus food supplies, which could be sent to Germany and Italy. Scant stocks of munitions.

Japan—Sufficient food supplies. Deficient in certain raw materials, especially iron and oil. Stocks probably, but not certainly, sufficient for a year's warfare. With development of China might carry on longer.

The general view of the Axis resources indicated that they had food supplies sufficient for their needs. Provided that German production plants were not destroyed, they could amply supply that country, and materially assist Italy and Hungary, which countries would need extensive aid shortly after a war started.

The Allied Powers

England and France—Lacked many supplies, both as to food and as to munitions. With control of the sea, apparently assured, and access thereby to the British and French Empires, they would be self-sustaining both as to food and as to munitions. With access to the markets of the United States, large excess of resources was expected.

Czechoslovakia—Food ample. Munitions could be produced in sufficient quantities, provided mines and factories could be protected. Doubt as to this. Stocks would permit of a strong defense.

We will not follow the political plays of the Sudeten crisis. Diplomatic action was extensive; for the Allies it was not very satisfactory. They did not know by this time whether Germany would fight, or was bluffing. The Allied press published reports that in May, 1938, Germany backed away from a then-intended invasion of Czechoslovakia, when the Allies had intimated that this meant war. The Allied press argued that the strength of the Allies, especially on the sea, and as to resources, was superior to that of the Axis, that the Axis knew it, and that it would not venture a war. The United States diplomatically, and in its press, suggested that the Allies show a bold front, and make the Axis understand that further aggressions from them would not be tolerated. The peoples of the democracies, not familiar with the facts as to the relative reserve and resources of the contending parties, had no doubt as to the greater strength of the Allies, especially if the United States was considered as benevolently neutral, and as furnishing supplies.

By about 20 September some gradual changes in the positions of troops had occurred. None were individually alarming; and they were not inconsistent with the idea of maneuvers or of precautionary measures.

It was known that the German western defenses were far from being completed, but enough work had been

done to provide a continuous position against French attack. France considered that the defenses could be smashed by strong artillery preparations. But these defenses had two to four lines in depth. Several artillery displacements forward, with as many artillery preparations, would be necessary to pierce them. This was bound to take time. It was doubtful whether the German frontier could be penetrated before Czechoslovakia was overwhelmed.

The Balkan states still showed no sign of action. Fearful and intensely interested, they preferred to remain neutral until they had reliable information as to which side would be likely to win. They refused to commit themselves at this time.

There were reports that Russia had concentrated about 30 divisions, plus two cavalry corps, near Kiev. It was understood that these troops were not entirely at war strength; and the Allies did not know what they were to do, or when they would do it. Their location was suitable for advancing through Rumania towards Czechoslovakia; but it was also suitable for a defense against invasion by Poland, or for an invasion into Poland. As no permission had yet been received from Rumania for passage of Russian forces, the only conclusion was that the Russians were concentrated in readiness for future undetermined action.

As near as could be determined, Russia had 70 other divisions, about 6,000 planes and a large tank force. There was an absence of information as to whether Russia could or would place these forces in line and be able to supply them. No one knew whether a major war might cause a revolution in Russia. Russia continued sympathetic to the Allies but was very noncommittal.

Poland at this date was alined with the Axis. She wanted her share of any spoils resulting from the disintegration of Czechoslovakia. On the frontier of that country she had about 5 divisions; 35 others were available against Russia. The Allies doubted whether Russia really intended to intervene; they thought that if she did, Poland, with German resources at her disposal, and with superior leadership, might defeat Russia. Had not Poland alone done so in 1920?

Japan quite positively announced her intention of joining the Axis. This was another reason why assistance from Russia was considered improbable.

It is curious to note the Japanese reasons for intervening in a quarrel apparently nowise connected with her own interests. In 1919, Japanese troops had formed the largest, best, and most active contingent of an Allied expeditionary force in Siberia. The alleged mission of this incursion was to save Czech troops, prisoners deep in the interior of that great land. The Czechs were rescued; they were duly sent back to their own country. Japan believed that she was entitled to some expression of gratitude from Czechoslovakia, and was unpleasantly surprised when Mr. Benes, president of that country, in 1932 took a leading part before the League of Nations in condemning Japan for her occupation of Manchukuo. Later in 1937 and 1938, Japan noted that an important part of the matériel she captured in her war with China was marked "Made in Czechoslovakia." To the Japanese this all looked like base ingratitude.

In 1935, the same Mr. Benes, in the same League of Nations, was the leader in imposing sanctions against Italy. The Italians did not forget this. Mr. Benes was personally disliked strongly by Japan and Italy. He was equally strongly disliked by Germany for failure to provide autonomy for the Sudeten, as had been promised in 1919. This personal dislike, or hatred, for Benes, was extended to include his country. In the hour of Czechoslovakia's need, the three great Axis Powers repaid old scores.

The German preparations for the attack, originally scheduled for 2 October, were on time. About 20 September it was decided to move the divisions and artillery from the maneuver areas into battle positions close to the Czechoslovakian frontier. Germany advised Italy and Hungary of her intentions, and these two countries also commenced to concentrate their troops. The first large troop movements in Germany were on 23 September. They were made during daylight hours, and passed through large cities; the various units could be counted and identified. On the same day, Chancellor Hitler announced that his troops would enter Czechoslovakia on 1 October unless the Sudeten was surrendered before that date.

According to reports of Americans then in Germany, the troops marched with full war equipment. The newest and most modern types of heavy guns, tanks, and other matériel were visible to all. There was no enthusiasm, either among troops or people. On the other hand, the troops were imbued with a spirit to do their duty. And there was an indefinable feeling that the cards had been stacked, that war would be avoided. But the Germans believed that if war did come, the Axis Powers were much the stronger, and would overcome resistance within a short time. They hoped and expected that matters would not be allowed to go too far.

French and British intelligence operatives in Germany promptly reported the movements of the German army; they located most of the Regular divisions, and some of the reserve divisions. Plotted on maps at London and Paris, the encirclement of Czechoslovakia by strong bodies of excellent troops was apparent on 24 September. Other reports indicated that Polish and Hungarian divisions were closing in on their sections of the Czechoslovakian front.

It being certain that the Allied powers had observed the concentration of troops, and were themselves mobilizing, on 26 September, Germany declared that she certainly did intend to seize the Sudeten, and would advance into that country at 2:00 PM, 28 September, unless a peaceful cession was arranged prior to that time.

The mobilization of Italy during these days was secret and so well conducted that the Allied operatives discovered only the movements of certain specialists. The secret mobilization of some of the German reserve divisions was successfully accomplished.

There was great excitement throughout the world. There had been doubt as to whether Germany was serious in her war threats. It now seemed that she was, that war was inevitable, and would occur in a few days. Citizens of France and Great Britain immediately foresaw bombing of their cities, bringing gas, injury, and death to their women and children.

There was a rush to evacuate London and Paris. A million people departed from the latter city. Uncounted numbers fled from London. There was hasty emergency construction of trenches and shelters. Gas masks were issued. Dugouts were built in parks and public places. But in spite of all that could be done, it was evident that it would be impossible, in the time available, to protect large centers of population from widespread catastrophe. And could Czechoslovakia be saved? How? Apparently that unfortunate country would be crushed by the combined forces of Germany, Poland, and Hungary, before help could possibly reach her.

France had started mobilizing on 24 September, two classes joining the colors that day. England had called out her reserves and sent her fleet to occupy their war stations. Owing to the small size of her country, Czechoslovakia was completely mobilized by 25 September. She prepared to fight to the last, stating that she expected France to come to her aid as required by treaty. Under existing treaties, it was understood that if France attacked Germany, the only thing she could do to assist Czechoslovakia, that Russia and Great Britain would automatically enter the war on the side of France. Although Great Britain and Russia, as well as France, understood this quite well, they showed no great enthusiasm for this mission which might bring ruin to their countries yet not save Czechoslovakia.

On 25 September Great Britain and France decided to confer. On the following day the heads of their governments and the chiefs of staff of the respective armies met in London. This conference was unlike the one held in Germany only three months earlier. Time now pressed. Hitler had that day announced his intention to advance into Czechoslovakia on 28 September, only two days later. The people were not, as in May, in ignorance of the situation. On the contrary, they were excited and fully aware of the impending danger. They had definite impressions as to what was going to happen.

No one in France or Great Britain wished to sacrifice Czechoslovakia. But no one desired to see civilization ended by wholesale destruction of cities or by brutal slaughter of men, women, and children. Was there any solution to this problem? What could it be? This was what the conference had to decide.

The prime ministers and their military and naval advisers discussed the situation. Except as to the mobilization of Italy, the facts narrated above were known. It was believed that Italy had not mobilized; it was hoped that this was an indication that Italy might consider withdrawing from the Axis. It was just a hope. They realized that Italy might remain with Germany; common prudence required that her forces be counted as part of those of the Axis.

According to the latest information, the disposition of the ground forces of the Axis were approximately as follows:

Opposite Czechoslovakia—55 divisions, being 40 German, 10 Hungarian, and 5 Polish—all 1st-class, and including 4 mechanized and 4 motorized.

Opposite France (Rhine)—13 divisions, all German, 10 of which were 2nd-class. Very strong artillery.

Opposite France (Italy)—5 1st-class divisions.

In reserve—43 divisions, German, 2nd-class; 35 divisions, Italian, 1st-class; 20 divisions, Italian, 2nd-class; 10 divisions, Hungarian, 5 each class; 35 divisions, Polish. In all, 216 divisions.

The Allies only had the 128 divisions previously listed.

If Russia with her 100 divisions should join the Allies, the latter would then have a slight superiority, but there was doubt as to what Russia would do. On 20 May preceding, Stalin, in an address to the directors of the International Communist Party, had stated that the interests of Soviet Russia lay in a war *between* capitalistic states. He added that the entire efforts of Russia, and of Communists elsewhere, must be directed to promoting such a war, which would certainly lead to a revolution of the proletariat. Now the hour had come, the World War was about to break. He desired all Communists to be prepared to profit by this. In view of such an order, could the Allies depend on Russia? It seemed quite possible that the reported mobilization of Russia's huge armies might be for a very different purpose than that of assisting Czechoslovakia.

There was doubt as to the ability of Germany to build 1,000 combat planes per month. Factories to do this had been established, but could the necessary materials be obtained? Some thought that 600 planes was nearer the limit. If that were so, and the Allies had access to the markets in the United States (as appeared certain), the Allies ultimately would have an air force superior to the Axis.

In the beginning the Axis would have about a 3 to 2 superiority in the air. This was unfortunate. Judging from experiences during the war in Spain, it could result in serious damage, some loss, and occasional tactical derangements. The general belief was, however, that if nations were prepared to support temporarily this very undesirable condition, the Axis could not force a decision in their favor in this way.

French generals considered it impossible for the Axis to invade France, either through the Maginot line opposite Germany or over the Alps from Italy. They believed that given sufficient time the highly trained and equipped French divisions could smash through the yet uncompleted German west defenses. The Czechoslovakian army was first class, and would be able to prevent German divisions being sent to the west before a large part of the penetration by French troops had been accomplished. But there could be no promise that Czechoslovakia could be reached early enough to save her.

As to resources, Germany had sufficient to last a year, possibly much longer. But if she had to supply Italy and Hungary, as seemed to be the case, she might break down at some future date now impossible to predict. The Allies had unlimited resources, especially if those of the United States were available. On resources alone the Allies in the long run should win.

The conclusions were:

a. That because of the Axis having superior land and air forces, Czechoslovakia could not be saved from being overrun before Allied troops could penetrate through south Germany.

b. That if war started, it would be a general world war, and might last a long time. It would finally be won by the side having the most reserves and resources, which was the Allied side.

The conference closed with an earnest desire to avoid a war if an honorable way out could be found. The peoples did not want war. The result of a world war would be uncertain, would entail enormous danger.

The result of the September conference was that rather than risk a lengthy, uncertain, and horrible war, the Allies accepted on 29/30 September a proposition of the Axis to agree to peaceful cession by Czechoslovakia of the Sudeten to Germany, based on the principle of self-determination of peoples.

This ended that crisis.

Comments

The open movement of German troops which precipitated the acute stage of the Sudeten crisis was deliberate. It was intended that the Allies should "discover" about 40 first-class German divisions, with artillery, tanks, and so on, plus numerous Hungarian and Polish divisions, lining up around Czechoslovakia. Only about 13 other German divisions, mostly second-class, were "discovered" opposite France. It was clear that Germany intended to crush Czechoslovakia, but had no intention of attacking France.

Why did she disclose her plan?

It was an application of the psychological principle that if fear is suddenly and unexpectedly caused, but a way to escape is open, the first impulsive instinct is not to reason but to retreat. The opinion that Germany was bluffing had been widely held. The Allied press had quite generally boosted that on 21 May, 1938, Germany had abandoned an intended invasion of Czechoslovakia because France and Great Britain had announced that they would not permit this. It had been represented on numerous occasions that the dictators understood no language except force. The Allied governments were urged not to yield again. Their people believed that the totalitarian states were so hopelessly inferior that they could not dream of waging a major war; that all that was necessary to stop the proposed aggression was to make it understood that the Allies would fight.

Therefore Chancellor Hitler decided to show that Germany was strong enough to crush Czechoslovakia. He moved his divisions into their battle positions, creating a situation which made it highly improbable that Czechoslovakia could be rescued. Hitler knew that the French and British general staffs would correctly evaluate the Axis strength. What he desired was to impress the Allied men-of-the-street, and Allied statesmen, that to interfere with Germany meant death and destruction without possibility of saving Czechoslovakia.

Chancellor Hitler has an extraordinary knowledge of psychology, an unequalled psychic insight. He did instill fear into the Allied nations that they might become involved in a useless, disastrous war. Their first blind reaction to this sudden view was to avoid the war if some face-saving way could be found. The Axis arranged for this, insisting on immediate conference and action, before extended reflection should suggest some other solution.

Suppose the Allies had not yielded. Would the Axis have given way, or would they have fought? Had not Germany, by disclosing the deployment of its forces, violated the military principle of acting by surprise? Only two men can positively answer the first of these two questions. These two are the German Führer and the Italian Duce, and they have not told us. We do not know, and may never know, what their real intentions were. The evidence available at this time indicates that the Axis was prepared for war, better so than the Allies.

While the mobilization of the German regular divisions was openly made, Italian mobilization was secret—remarkably so. Allowing for 10 divisions on the French front, and assuming that Hungary would watch Yugoslavia (expected, however, to be neutral), 30 first-class Italian divisions remained. The Germans could add 43 second-class divisions to these, the mobilization of which had been only partly observed by the Allies. A formidable mass of maneuver, consisting of 73 divisions, and which does not count 20 Italian second-class divisions, was also available.

There is no information yet as to how the Axis intended to use these 73 divisions. Germany and Italy, on 26 September, arranged for a joint GHQ at Munich to open on 28 September. This is an indication that the Axis intended to operate in south Germany, possibly after the Allies had become partially exhausted through frontal attacks on the German west defenses. The presence of the strong German artillery force in rear of these defenses would be consistent with this view.

Undoubtedly the Axis preferred sincerely to avoid a war, provided its mission could be accomplished. It was, nevertheless, well prepared for war.

As to the second question—whether disclosure of German troop movements violated the principle of surprise—the answer is, it did not. The Sudeten operation on the part of the Axis was an example of the change in method of application of this principle. It combined military with psychological factors. Surprise was distributed between fear, widely and suddenly disseminated, and certain military measures carefully hidden. It was a modern way, and it worked.

Cavalry Shock Tactics

By Colonel H. S. Stewart, Late 15th Lancers, Indian Army

Today the shock action of cavalry versus cavalry arouses little interest. The more extreme opinion holds that all cavalry should be mechanized, the less extreme one considers that even cavalry which retains its horses can now only act by fire, and should not be trained for anything else, and even amongst those who are strong supporters of the "mounted attack at extended intervals" against dismounted troops, there is probably no one who thinks that in future wars cavalry will act as was visualized prior to 1914.

Nevertheless, there is some reason to anticipate that when mounted formations, even of considerable size, encounter each other (especially in areas where fighting vehicles are unable to accompany them), one side or the other may find it possible to resort to mounted action: and if this does happen the *cavalry unprepared for such a contingency will lose the initiative in any locality where it can be so attacked.*

In the last Great War the anticipated large scale mounted action of "Cavalry versus Cavalry" did not take place; there were numerous small engagements but no great battles. A mounted action in Eastern Galicia in August, 1914, between Russian and Austrian cavalry divisions resulted in fiasco. In part, at least, this was due to both sides contravening all the principles of mounted tactics.

The reasons of the lack of shock action in the Great War of 1914-18 are debatable. The terrain of northern France and Belgium was, it is true, too enclosed for the maneuver of large bodies of mounted troops, but this was not the case on the Russian frontier. The real fact is that nerve and resolution, greater than that of Seidlits or Murat, were required for hazarding the destruction of the great masses of horsemen that marched to war in 1914; and few if any of the higher leaders seem to have possessed the temperament "to put their fortune to the touch, to win or lose it all." What they could have done is rather beside the point; the fact is *they did not try.*

There is nothing very remarkable about this. Writing before 1870, Ardant du Picq said: "It (the cavalry) has not given great results for the reason that we and others lacked real cavalry generals. He is, it seems, a phenomenon that is produced every thousand years."

There were no great mounted battles in the Spanish Civil War. But, apart from the mountainous nature of Spain being unfavorable to shock tactics, there was no Republican Cavalry. The close order charge can only be made on opponents who fight mounted; against cavalry which dismounts the attack in extended order must be employed.

In open country without natural obstructions to free movement, and where there are secure and ample supply facilities, fighting vehicles, which are able to go in force anywhere and everywhere, may make it difficult for cavalry on horses to play a leading part in the operations. However, cavalry equipped with antitank weapons, has little to fear from fighting vehicles in small numbers.

But all wars will not be fought in countries with roads, bridges, and communications suitable for fighting vehicles; and even where these facilities are plentiful, the terrain will seldom permit of the free movement of vehicles across the intervening country, although this will offer few obstacles to cavalry on horses. In parts of the world where war may occur, there are vast non-mountainous areas where cavalry can move freely, but where fighting vehicles could scarcely move at all; and certainly could not be employed with advantage. Even in Europe there are many areas, unsuited to the mass movement of vehicles, where natural and artificial obstacles to horsemen are few.

Assumptions based on tactical premises deduced from circumstances that may or may not repeat themselves have caused disasters in the past; and hasty conclusions, that shock action can be left out of consideration in future, should be accepted with reserve.

The very reasonable opinion, that shock action will not in future be the normal cavalry action, is no reason for neglecting its practice altogether, or for despising its possibilities. "Cavalry action, more than that of infantry, is an affair of *morale*."[1]

Cavalry on independent missions has to make every effort to achieve decisive success as quickly as possible. If it is totally untrained to mounted action, it is unable to do this because it can not act offensively against opponents who determinedly attack it mounted whenever it makes use of its horses to change its position.

While in future battles cavalry attacks on a great scale may be impracticable, as long as soldiers continue to ride horses on detached duties, there will always be shock actions involving the smaller tactical units; and even during great battles such encounters may take place. At times minor successes may lead to great results.

When in contact with an enemy determined to operate mounted, the only alternatives are:

(a) A mounted counter-offensive.
(b) The defensive occupation of positions.
(c) An attack by encircling fire.

The Mounted Counter-Offensive

Cavalry on an independent mission unexpectedly encountering at close quarters a mounted enemy (even in

[1] Ardant du Picq, Battle Studies.

As to resources, Germany had sufficient to last a year, possibly much longer. But if she had to supply Italy and Hungary, as seemed to be the case, she might break down at some future date now impossible to predict. The Allies had unlimited resources, especially if those of the United States were available. On resources alone the Allies in the long run should win.

The conclusions were:

a. That because of the Axis having superior land and air forces, Czechoslovakia could not be saved from being overrun before Allied troops could penetrate through south Germany.

b. That if war started, it would be a general world war, and might last a long time. It would finally be won by the side having the most reserves and resources, which was the Allied side.

The conference closed with an earnest desire to avoid a war if an honorable way out could be found. The peoples did not want war. The result of a world war would be uncertain, would entail enormous danger.

The result of the September conference was that rather than risk a lengthy, uncertain, and horrible war, the Allies accepted on 29/30 September a proposition of the Axis to agree to peaceful cession by Czechoslovakia of the Sudeten to Germany, based on the principle of self-determination of peoples.

This ended that crisis.

Comments

The open movement of German troops which precipitated the acute stage of the Sudeten crisis was deliberate. It was intended that the Allies should "discover" about 40 first-class German divisions, with artillery, tanks, and so on, plus numerous Hungarian and Polish divisions, lining up around Czechoslovakia. Only about 13 other German divisions, mostly second-class, were "discovered" opposite France. It was clear that Germany intended to crush Czechoslovakia, but had no intention of attacking France.

Why did she disclose her plan?

It was an application of the psychological principle that if fear is suddenly and unexpectedly caused, but a way to escape is open, the first impulsive instinct is not to reason but to retreat. The opinion that Germany was bluffing had been widely held. The Allied press had quite generally boasted that on 21 May, 1938, Germany had abandoned an intended invasion of Czechoslovakia because France and Great Britain had announced that they would not permit this. It had been represented on numerous occasions that the dictators understood no language except force. The Allied governments were urged not to yield again. Their people believed that the totalitarian states were so hopelessly inferior that they could not dream of waging a major war; that all that was necessary to stop the proposed aggression was to make it understood that the Allies would fight.

Therefore Chancellor Hitler decided to show that Germany *was* strong enough to crush Czechoslovakia. He moved his divisions into their battle positions, creating a situation which made it highly improbable that Czechoslovakia could be rescued. Hitler knew that the French and British general staffs would correctly evaluate the Axis strength. What he desired was to impress the Allied *men-of-the-street*, and Allied statesmen, that to interfere with Germany meant death and destruction without possibility of saving Czechoslovakia.

Chancellor Hitler has an extraordinary knowledge of psychology, an unequalled psychic insight. He did instill fear into the Allied nations that they might become involved in a useless, disastrous war. Their first blind reaction to this sudden view was to avoid the war if some face-saving way could be found. The Axis arranged for this, insisting on immediate conference and action, before extended reflection should suggest some other solution.

Suppose the Allies had not yielded. Would the Axis have given way, or would they have fought? Had not Germany, by disclosing the deployment of its forces, violated the military principle of acting by surprise? Only two men can positively answer the first of these two questions. These two are the German Führer and the Italian Duce, and they have not told us. We do not know, and may never know, what their real intentions were. The evidence available at this time indicates that the Axis was prepared for war, better so than the Allies.

While the mobilization of the German regular divisions was openly made, Italian mobilization was secret—remarkably so. Allowing for 10 divisions on the French front, and assuming that Hungary would watch Yugoslavia (expected, however, to be neutral), 30 first-class Italian divisions remained. The Germans could add 43 second-class divisions to these, the mobilization of which had been only partly observed by the Allies. A formidable mass of maneuver, consisting of 73 divisions, and which does not count 20 Italian second-class divisions, was also available.

There is no information yet as to how the Axis intended to use these 73 divisions. Germany and Italy, on 26 September, arranged for a joint GHQ at Munich to open on 28 September. This is an indication that the Axis intended to operate in south Germany, possibly after the Allies had become partially exhausted through frontal attacks on the German west defenses. The presence of the strong German artillery force in rear of these defenses would be consistent with this view.

Undoubtedly the Axis preferred sincerely to avoid a war, provided its mission could be accomplished. It was, nevertheless, well prepared for war.

As to the second question—whether disclosure of German troop movements violated the principle of surprise—the answer is, it did not. The Sudeten operation on the part of the Axis was an example of the change in method of application of this principle. It combined military with psychological factors. Surprise was distributed between fear, widely and suddenly disseminated, and certain military measures carefully hidden. It was a modern way, and it worked.

Cavalry Shock Tactics

By Colonel H. S. Stewart, Late 15th Lancers, Indian Army

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The Mounted Counter-Offensive

Cavalry on an independent mission unexpectedly encountering at close quarters a mounted enemy (even in

[1]Ardant du Picq *Battle Studies.*

considerably superior force), will protect itself more easily and effectively by an immediate resolute mounted action than by dismounting to fire. This is especially the case when small parties, unaccompanied by artillery or machine guns meet in comparatively open country.

The Defensive Occupation of Positions

Cavalry cannot carry out any mission, if whenever the enemy is encountered it has to ensconce itself in defended positions. Such tactics would not only cause it to neglect its mission, but would expose it to the continual risk of attack from the flanks and rear. Cavalry by dismounting cannot force its enemy to do the same, and the knowledge that it is only safe when on its feet affects both its *morale* and its mobility. Mounted forces will not attempt to break through defended fronts, they will go round a flank. Mounted riflemen are particularly vulnerable to mounted attack when obliged to remount because their position is outflanked. "Mounted infantry (i.e. riflemen) are as helpless when in the saddle as artillery when limbered up."[2]

The Attack by Encircling Fire

In enclosed country dismounted riflemen (of mobility superior to their enemy) may be able to envelope mounted forces inferior in number with a ring of fire. The nature of the country would be such that detachments can move freely from tactical position to tactical position, protected from view, secured both against fire attack and mounted attack while on the move. These tactics necessitate dispersion; and there is a great danger of being defeated in detail by a cavalry which does not hesitate to ride down the fire-ring, with an extended order attack as French did at Kilp Drift.

The evidence of history is—

(a) That fire alone has seldom, if ever stopped a determined and well conducted mounted attack launched over suitable ground. (This of course is more particularly applicable to the extended interval mounted attacks on dismounted men.)

(b) That in open country all cavalry best protects itself by its readiness for mounted action, and the speed of its horses.

(c) That the attack of cavalry on cavalry which does not dismount, calls for close interval between files.

The Mounted Attack at Close Interval

This calls for quick decisions, and is facilitated by the concentration of units, because dispersed cavalry formations are difficult to control.

Because of the danger from air attack, artillery directed

[2] *Lessons from Two Recent Wars* by General Langlois.

WELL DONE

The Cavalry Rifle Team has experienced a brilliant year. In the National Rifle Team Match the cavalry stood second, only a shy four points below the winning team. Our team this year made the best showing in The National Rifle Match since the World War. Every stage of fire was hotly contested. The finish of only six points between the first three teams indicates the competition which prevailed. The more notable accomplishments of the Cavalry team may be demonstrated by the following statistics:

The Enlisted Men's Trophy Team Match—Cavalry, 2nd place.

The President's Match—High cavalry, First Lieutenant Joseph Williams, score, 135 (highest score, 137).

National Pistol Team Match—Cavalry, 4th place.

Infantry Match—Cavalry, 2nd place.

National Individual Pistol Match—Staff Sergeant Jens B. Jensen, Cavalry School Staff, score 277 (high score, 280).

Herrick Trophy Team Match—Cavalry, 3rd place.

.45 Caliber Restricted Class Pistol Match—First Sergeant Edgar W. Holtz, 5th Cavalry, 1st place.

Scott Trophy Match—Sergeant Edward Weszerski and First Lieutenant Charles B. Fuller, Cavalry Reserve, tied for 1st place.

from the air, and machine guns, cavalry normally will not be able to move in concentrated formations. Even brigades may not be able to concentrate prior to an actual engagement. Divisions would have to rely on intelligent cooperation rather than orders.

Formations larger than a division require so long to assemble and deploy, that they would never be able to take advantage of a fleeting opportunity. It may be accepted that, unless chance brings about some unexpected sequences of fortune, shock actions will be limited to encounters between squadrons and regiments. Should for some reason or other (such as distance from aircraft bases or a break down of mechanization) danger from air attack and long range artillery be temporarily minimized, cavalry might be able to take advantage of this to concentrate to a much greater degree than is normally possible.

Success in shock action in the past has depended mainly on—

(A) The leader.
(B) On surprising the enemy: at least by the direction of the attack.
(C) Cohesion and harmonious movement.
(D) Skilled disposition and employment of the supports and reserves.
(E) Combination of fire and shock, and a fire pivot.

But the following also have played important parts:

(a) Support by other arms.
(b) "*Apropos*" attack.
(c) *Morale*.
(d) Luck.
(e) Utilization of ground.
(f) The non-existence of serious obstacles.
(g) A simple plan, clear orders.
(h) The immediate rally.
(i) The horses' condition.

Are these factors the ones that are still applicable? Modern conditions have revolutionized tactics, but "centuries have not changed human nature. Passions, instincts, amongst the most powerful one of self preservation may be manifested in various ways. . . . But at bottom there is always found the same man."[3] These factors are all more or less closely associated with human nature and only incidentally with tactics; they will apply in a degree to the end of time.

The Leader

The rôle of cavalry throughout the ages has increased or diminished according to the "character of those who have had command."[4]

His maneuvers (to ensure the best direction to the attack his employment of the reserves), and his judgment (about the correct moment of deployment), are what achieve victory or disaster.

The cavalry leader must rely on instinct to visualize a prophetic mind picture (of the tactical situation, the ground, the enemy, the plan, and of what will occur within the next fraction of time) and act in accordance with what this tells him is most likely to happen.

It is impossible to stereotype cavalry maneuver; theories appear simple on paper, but on the ground everything moves so fast that cavalry mounted action is one of the most difficult operations of war; situations change momentarily and do not repeat themselves.

Captain Loir (in Cavalry) defines maneuver as "putting into execution the idea of the leader," and emphasizes two things should be kept in mind: suddenness, and "the object of demoralization rather than destruction." He adds that the cavalry fight had been called "the encounter of two moral forces," and says "Instantaneity of action will doubtless entail a series of effect so rapid that the outcome will be influenced by the soundness or otherwise of the plan evolved at the start, which plan will admit of no modifications once blades have crossed."

Direction of Attack Surprising Enemy

"Cavalry maneuvers like those of infantry are threats. The most threatening win."[5] The object should be an advance against the flank of the enemy which does not

[3] Ardant du Picq *Battle Studies*.
[4] Lord Haig's *Cavalry Studies*.
[5] *Battle Studies* by Ardant du Picq.

mask the supporting fire. When formations charge each other in parallel lines the results (except one side is greatly superior either in numbers or in cohesion) must be indecisive.

"When the British cavalry charges you, make one rapid change of front and take it in flank. You will always successfully execute this maneuver against every cavalry whatsoever which like the English make a vigorous and headlong charge, whose horses are but little under control and whose troopers have more bravery than tactics, so they push their charges to too great a distance." (de Brack) This opinion is borne out by the Duke of Wellington, who considered the cause of Slade's fiasco at Maguilla "was the trick our officers of cavalry have acquired of galloping at everything, they never think of maneuvering before an enemy."

"Whatever method be adopted in charging, one of the best methods of using cavalry opportunity is on the enemy's flanks. This maneuver may be completely successful especially in charges of cavalry against cavalry. It should be employed at the very moment when the lines came in collision. A flank attack being more to be apprehended by cavalry, than in a combat of infantry with infantry, several squadrons should be formed in echelons on the flanks of a line of cavalry which may form to the right or left to meet an enemy coming in the same direction. For the same reason it is important to throw several squadrons against the flanks of a line of cavalry which is attacked in front." (Jomini)

"An attack direct to the front must be an exceptional thing: to advance and at the same time gain ground to a flank must be the rule." He also says: "Ten men on a flank do more than one hundred in front." (Von Schmidt)

"The efficacy of the flank attack is so universally admitted as to need no argument to support it. A more difficult question is how should we protect our own flanks from attack?" (Lord Haig)

Utilization of ground may conceal a flank march, but only a mistake of the enemy can usually provide the factor of time. Long gallops (to secure advantage of position) defeat their own ends by prematurely exhausting horses and men. Many consider that maneuver to attack a flank position, prior to an attack, is not practical because advantages gained will be more than nullified by the time lost. Where the ground is favourable offensive flanks may be formed by bodies in 'forward echelon.' Flanks echeloned to the rear are a defence against enemy flank attacks; but such echelons cannot act as support and reserves, and protect the flanks as well." In these days of aeroplane observation the difficulties of carrying out extensive flank movements by large forces are almost insoluble.

Capeain Loir (Cavalry) says: "Without doubt a flank attack greatly helps to demoralize the enemy, but we must have no illusions regarding its importance and usefulness," and goes on to emphasize "that its success is essentially based on surprise" and says "every attack on the flank which is seen, is an attack paried; it degenerates itself into a frontal attack."

Cohesion and Harmonious Movement

The horse is the primary weapon of cavalry, and cohesion is the medium of its power. Shock action aims at overwhelming the opponents by an irresistible blow. Close interval between files is necessary to give weight to this blow, as in a closed line several horses oppose each horse in a line of extended order. Cohesion is however impossible without harmonious movement.

There are ideas that the attack with "extended intervals" can be effectively used nowadays against hostile cavalry. But this is not based on logic; one horse meeting three is knocked down as easily as ever and modern troopers are not more ready than their ancestors to meet a line advancing like a wall.

There are those who have imagined that the necessary cohesion can be secured by the rear ranks during the charge filling up any gaps that may occur in the front ranks; practical cavalrymen realize that such a project is an illusion; men "barging in" from the rear create almost as great demoralization as an enemy breaking through the front.

It will seldom happen that two forces will actually meet in a charge. Usually units which perceive the enemy's cohesion is superior to their own, will try and avoid any collision at all. Ardant du Picq mentions an instance of an encounter (between two regiments of Russians and two of Poles) where both sides fled before any shock took place. Obviously in this instance, apart from poor *morale* both must have lacked cohesion because it is only when there are loose intervals, that weak-hearted men can turn their horses to flee. Every regiment does have some men "who wish to live to fight another day."

Maneuver at close interval is one of the best ways of ensuring that all troopers become competent horsemen. It is a great handicap not to be able to ride at six inches from knee to knee.

Inspecting officers should not judge efficiency by observing the "dressing" from a flank; but should make squadrons advance towards them at speed and see if they can maintain their intervals without "opening out" or "closings up." Six inches from knee to knee gives plenty of room to men who ride straight. Cavalry should never, even on ceremonial, carry out movements with files closed more tightly.

Jomini thinks that cohesion is more important than pace; he says: "It must not be understood, however, that impetuosity always gives the advantage in a shock of cavalry against cavalry; the fast trot on the contrary seems to me the best gait for charges in line, because everything depends in such a case on the *ensemble* and good order of the movement, things that cannot be obtained in charges at a fast gallop."

"By cohesion is not meant that men are to be jammed together for this only produces disorder by men being

forced out of their places and the number of ranks increased." (Von Schmidt)

Today, owing to the necessity of advancing into action in as open a formation as possible, close interval between files may only become possible just prior to a charge. This is all the more reason for devoting time to such training.

As long as the tactical situation permits, attacking lines should advance at the "Trot." The pace should be increased to the gallop in time to work up the necessary momentum to the charge, but the order "Charge" should not be given till about fifty yards from the enemy.

Napoleon's heavy cavalry actually charged at a trot because its training was so indifferent that it could not maintain cohesion and order at a faster pace. Cohesion is certainly quite as important as pace; it is facilitated by shortening the distance over which a charge is made; this will not only preserve cohesion, but will save the strength of the horses for the moment of shock.

Hurried deployments make for confusion; the better the training, the later can deployment be left. Cohesion is facilitated by late development: "columns" change direction easily, but "lines" find this difficult. Even slight changes of direction by a line committed to an attack, will cause loss of cohesion even in the best trained units. Last minute attempts to change direction by "shouldering," even where only squadrons are concerned, will catapult men out of the ranks in some places and cause gaps in others. "Shouldering," besides disordering the line, calls for the maximum pace of flank units and tires the horses. If an attacking line is obliged to change direction suddenly, it is better to attack in echelon of regiment or even of squadrons, that attempt to "shoulder the line" or even to make a "half wheel of troops," and then reform line.

Supports and Reserves

Once a commander has launched an attack he should move to the position from which he can best watch the fight and issue orders to his supports and reserves; *these are the only means left to him of influencing events.*

Supports and reserves are essential in every cavalry action. They exploit initial successes, which otherwise would lead to no results. The side, which retains the last formed reserve, is certain of victory. A repulsed cavalry force is liable to be destroyed unless a formed reserve is at hand, behind which defeated detachments can be rallied and led back to the fight; and even a victorious body of cavalry which has expended its reserves, is in danger of defeat by quite a small formation which has not been engaged, because of the confusion which is inseparable from the aftermath of a charge. Once victory is gained large portions of reserve can be used for pursuit; but some reserve must always be kept in hand to deal with any fresh reinforcements brought forward by the enemy.

Supports and reserves follow attacking lines, but need not necessarily move directly behind them; in fact it is usual for a portion of them to be in echelon on the flank, but some formed bodies must follow the attacking line to reinforce and restore breaks in case of a reverse. As a unit in column or echelon is in the hand of its leader, and can be directed to any area where it is required, supports and reserves should not deploy until required to take part in an attack. Echelon, by breaking up continuous lines into easily handled bodies, conduces to the retention of good order when advancing over rough ground: it automatically provides some flank protection, but no part of a rear echelon can carry out the double task of protecting a flank, and acting as a support or reserve.

General Bernhardi preferred that supports and reserves should follow on lines rather than on the flank in echelons. He contended that such echelons were not favourably placed to deal with reverses in the middle of the line, and argued that Frederick the Great did not echelon his supports and reserves, but formed his cavalry in two lines, and retained it in this formation throughout an engagement.

The fact that Frederick did not employ echelon does not necessarily condemn it. The drill methods of his day were not adapted to the quick deployments of echeloned columns. His cavalry masses had no higher formation than a regiment, nor were there words of command in use suitable for units larger than regiments. Moves to a flank called for square wheels of squadrons into column followed by further square wheels into line. Prior to an action Frederick normally employed his hussars in the advance guard; in an action they formed a third or reserve line.

Combination of Fire and Shock

Since the beginning of history, the combination of Fire and Shock has always led to cavalry victories, and where and when these tactics have not found favour, cavalry has met with constant failure. The mounted missile action of the light cavalry of the East made them universally feared; but in the West made little attempt to imitate their tactics.

In the past horse artillery was the main fire power of cavalry, but now this has been supplemented by machine guns and other automatic weapons.

To facilitate the effective combination of fire and shock, mounted forces maneuver with reference to previously selected fire pivots.

As the result of an action may depend on the choice of a fire pivot, horse artillery, machine gun and fighting vehicle commanders must continually reconnoitre well in advance for suitable positions and areas. At the time they are called on to provide fire support, there will be no opportunity for reconnaissance and little for explanation. It is best for the fire attack to select its position, and for the mounted attack to move away from this. Should the fire attack have to move its position away from the mounted attack, it seldom is able to get into action sufficiently early. If the shock attack can be launched at right angles to the line of fire of the fire attack, the enemy can be enfiladed up till the moment of shock. Enfilade fire is very important, as apart from the superior tactical effect the actual firing can be continued longer. With machine guns enfilade fire is even more essential, as

it is only with enfilade fire that a machine gun attains its full effectiveness.

The following influence events in all forms of cavalry action:

Support by Other Arms

Artillery and machine guns have the tasks of aiding the attack and covering a rally. Movements should be concealed, so normally fire should not be opened till the enemy is committed to action; but once fire commences, it should be continued as long as possible. Artillery usually should concentrate its fire on the enemy cavalry, not on his guns. Machine guns, by providing security to the artillery, can obviate the necessity of detaching mounted tactical units for an escort.

Mechanized cavalry if available will be used as the situation demands. If it is retained in reserve, it will be available to counter-attack any enemy mechanized formations, and to cover a rally or withdrawal. As it requires: (a) time to prepare for action, and (b) carefully thought out orders it should not be prematurely employed.

As regards other fighting vehicles, when these are available in force, shock action is inopportune; except in localities where the fighting vehicles cannot go. But on the other hand a few fighting are not a serious danger as these can easily be dealt with by the antitank weapons which should be in close support ready to counter-attack any surprise intervention of the enemy mechanized cavalry.

The "Appropos" Attack

Much of the discredit which is showered on shock tactics is attributable to their having often been attempted when conditions were unfavorable. There are occasions when shock action is appropriate, there are others when it is hopelessly inappropriate. The attacks of the German cavalry at Haelen on the Belgians ensconced behind obstacles, is a typical instance of mistaken tactics. Even against mounted men, unless there is a decisive superiority of force, shock action normally will only lead to a great success when the enemy is taken at a disadvantage. Instances of really *appropos* attacks are those made when the enemy's dispositions are incomplete, or when his units are too dispersed to aid each other effectively.

Morale

This requires little emphasis; to be successful in shock action cavalry must believe in the efficacy of such tactics, or it will be half-defeated before the action commences. Lord Haig says: "Cavalry must be educated up to a readiness to act absolutely regardless of consequences and to a determination to conquer."[6]

Luck

Napoleon said: "It is necessary in war to profit by every occasion, for fortune is a woman; if you let her slip today, do not expect to find her to-morrow." The element of chance is most marked in cavalry fighting. Everything happens so quickly, and vital information usually arrives so late that much has to be chanced. Patrols, even if able to estimate the numbers of squadrons and batteries and to report on the ground, will not usually be able to give reliable information about the disposition of a rapidly moving force.

Utilization of Ground

Ground can conceal the direction and dispositions on an approach march, except from air reconnaissance; and certain types of country are unfavorable to visibility from the air. Even air reports take some time to transmit and they are normally of little or no use in close cavalry reconnaissance. A primary consideration in choosing ground for a mounted action is the possibility of establishing suitable fire pivot on one flank or the other.

The Non-Existence of Serious Obstacles

Ground scouts can only work in the immediate vicinity of the squadrons that send them out; so to insure that attacks are not made over ground unsuitable for mounted action, special trained officers must reconnoitre well in advance. It might well be worth while for some officers to go forward by road in cars with their horses towed behind in those light road horse boxes used for carrying hunters. It is important to locate and report on areas where collisions are likely. Ground suitable for shock action may be limited in extent, and the effective employment and deployment of the available squadrons in those areas will be facilitated by early information.

Simple Plan and Clear Orders

That great American (Confederate) Forrest said that his only plan was to get there first with the most men. The words largely epitomize cavalry tactics. But "the most men" will not arrive first anywhere, if the orders are not simple and clear.

The plan and orders must be sufficiently simple for subordinate leaders to grasp their meaning without long explanations for which time will never be available. Rapidity is essential, and complicated maneuvers will never lead to success. Units trained and led on the "follow-my-leader system" can give effect to unexpected movements in any direction without any verbal orders at all.

The Immediate Rally

Both in victory or defeat, an immediate rally is essential. A portion of the victorious squadrons must follow a defeated enemy in disorder at top speed, to prevent his rallying; but, as these will be at the mercy of any formed enemy reinforcements, some squadrons must rally before following, so that there will be detachments in regular formation supporting the pursuers.

Rallies should be to the "front"; the faint-hearted troopers may fail to check their horses should their noses once be turned towards the rear! The losses in retreat are not confined to those killed and wounded.

The Horses' Condition

Horses in bad condition are of little use for shock action; and it is essential that no mercy should be extended

[6] *Cavalry Studies.*

to men who fail to place the well being of their horses before their own. But the preservation of the horses should not be allowed to become such a fetish with leaders that they will not sacrifice horses when tactical conditions demand it. A great cavalry success may even destroy a number of units for the time being, but if victory can be achieved this may well be worth while. Napoleon said: "Cavalry should not be handled with any miserly desire to preserve it intact" and that "I do not wish the horses to be spared if they can catch men."

The Arme Blanche or the Pistol

Contrary to historical experience many hold the opinion that the *Arme Blanche* is no longer necessary for cavalry; and that the pistol is sufficient shock action. The value of the pistol in the mounted attack was firmly believed in, as long ago as the time of the Thirty Years War: but Cromwell and Frederick subsequently forbade its use, and by doing so made their cavalry charges irresistible; thereby proving that the previous theories had been ill founded.

While firearms have improved out of all recognition, men's hearts have not changed, and the possession of a sword undoubtedly increases the *morale* of most men, and is not without its effect on the *morale* of opponents. In any case a sword is well worth the slight extra weight entailed on the horse.

Before they had any experience of war, the Australians and New Zealand Light Horse despised the *arme blanche*, but after they had been some time "on service" they demanded swords.

For attacks in extended order against dismounted opponents automatic pistols, *in the hands of men highly trained in their use*, may prove most effective. Theoretically in shock action (provided the leaders do not ride in front) a line armed with pistols should be able to shoot down a line armed with swords, before an actual collision could take place. In practice, however, things seldom work out according to theory. It is undesirable to remove leaders from the front of a cavalry attack; and there are great objections to the use of pistols in mounted attacks that excitement and the movement of the animals makes the best of shots fire less accurately at the gallop, while cohesion and harmonious movement is decreased through the natural instinct of everyone to edge way from any neighbor flourishing a loaded pistol.

A pistol is considered by many to be more useful in a *mêlée* than a sword; but "a bullet fired of in a *mêlée* may hit friend or foe. Very fine horsemen like Arizona cowboys, who break insulators of telegraph wires as they gallop along with a weapon which they have been accustomed to handle from their youth up, would probably do well in a pursuit with such a weapon, but it is not, we believe, seriously contemplated by any nation as a weapon for use in its ranks."[1]

Conclusions

In areas unsuited to Fighting Vehicles or Armoured Forces, or where these are not available, horsemen *must* still be employed. In other areas they will also be used with non-armoured forces as long as the utility of "mechanized cavalry" remains dependent on so many unpredictable circumstances and factors.

The great military powers of Germany and Russia are increasing their mounted forces, not reducing them. While this does not necessarily mean that they they believe that the pre-1914 tactics will be those of the war for which they are now all preparing, but it does mean that they consider that the horse will continue to be used in war to carry fighting men in future wars. Human nature being what it is, horsed units will endeavour to fight mounted whenever they can provided that the timidity of higher leaders does not blight the individual enterprise of regimental and squadron leaders.

Cavalry leaders should never despise the power of shock, but neither on the other hand should they unduly exalt it to the prejudice of other training, as has sometimes happened in the past. The training and employment of cavalry calls for a sense of proportion in the utilization of "the means at hand" to achieve "the end in view."

The appropriateness of any sort of mounted action is entirely dependent on its offering in some particular tactical situation the chance of an important success. Such opportunities are on the decrease, and they do not all afford openings for a "close order charge." This is only called for when attacking an enemy formation which decides to remain mounted. In all probability, future shock action will mainly be restricted to fights involving squadrons and regiments: occasionally perhaps forces larger than regiments may carry out attacks, but the weapons and conditions of modern war are unfavourable to employment of mounted men in masses. It is no longer possible to carry out great attacks according to the practice of Seidlitz and Murat.

To make success likely:

(a) There should be an element of surprise.

(b) The ground should be free of the kind of obstacles that give occasion for dismay and disorder before any enemy is met.

(c) There should be effectual arrangements about supporting "shock" with fire.

(d) Once an attack is launched, it should fall on the enemy without counting his numbers; therefore the units must possess *morale*, and the determination either to conquer or perish with glory.

Shock action calls for the mobility, discipline, horsemanship, and horsemastership. Without these qualities units cannot maintain cohesion and harmony of movement during extended advances, even when these are not made in close interval. Attacks which lack cohesion and harmony will usually fail.

Even under the most favourable conditions disaster may result from the ineptitude of leaders, and from reliance on complicated plans, which normally lead to misunderstandings and confusion.

[1] *Our Cavalry* by Major General Rimmington.

Reserves Take Command at Fort Bliss

By Captain Carl N. Smith, Cavalry Reserve

Ever since the Reserve Corps was organized Reserve officers have been checking in at the various military posts of the United States for periodical training with the Regular Army. And what a wide variety of training they've received! Some of the stories they tell about their work would shock the commanding general or even lesser rank. One related a story of busy period of training—two days' travel to camp, two days' back home, three days for physical examination to get assigned to troops and three more, perhaps less, to get in physical condition to return home, two days to get equipment on memorandum receipt at the beginning of camp, and two days to return it to the government before leaving; and thus his fourteen days of active duty training for that fiscal year was completed without even the ball of red tape with which his training was wrapped to take back home. Another and more authentic story revealed a tough schedule on a cavalry post with intensive instruction in the manual of arms, with the 1903 model Springfield, grooming of horses with due emphasis on the extremities of each end of the animal, stable cleanliness and a few other lessons the officer assigned for instruction of the Reserves had learned when last he was in charge of a class of recruits. This went on each day of camp, so the officer related, with a group of some 40 to 50 officers in the class. However, as the years came along, official dignity was to encircle the crowns of Reserve officers who put in their appearance for military training. They graduated from recruit instruction to that of official observer, and were allowed to observe the troops in action.

Those were peaceful years even in Europe and the populace of the United States felt sure that the army of this country would never be called upon for national defense. The training of an army seemed a waste of public funds to many self-appointed spokesmen for the pacifist cause. To these curbstone orators the Reserve was a useless appendage to a useless body. Though the army itself did not feel the uselessness of its appendage, its personnel gave little thought or preparation to training Reserves. The possibility that Reserve officers might some day be in command of young Americans in the front lines of the battlefield seemed quite remote to practically everyone, even most of the officers of the Regular Army.

If the active duty program of Reserves was of little concern to the Regulars then, it was perhaps even less to many Reserve officers who turned out with considerable enthusiasm to the officers' club swimming pool and social functions of the evening but settled down to drowsy inattentiveness as the work of the morning began.

That was the trend of training of Reserves in its extreme and the tales will grow even worse as the officers of that day have grandchildren to listen to their yarns. A vastly different tale to any of these will be the authentic narrative of the summer camp of the 312th Cavalry active duty training at Fort Bliss, Texas, July 14th to 28th this year. The seventy-six cavalry officers who passed all requirements for training in July found something besides "bunk fatigue" waiting for them. First call developed a far different meaning than it had to some of the officers who had attended those camps of the legendary past.

The commanding general on one post flatteringly told Reserve officers assigned to his instruction that the only way he could tell them from his Regular officers was by their clean hats and new hat cords. This identifying mark was soon lost to the 312th Cavalry for in short order these officers had kicked up such a dust that their hats and cords looked as dirty and "time honored" as the Regulars.

By far the most significant factor in the training of the 312th Cavalry this summer was that the troops were turned over to the Reserves to command tactically with the entire responsibility resting squarely on their shoulders. While this type of command has likely been tried at other posts at some time, this is believed to be the first time that Reserves took sole command for the duration of the camp with no Regular officers standing at arm's length to prompt the Reserve officer when he missed his lines. As a matter of fact, the umpire system and staff was operated by the Reserves and the 312th Cavalry regimental staff issued all orders and even took on the duty of supply for the three-day field maneuver of the second week. Authorities at Fort Bliss who worked for months in advance with Lieutenant Colonel John T. Minton, the unit instructor, coöperated in wonderful manner. All concerned recognized the importance of giving Reserves an opportunity to make and correct their own mistakes and as a result the Regular officers were completely out of the picture.

The 312th started cutting corners from the outset of their camp to leave as much time as possible for beneficial training. Regimental and squadron staffs and umpires were organized before the officers left their homes and staff officers traveled on their own time so as to arrive at Fort Bliss and push off a vigorous schedule. Before the medical corps of the post had gotten well into their routine of physical examination, which by the way was conducted with considerably more care than many other years, the regiment's ranking officer, Lieutenant Colonel Ralph O. Baird, of Denver, Colorado, had completed assignment of officers to the war-strength regiment, which was to be the unit for instructional purposes. There were a few casualties at Dispensary "D" from physical examination, but seventy-six officers ended up with the coveted medical O.K. and practically all of them were ready to begin work by noon of the second day with a health certificate in their hands and with bunks, clothes and equipment in their possession. This did away with any

delay and cut considerable off the checking-in time established by the officer who related the earlier episode of going to summer camp.

The program of training for the 312th Cavalry has been carefully worked out far in advance by Colonel Arthur E. Wilbourn, formerly chief of staff of the cavalry district of the Eighth Corps Area, who made up a five-year program of which training camps constituted the culminating feature of each year's program. This summer's camp concluded the third year of this extensive program. Particular emphasis was placed this year on reconnaissance, attack, flank guard, rear guard and deployed defense. The Reserves are supposed to come to camp each summer with a fair idea already fixed in their minds of the tactical problems. The plan worked out by Colonel Wilbourn called for intensive study through troop schools held in the various cities of the corps area where Reserve officers reside. Of course the success of these troop schools rested largely with the Reserves themselves and in far too many cases these officers turned out for camp with little troop school experience behind them. Attendance is purely voluntary and first and foremost a Reserve officer is a free American citizen and like many another American, he likes to flourish that word "free" with an oratorical tongue. Among the thousands of other liberties his revolutionary forebears gave him was that of missing troop schools. In the interest of a more adequate national defense it is the hope of many of the older Reserve officers that more stringent regulations are adopted governing inactive duty training and that more encouragement for this training be given Reserve officers. Every second week throughout last winter troop schools were held for officers of the 312th Cavalry in Miami, Phoenix, and Tucson, Arizona; Denver, Colorado; Albuquerque and Roswell, New Mexico; Oklahoma City and Tulsa, Oklahoma; and El Paso, Texas. The ranking officer residing in each city was responsible for these schools. It was his job to see that schools were held and that instructors were assigned and prepared for each exercise. Historical example taken from the pages of various wars as well as improvised problems from the Cavalry School were used to bring out the practical principles desired.

As mentioned earlier, the umpire staff for the camp was made up of Reserves and in preparation of this job umpire schools were held in El Paso and Tucson for officers selected for this work. Mimeographed texts of the entire summer program were printed and turned over to umpires for study months before the camp began. Umpire check lists were carefully drawn and studied so that the utmost in training could be derived from fourteen days of active duty training.

Since the regiment's ranking officer resides in Denver, he chose his staff largely from his own city to facilitate holding staff schools in preparation for the active duty camp. Regrettably, however, some of his selected staff members could not attend the camp which forced a reorganization of his staff a few days prior to camp. This was true also with the umpire staff but the latter was less crippled because a larger number of officers than would have been needed if they all went to camp was trained for this work.

The heavy work of camp got under way on Tuesday morning (the third day of camp), when the Reserves took over a war-strength regiment formed by combining all available troops of the 7th and 8th Cavalry Regiments. Though there were insufficient troops available for complete organization, a skeletonized regiment was formed. Organization of the new regiment known as the 312th Cavalry for the remaining two weeks, was handled by authorities of Fort Bliss. There was only a little delay and the expected amount of confusion in getting all the totally strange officers affixed to the proper troops and the 312th was soon on the field. Its officers cheerfully moved out far more inclined to accept responsibility for the conduct of tropos than would have been possible if Regular officers were attached even remotely. Colonel Palmer Swift, commanding the Second Cavalry Brigade at Fort Bliss, is due credit in no small part for organization of the war-strength regiment and for firmly enforcing the policy of Reserves taking complete control.

Work of the first week was the conduct of tactical exercises to bring out the principles of reconnaissance, attack, flank guard, rear guard, and deployed defense in preparation for the second week of the camp which was a three-day maneuver with a continuing situation. Two problems were conducted on Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday; one for the regiment less one squadron; the other for one squadron reinforced. Saturday the regiment went into action in the first deployed defense problem.

There were, as will be expected, plenty of errors every morning and these were called to the attention of all officers by umpires at critiques. Of course the opportunity for command is not afforded the officer selected for umpire and his only chance to "sound off" is at the critique. Umpires often poured forth generously with their comments but unit commanders took their criticism good-naturedly, realizing their study and hard work had merited for them at least the moral right to an audience. The conduct of unit commanders in general was very encouraging and expression of this fact was made numerous times by umpires.

The afternoons of the first week were spent in attending and taking part in classes and demonstrations. Though somewhat hurried through the various phases of instruction, officers received a smattering of instruction in numerous subjects from morning reports to indirect machine gun laying; from horseshoeing to courts-martial.

Perhaps the most exacting test of leadership given to Reserve officers was the three-day maneuver which started Monday night the second week of the 312th Cavalry summer camp. Attached to this regiment was another Reserve organization, one battalion of the 382d Field Artillery (horse) whose unit instructor, Major William B. Walters, had worked out a plan with Colonel Minton to show officers of both branches how these two arms

would operate together in war time. It was the second week of training for the Field Artillery officers also, who had taken over somewhat similarly though with a less free reign, one battalion of the 82d Field Artillery, the regular regiment at Fort Bliss. This maneuver was a continuing situation which began with a retrograde movement at 10 o'clock, Monday night.

After receiving the general and special situation late in the afternoon the regimental staff decided to march under cover of darkness to concealed bivouac southeast of Fort Bliss on the Rio Grande River. Any night march is difficult, and particularly with a newly formed organization whose officers and men are none too well known to each other. The reinforced regiment marched at 10 PM and consisted in all (including umpires) of 101 officers, 804 men, 900 horses, 39 trucks, 8 scout cars, 1 command car, 2 station wagons, 2 scout cars with umpires and the 8 howitzers of the artillery battalion. The reinforced regiment was to be completely concealed from enemy airplane observation by daylight.

Despite the difficulty of night marching and the lack of experience of the officers, the march was made with phenomenal success across country to an area of deep sand and heavy thicket of brush. Those who have fallen into the "man of the street" method of thinking that horses and mules will be replaced entirely by motor vehicles in the army would amend this idea after a night march in sand such as was encountered by this regiment. Long after all animals had been tied to trees and bushes, motors were humming and growling, drivers cursing, tow ropes breaking, and tow chains rattling. There was no human error in handling trains; as a matter of fact, they were under good supervision, but the terrain over which the regiment moved the first night into bivouac was fit indeed for horses and not motors. It is worth while remembering, too, that wartime terrain very likely will be so irregular as to hamper if not render entirely inefficient many of the army motor vehicles.

By daylight the camouflage for the regiment was so perfectly completed that a Regular Army pilot and umpire staff observer were unable to locate the bivouac area although their search was limited to a five-mile area. Several times during the morning the plane flew over the general area without success.

The reinforced regiment constituted the "Blue" forces and during the continuing situation was met with "Red" forces of varying size. The cavalry regiment and its attached field artillery battalion had been detached from the "Blue" brigade represented only in the general situation.

Developments of Tuesday in the enemy situation were such that the regimental commander ordered the organization to march to a new bivouac area after dark Tuesday night to avoid attack by a superior force. The second night march was considerably easier than the first. The next bivouac area too was on far more favorable terrain for night encampment and the reinforced regiment went into bivouac on the great open plains of West Texas with distant outposts to protect the command during much needed and well earned rest and sleep. The terrain being far more favorable for trucks, motor vehicles won back a share of the esteem they had lost the previous night. Umpires, realizing the fatigued condition of men and animals refrained from the natural temptation to harass the "Blues" or their outposts during the second night.

The "Blue" commander was presented with his enemy situation Wednesday morning and decided to march immediately to protect his brigade in a debouchment through a mountain pass. Only by vigorous attack in which both cavalry and artillery participated was it possible to push the "Reds" aside and proceed with his mission. Attacks were awarded successful decisions from umpires so that the regiment was able to reach another watering place for the third night's bivouac area. At the critique held Wednesday evening umpires reported considerable improvement in commanders of all units and praised unit commanders for sound tactical judgment and aggression in carrying out their decision when made. The regiment and attached artillery went into bivouac the third night on terrain occupied earlier in the day by "Red" forces. Careful selection of outposts therefore was necessary. However officers had the benefit of a few hours of daylight for the first time in going into camp and therefore were able to protect the halt with more ease.

Thursday morning the "Blue" commander received his orders from higher command to proceed on his mission to protect the debouchment of the brigade through the mountain pass. Selection of suitable terrain for deployed defense was of first importance, and of course constituted an important portion of the problem for the final day. The "Blue" force occupied its selected position by 11:00 o'clock, Thursday morning, using the attached battalion of field artillery to support in excellent manner. Enemy situations developed one after another, with umpires working carefully on time and space factors which actually would confront the "Reds" were they in the field. The "Blues" were credited with stubborn resistance plus terrain advantages too favorable to overcome. Positions were maintained throughout the day and food for men and horses for the evening meal was taken to the main line of resistance.

At the conclusion of this deployed defense problem about 6:00 PM the "Blue" commander organized his forces and started the 22-mile march to Fort Bliss, watering animals en route. The reinforced cavalry regiment reached the post by 11 o'clock, officers, men, and mounts, all tired from the hardest day's work of the maneuver.

The problem of supply is always with the army, and this too was handled by the Reserve through the 312th Cavalry S-4. Coupled with supply is the most tremendous of all problems in the southwestern desert, that of water. Hot dry days like those experienced on this maneuver require the maximum water for horses and men. The tactical situations were drawn up with the practical problem of water in view. Despite the heat which reached approximately 100 degrees every day, and despite the

Cavalry District, Eighth Corps Area Active Duty Training, 1939

NOTE: All officers should at once provide themselves with the Special Texts and other publications referred to herein. For further information on this subject, contact your unit instructor.

DAY	HOUR	SUBJECT	STUDY REFERENCE
Sun	All Day.	Mobilization.	
Mon.	AM	Complete Mobilization.	
Mon.	1:00 PM to 2:00 PM	Administration (1).	See attached schedule.
Mon.	2:00 PM to 4:00 PM	Demonstration No. 1, Scouting & Patrolling, Mounted.	Chap. 4, Vol. I, CFM.
Mon.	5:00 PM to 6:00 PM	Orientation.	
Tue.	6:30 AM to 10:30 AM	Regiment (less 2d Sq.): Tactical Exercise No. 1, Flank Guard.	Sects. I & V, Chap. 2, Pt. I, Vol. III, CFM.
		2d Sq.: Tactical Exercise No. 2, Rear Guard.	Sects. I & IV, Chap. 2, Pt. I, Vol. III, CFM.
Tue.	10:30 AM to 11:30 AM	Care of Animals and Equipment.	Chap. 7, Pt. III, Horsemanship & Horsemastership (Special Text 856).
Tue.	1:00 PM to 2:00 PM	Administration (2).	See attached schedule.
Tue.	2:00 PM to 4:00 PM	Demonstration No. 2: Scout Cars and their uses.	Sect. XIX, Chap. 5, Vol. I, CFM.
Tue.	5:00 PM to 6:00 PM	Orientation.	
Wed.	6:30 AM to 10:30 AM	Regiment (less 2d Sq.): Tactical Exercise No. 2, Rear Guard.	Sects. I & IV, Chap. 2, Pt. I, Vol. III, CFM.
		2d Sq.: Tactical Exercise No. 1, Flank Guard.	Sects. I & V, Chap. 2, Pt. I, Vol. III, CFM.
Wed.	10:30 AM to 11:30 AM	Care of Animals and Equipment.	Chap. 7, Pt. III, Horsemanship & Horsemastership (Special Text No 856).
Wed.	1:00 PM to 2:00 PM	Administration (3).	See attached schedule.
Wed.	2:00 PM to 4:00 PM	Demonstration No. 3, Battle Leadership of a Cavalry Rifle Platoon.	Sects. I, II, III, & IV, Chap. 5, Vol. I, CFM. Chaps. 4 & 5, Pt. I, Methods of Combat for Cavalry. Chap. 6, Pt. I, Vol. III, BFM.
Wed.	5:00 PM to 6:00 PM	Orientation.	
Thu.	6:30 AM to 10:30 AM	Regiment (less 1st Sq.): Tactical Exercise No. 3, Reconnaissance Detachment.	Sects. I & II, Chap. 2, Pt. I, Vol. III, CFM.
		1st Sq.: Tactical Exercise No. 4, Offensive Action.	Chap. 4, Pt. I, Vol. III, CFM. Chap. 4, Pt. I, Methods of Combat for Cavalry. Chaps. 10 & 11, Pt. 2, Methods of Combat for Cavalry.
Thu.	10:30 AM to 11:30 AM	Care of Animals and Equipment.	Chap. 7, Pt. III, Horsemanship & Horsemastership (Special Text 856).
Thu.	1:00 PM to 2:00 PM	Administration (4).	See attached schedule.
Thu.	2:00 PM to 4:00 PM	Demonstration No. 4, Methods of Combat, Light, Heavy, & .50 Cal. MG Squads.	Sects. IV, VII, XIII, Chap. 5, Vol. I, CFM.
Thu.	5:00 PM to 6:00 PM	Orientation.	
Fri.	6:30 AM to 10:30 AM	Regiment (less 1st Sq.): Tactical Exercise No. 4, Offensive Action	Chap. 4, Pt. I, Vol. III, CFM. Chap. 4, Pt. I, Methods of Combat for Cavalry. Chaps. 10 & 11, Pt. 2, Methods of Combat for Cavalry.
		1st Sq.: Tactical Exercise No. 3, Reconnaissance Det.	Sects. I & II, Chap. 2, Pt. I, Vol. III, CFM.
Fri.	10:30 AM to 11:30 AM	Care of Animals and Equipment.	Chap. 7, Pt. III, Horsemanship & Horsemastership (Special Text 856).
Fri.	1:00 PM to 2:00 PM	Administration (5).	See attached schedule.
Fri.	2:00 PM to 4:00 PM	Demonstration No. 5, Packs & their uses.	Cav. School Stencil W-38 (35 36).
Fri.	5:00 PM to 6:00 PM	Orientation.	
Sat.	6:30 AM to 11:00 AM	Regimental Command Post Exercise. The Deployed Defense.	Par. 19-a, Vol. III, CFM. Chap. 5, Pt. I, Vol. III, CFM.
Mon.	6:30 AM to 10:30 AM	Tactical Exercise No. 5, The Regiment in The Deployed Defense.	Par. 19-a, Vol. III, CFM. Chap. 5, Pt. I, Vol. III, CFM.
Mon.	10:30 AM to 11:30 AM	Care of Animals and Equipment.	Chap. 7, Pt. III, Horsemanship & Horsemastership (Special Text 856).
Mon.	1:00 PM to 4:00 PM	Preparation for the March.	
Tue. to Thu.	12:01 AM to 11:30 PM	Regimental Field Exercise and March involving Marching, Camping, and Camp Sanitation; Logistics. Tactical Exercises to Include Tactical Marches; Security while on March and halted; Defensive Action; and Exploitation of a Success.	Pt. 2, Vol. III, CFM.
Fri. to Sat.	AM to PM	Demobilization.	

NOTE: CFM—Cavalry Field Manual.
BFM—Basic Field Manual.

long distance between watering places surrounding Fort Bliss, no animal suffered for want of water.

Reserve officers clearly withstood the ravages of the saddle much better than those of the bright hot summer sun of West Texas. They were a ruddy sunburned lot when they returned to Fort Bliss but the saddle had not taken the toll expected. They were tired, dirty, and unshaven when they returned to make their midnight raid on the shower baths, but in good physical condition and high spirits which gradually improved as many of them

(Continued on page 423)

The Eighth Cavalry Miniature Combat Range

By FIRST LIEUTENANT BRUCE PALMER, JR., *8th Cavalry*

Today's cavalryman must learn the technique of many diversified subjects to earn the name of a first-class fighting trooper. In a pinch, he may be called upon to function as an infantryman, so he must know the ways of the doughboy. As a cavalryman, besides learning the technique of dismounted combat, he must learn to ride his mount over any terrain at any gait, to scout and to fight from his horse, and to take care of his horse, in the field or on the march, by day or by night, in all kinds of weather. A successful leader of modern cavalry must be a man of extreme versatility; a great leader must, indeed-be a virtuoso in the fine art of war. Not only must he know how to lead his troops, dismounted and fighting as infantry, but he must master the vast field of cavalry tactics, both horse and mechanized. He must know how to guage the capabilities and limitations of his own arm according to the terrain at hand, so that he can exploit to the greatest advantage the weaknesses of his enemy, whether it be infantry, horse cavalry, mechanized cavalry, tanks, attack aviation or "streamlined" infantry in motors.

In view of the wide field to be covered, it immediately becomes apparent that in training cavalry, rigid economy of training time available must be practiced, and training schedules must be carefully planned and strictly followed. Important in peace, it is paramount in war, when new troops must be thoroughly trained in a minimum of time.

A cavalry training time-saver is the miniature combat range, developed initially at the Infantry School, and adapted to cavalry use by the 12th Cavalry at Fort Brown, Texas. Further development of such a range has been made by the 8th Cavalry, stationed at Fort Bliss, Texas, with the result that the instructional value inherent in a miniature combat range has been greatly enhanced, and the interest of the men has been aroused to a remarkable state of enthusiasm.

The purpose of the 8th Cavalry Miniature Range is to conserve time, space, energy, and funds in the training of leaders and the individual soldier for their duties in dismounted combat.

Many desirable and worthwhile advantages have been found in connection with the range. Among them are:

(1) *Location:* Being only three-fourths of a mile away from barracks, the range is readily accessible to all troops. Due to the small area (400-500 feet by 50-100 feet) necessary for a range, and the fact that only Cal. .22 weapons are used, units desiring to build a range should be able to find a site close to their barracks.

(2) *Time Element:* Little time is wasted in setting up targets before firing and marking targets after firing, due to the short distance between the firing line and the targets.

(3) *Variety of Instruction:* An infinite number of situations can be devised by merely changing the location of natural and man-made terrain objects, or by changing the location, number, and disposition of target.

(4) *Superiority over Landscape Targets:* The range is found to be far superior to landscape targets, because the miniature range has depth, and it can be changed before its appearance becomes monotonous.

(5) *Economy:* Range material is practically without cost and simple to construct. The range is intended for calibre .22 weapons, and so training allowances of service ammunition are made available for other combat firing.

(6) *Safety:* No elaborate back-stops are necessary, since with calibre .22 weapons a vertical bank, 15 feet high will suffice.

(7) *Interest:* The range is unequalled in arousing interest, a quality which is vital to the success of any program of instruction. Interest is maintained because there is a realistic picture before the soldier at all times, and nothing is assumed, or left to his imagination. In addition, the targets representing enemy troops are so constructed that they will fall when hit, a factor which is not only valuable from a training standpoint, but also produces enthusiastic participation in range problems on the part of all ranks.

(8) *Training:* Immediate supervision over all members of the unit firing is made possible by their close proximity. The instruction can therefore be made more individual. Moreover, the nature of the range permits the application and the effect of fire to be shown in a minimum of time.

Construction of the Range: An old gravel pit 400 feet in depth by 75 feet in width provides the range. The side

Plate 1: CLOSE UP VIEW OF 8TH CAVALRY MINIATURE COMBAT RANGE

Note: 1—Snipers in dead tree to the left of the silo in center of the picture. 2—Truck convoy moving west on road running through center of picture. 3—Officer on horseback with a dismounted messenger near him on a small hill in foreground. 4—Sniper in belfry of church in left foreground.

of the pit vary in height from 15 to 30 feet. The approach to the range has ample cover for approach formations in rear of the firing point. The range proper is dressed up so that it simulates actual terrain. (See attached Photos No. 1 and No. 2.)

Mountains, hills, ridges, ravines, streamlines, and rock formations are as found in the pit, and can be varied at will in a few moments with a pick and shovel. Trees, bushes, and hedges are merely branches of greasewood, cut to the desired length and stuck in the sand. Trees planted at regular intervals represent an orchard. A large branch stripped of its foliage becomes an old dead tree. An old piece of IC'd canvas painted green becomes a pasture, or an alfalfa field. A cornfield or wheatfield is simulated with a piece of canvas artfully painted with spots of yellow, or by grain sacks spread flat on the ground. Small bundles of hay, fastened with baling wire, representing stacks of cornstalks, add to the realism. Larger bundles of hay become miniature haystacks.

A few minutes' work with a little dry lime produces the roads. The buildings are made out of discarded egg crates. A few houses painted yellow and white, with doors and windows in black, make a very realistic town. Barns painted red and farm houses of white are easily made. A white cross stuck on a mountain top becomes a shrine. A windmill and a ranch house are quickly built. A low yellow and black building with a level clearing in front makes a miniature airport. A silo is easily made from a piece of stove pipe. A church with bell tower, steeple, and cross is not difficult to build. Stone walls are painted in black and white on small lengths of wood. Rail and worm fences are easily whittled with a jack knife.

Targets representing the hostile Reds are jigsawed from cardboard procured from old field firing silhouette targets, and are cut to the same shape as the prone and kneeling field targets. The prone targets are made 2 inches high and 2 inches wide at the base; the kneeling targets, 3 inches high and 2 inches wide at the base. The miniature silhouettes set up at a distance of 2,640 inches (220 feet) appear to the eye the same as the corresponding full size silhouettes at a distance of 450 yards. The scale between these miniature silhouettes and the full size silhouettes is approximately 1 to 10 inches. This same scale is used in the construction mentioned above. Tank, combat car, scout car and truck convoy silhouettes are also jigsawed from the same material and cut to the same scale. These vehicular targets camouflaged with zig-zag painting of various colors appear as they would on the battlefield. To save wear and tear on the three-dimensional buildings, silhouettes of barns, churches, etc., with machine gun nests or snipers painted on the fronts, are also cut and provide interesting targets. (See Plate No. 1.)

Prone and kneeling silhouettes are tacked to small bits of wood projecting about 1 inch below the base, so that the targets will stand in the sand, but will be flattened when struck by a calibre .22 bullet. The other silhouettes are nailed to longer stakes which can be driven into the ground. A few rubber toy soldiers, horsemen, motor-

cyclists, and machine gunners add further to the effect of realism.

Use of the Range

(1) *Calibre .22 Rifle:* Squad and platoon problems can be easily conducted. The situation can be initiated with the unit already deployed along the firing position, with the unit halted in approach formation, or with the unit advancing in approach march formation, with scouts out. The situation can also be developed to allow a further advance beyond the initial firing point. (See Photo No. 3.)

To give the rifleman a basis from which to set the Lyman sight on the calibre .22 rifle, the following table was derived after consultation with the Division Ordnance Officer:

Use of Lyman Sight on Cal. .22 Rifle for Miniature Range

Actual Range	*Theoretical Range (Yds.)*	*Proper rear sight setting*
1,000" (28 yds)	170	1.0
1,500"		2.5
2,000" (56 yds)	340	4.5
2,500"		7.0
3,000" (83 yds)	510	10.0
3,500"		14.0
4,000" (110 yds)	680	19.0
4,500"		26.0
5,000" (140 yds)	850	33.0

This table gives only the approximate sight setting in minutes, and, of course, the zero of the individual rifle varies, but actual firing has shown the data to be very accurate.

(2) *Calibre .22 Machine Gun:* Section and platoon problems can be readily conducted. The problem may begin with the gun already in position, or the reconnaissance, selection, and occupation of gun positions may be actually carried out. Guns may be displaced forward by section, or platoon, as the situation develops.

Experiments conducted by the infantry have shown that a sight setting of 700 yards comes to 3,000 inches on the range, and one of 900 yards to 4,000 inches. These sight settings have been used as a basis from which the gunners set their sights, and have given very accurate results.

Training Value—Rifle: Due to the rough and uneven nature of the firing point, the individual soldier receives good practice in selecting a position where he has a good field of fire without unduly exposing himself. (See Plate No. 2.)

Instruction in target designation is rapidly and readily imparted on the miniature range. Targets may be designated by the leader firing shots and ordering his men to watch the strike. Since the strike is readily picked up at the short distance, this method of designation simulates very closely the firing of tracer bullets on field ranges. The method of oral designation is also readily taught. Men learn to recognize terrain features as defined by

Plate 2: VIEW OF RANGE FROM VICINITY OF FIRING POSITION

Note: 1—Squad engaged in fire fight. Line has been built up by infiltration. Men are about 2,000 inches from nearest targets (stone wall in foreground of range). 2—Squad leader has taken cover in rear of squad controlling fire fight.

Plate 3: VIEW OF RANGE FROM VICINITY OF FIRING LINE

Note: 1—Scout car in foreground in position for a quick getaway; driver at the wheel. 2—Gunner (on right) firing over rear end of scout car. Machine gun can be seen to left of gunner's head. 3—Car commander on left of gunner is observing fire through field glasses.

military terms and to locate targets by means of reference points very quickly. Leaders also have ample opportunity to recognize important terrain features and reference points, and soon learn to give very simple and understandable fire orders.

Due to the fact that the strike is readily picked up men are easily taught how to distribute their fire according to the nature of the target, since mistakes are quickly noticed and rectified. At the same time, the individual soldier learns to adjust his sight setting by observing his strike.

Training Value—Machine Gun: The beaten zone of the calibre .30 machine gun is actually reproduced in miniature on the range, thus presenting an accurate picture of all phases of direct laying. The characteristics of machine gun fire, a knowledge of which is so essential to a gunner, are quickly learned by direct observation.

The remarks made above concerning target designation apply equally as well to the machine gun as to the rifle.

The methods of covering wide targets, narrow targets, oblique targets, deep targets, and area targets, so difficult to put across in the classroom are readily demonstrated and practiced on the range. In connection with this, it is possible to set up targets between 3,000 and 4,000 inches whose depth is greater than the length of the beaten zone of one gun. Again, the gunner gets ample practice in adjusting his fire by the observation of the strike.

The range can be readily adapted to instruction in indirect laying. Such instruction is far superior to the blackboard and to field firing, since each step in the procedure of collecting data can be visualized on the ground from one position, without the confusion and loss of time resulting from a change of location. All instruments, except, of course, the range finder, are used exactly as in field firing. All that is needed is a screen to prevent the gunner from seeing the target.

Conclusions: Results of actual firing on the range have proved it of great value as a means of training. It has been shown that in a given period of time, many more problems can be conducted on the miniature combat range than on a field combat range. Such has been the reception of the range among the troops of the 8th Cavalry that many men have voiced a desire to stay and fire another problem, even after it was time to return to barracks.

It must be made clear that training on the miniature combat range is only a valuable adjunct to similar training on the field combat range, using service weapons, and is in no sense a substitute for the essential training in firing service ammunition under field conditions, which troops must receive. However, for the civilian components of our military establishment, where range facilities, time, and funds may be limited, the miniature range truly comes into its own as an indispensable item of equipment.

War Paint for Modern Fighters

By LIEUTENANT FORREST H. RIORDAN, JR., *305th Cavalry*

Since the beginning of time, nature has endowed her small and weak animals with a negative protection—camouflage. The young, speckled partridge, if it cannot find its mother in time of danger, instinctively tucks in its head and feet and becomes motionless and to keener eyes than those of a man, it looks like a crumpled leaf on the ground. The chameleon for purposes of protection changes color to match the limb or foliage upon which it is resting. The variable hare, willow grouse and arctic fox which inhabit northern regions are all white during the winter months, yet they change their coats in the summer so that they are inconspicuous in their natural surroundings.

Modern armies have also discovered the advantage of inconspicuousness and soldiers no longer march into battle with plumes waving, wearing red coats with white belts and breeches and covered with shiny buttons and medals. Uniforms are of a neutral color. Precision metal parts of pistols, rifles, and machine guns have a dull, steel blue finish, while trucks, tanks, and other matériel are painted the standard army olive drab color. Artillery, machine gun nests, and observation posts are camouflaged with small trees and brush in order that they will not be spotted by the enemy. It is reported that some elements of the Russian army are equipped with white mantles for winter service.

The art of camouflage has covered practically everything to the end of rendering men, equipment, and buildings invisible to the enemy. But one conspicuous and vulnerable target is left—white man's face. We are trained never to show our faces when in observation, never to look upward at hostile aircraft, except when firing. When a deployed line of skirmishers are caught in the light of a flare at night, the faces shine like individual bull's-eyes.

To reduce enemy perception why not dye or stain the face and hands of all combat troops? A dark tan or brown or even green would certainly make men less visible and would make it less imperative to keep the face hidden from view. After all, one can observe better and shoot straighter if he doesn't have to think about his face.

The hands could be dipped and the face and neck swabbed with a harmless vegetable dye which should not wash off with soap and water. The most vulnerable part of man's body cannot be covered with armor, but it can be made to present less of a target than it now does. Let's don our war paint like the first fighters of the new world—the American Indian—but for a more intelligent reason—CAMOUFLAGE.

March Schedules Simplified

By MAJOR GYLES MERRILL, *Cavalry*

A recent article in the CAVALRY JOURNAL dealt with the subject of marching in a very able manner, amplifying, among other things, the instruction contained in Paragraph 311 of the CFM, Vol. III. Reading this article and studying the examples of a timekeeper's records shown on Page 147 of CFM, Vol. III, led to a few simple computations which finally resulted in the preparation of the table shown in Fig. I. Believing this table with an explanation of its use might be of interest to others and in the hope that the following description of a simple method of timekeeping may be of value to some, this present article was written.

The first column in Figue 1 shows minutes at the trot (9 miles per hour) the remaining marching time being at a 4 mile per hour walk or lead. Under the appropriate heading in the other columns appears the miles travelled. Thus, if in any one hour the command marches a total of 50 minutes, 26 minutes of which is at a trot, it will have covered 5.5 miles (4th column, 12th line). Similarly if the command marches for a total of 55 minutes of which 40 minutes are at the trot it will cover 7. miles (3d column, bottom line). A glance at the table will save the time required for the computations shown as examples on Page 147, CFM, Vol. III.

Further, a commander decides to march at 5.75 miles per hour with 5 minute halts each hour. Column 3, Line 11, shows that he must trot 25 minutes of the 55 minutes marching time. Knowing this, it is a very simple matter to so arrange the trotting and walking periods as to accomplish the result.

Another example of the use of the table: a command must cover 36½ miles in 7 hours. The commander decides

to halt 10 minutes at the end of the first hour, 5 minutes at the end of the 2d and 3d hours, 30 minutes at the end of the 4th hour, and 5 minutes at the end of the 5th and 6th hours. The total time at the halt amounts to 1 hour, leaving 6 hours of actual marching. 36.5 miles divided by 6 hours gives 6.08 miles per hour of a full 60 minutes marching. In Column 2, 6.08 appears opposite 25 minutes at the trot, therefore the command must march 6 times 25 minutes or 150 minutes at the trot and 6 hours less 150 minutes or 210 minutes at the walk and lead. The ratio of 5 to 7, trot and walk, is at once apparent and will serve as a guide in determining the length of the periods.

Now as to the paper work required of the timekeeper. Those of us who have served as timekeepers with the ordinary equipment consisting of a wrist watch and a notebook and pencil know the difficulties attendant. In the first place there is always the difficulty of trying to compensate the fractions of a minute that are always present, (unless the orders for a change of gait are based solely on the watch, which they should not be). Next there is the difficulty of writing hours and minutes in a note book, on the back of a horse in motion, especially during inclement weather or at night. One can approximate such things but if you are going to approximate it, why bother with a timekeeper at all?

The approved solution, to my way of thinking, is one of the modern wrist watches that embodies the features of a stop watch and time interval recorder combined. The one I own (Xmas present) has the usual hour, minute and second hands, and in addition has a sweep second hand and a dial that records the time the sweep hand is in motion. There are two "push buttons," the upper one starts and stops the sweep hand and the lower one resets the sweep hand and the time interval hand to zero. It differs from the usual stop watch, or time interval recorder, in that the first push of the upper button starts the sweep hand and the hand of the recording dial, the second push of the same button stops both, and a third push starts both again where they left off and so on. In other words it enables one to "take time out" and record only that time that one wishes. Its use by a march timekeeper would be as follows: first note the hour at which the march started, or set the watch at 12:00 at the start of the march. Then at the beginning of the first trot push the upper button. At the end of the first trot push the upper button again and the duration of the trot will have been recorded. Again push the upper button when the second trot starts and again push the upper button when the trot ends, thus adding the time of the second trot to the first. A glance at the time interval dial will tell the total time at the trot for that hour. At the hourly halt make a record of the distance traveled by drawing a circle around the proper number on the march table card and numbering it 1 for the first hour, 2 for the second and so on. At the end of each hour push the lower button, resetting the sweep hand and time interval dial hand to zero. For example, the command marches 45 minutes in the first hour and then halts 15 minutes. 21 minutes of the time as recorded on the watch was at the trot. Opposite 21, in Column 5 draw a circle around 4.75 on the march table and mark it 1. The next hour the command marches 55 minutes of which 31 minutes were at the trot. Draw a circle around 6.25 in Column 3, line 17, and mark it 2. And so on. It is believed that the timekeeper's work has thus been brought to the irreducible minimum and bookkeeping errors practically eliminated.

Min. at	Total minutes marching				
trot	60	55	50	45	40
15	5.25	4.92	4.58	4.25	3.92
16	5.33	5.	4.67	4.33	4.
17	5.42	5.08	4.75	4.42	4.08
18	5.5	5.17	4.83	4.5	4.17
19	5.58	5.25	4.92	4.58	4.25
20	5.67	5.33	5.	4.67	4.33
21	5.75	5.42	5.08	4.75	4.42
22	5.83	5.5	5.17	4.83	4.5
23	5.92	5.58	5.25	4.92	4.58
24	6.	5.67	5.33	5.	4.67
25	6.08	5.75	5.42	5.08	4.75
26	6.17	5.83	5.5	5.17	4.83
27	6.25	5.92	5.58	5.25	4.92
28	6.33	6.	5.67	5.33	5.
29	6.42	6.08	5.75	5.42	5.08
30	6.5	6.17	5.83	5.5	5.17
31	6.58	6.25	5.92	5.58	5.25
32	6.67	6.33	6.	5.67	5.33
33	6.75	6.42	6.08	5.75	5.42
34	6.83	6.5	6.17	5.83	5.5
35	6.92	6.58	6.25	5.92	5.58
36	7.	6.67	6.33	6.	5.67
37	7.08	6.75	6.42	6.08	5.75
38	7.17	6.83	6.5	6.17	5.83
39	7.25	6.92	6.58	6.25	5.92
40	7.33	7.	6.67	6.33	6.

Fig. 1

Streamlined Training

By CAPTAIN CARVER M. LACKEY, *109th Cavalry*

The CAVALRY JOURNAL seems to welcome suggestions and we all *know* that the United States is *not* going to get into this War, still it is worthwhile for us to do a little thinking about training men in case we should have a war.

As Plans and Training Officer of my regiment, I have given this subject some thought and the following idea for training has occurred to me. It is absolutely original as far as I am concerned, but we know nothing is new under the sun so it might have been thought of before.

Lay out a marching course of about five hundred miles for about a four weeks' ride to train men and animals. Make a camp site for the end of each day's march. Provide instructors who should teach a definite lesson each day so that when the march is completed the men would have sufficient training to take the field.

In case of a large war, it would be necessary to train men and animals quickly and such a system of mass training based on the American system of production lines seems feasible and is at least novel.

The men and animals should be sent to a concentration camp where at least two weeks of basic training and conditioning should be given. The re-mounts could be worked out each day by older men and the recruits could be given basic training, using trained horses.

After such a period of basic training, which could be made longer or shorter according to the tactical situation, the new men should be placed on the new horses and started over the course, a troop or platoon each day with full pack.

The course should be started with short marches getting progressively harder. By the end of the march the course should average 25 miles daily and at least one or two marches should be made 40 miles to test the endurance. This course would, of course, condition men and animals and each succeeding unit would march the same number of miles, camp at the same places and receive the same instructions.

An organization for instruction should be set up. At least two or more instructors should be stationed at each camp site to give instructions, lectures and demonstrations on a definite subject in which they have been specially trained. An instructor could ride on the next day's march with that unit, instructing and correcting the unit in the subject which was being taught. The instructor could utilize the succeeding day to return to his original station and thus two instructors would be necessary or units could be started on alternate days.

A subject of importance which might be given on the first day's march is "Marching, Marching Discipline and the Proper Procedure Upon Arrival in Camp." This subject might be again covered because of its importance on, for instance, the seventh day (Sunday excepted) and possibly again touched upon so that the subject would be fully covered and the men would be completely trained in this subject.

A good deal of time should be devoted to working out a schedule so that every subject which it was necessary for the men to learn would be covered and at the end of the course the men should be (as far as possible) completely trained and prepared for field duty.

The course should be laid out, using hard surface roads as little as possible, by making use of back roads, trails and considerable cross-country. It should be as near as possible to what cavalry would expect to encounter in war. It should be over good country where it would be a pleasure to ride, thus raising the morale of the men and selling them on their branch.

Points and advance guard formations could be taken up, scouting and patrolling could be taught in wooded country. Individual men could be sent out with a map and a compass thus learning map reading and scouting. Individual squads could be sent out and taught how a squad would act on patrol missions. Problems could be carried out during the march. An advance unit could be held over one day and act as the enemy for the next unit at some favorable place along the route. Interior guard duty could be taught at night and on Sunday when the unit was not marching.

One camp might be equipped with all the material necessary to conduct the first phase of preliminary pistol marksmanship, the next camp to teach the next phase, until completed; then a camp could be equipped with a pistol range and another a mounted pistol range, thus giving a full course in pistol marksmanship. In like manner, rifle marksmanship could be taught and carried out. It would be possible for the course to go by a range and for the men to stop at this camp several days to complete its rifle firing though it might be better if this were taught at another time.

At one camp, the necessary instruction for stream crossing might be taught; the camp being located near a good stream to be crossed, the men could be instructed in stream crossing in an afternoon with stripped saddles and be required to cross it on the march the next day. The units should be given at least a week of night marches as this would be necessary in War.

In fact, I cannot think of anything that could not be taught on such a course.

This course could not be set up on M-day. To be of any value, it should be laid out and perfected well in advance so that on short notice it could be set up for mass training. Officers or non-coms should be selected and specially trained as instructors so that they would know thoroughly the subject they were to instruct. Regular army recruits could be sent through such a course and re-mounts could be trained in this manner so the course could be tested and necessary changes made to perfect

the system. National Guard units for their two-weeks' encampment could take, with much advantage, their summer training over part of the course. Selected noncoms of the National Guard might be allowed to take the full course. Reserve Officers might be sent over such a course with much benefit to themselves. The purpose of giving preliminary training to these units would be, mainly to perfect the system.

Hundreds of variations could be made in this plan. The ride could be made much longer if it were found that it was necessary. With a longer course, the daily march could be increased to thirty miles and practice forced marches could be made up to sixty miles. Stopovers at rifle ranges or for maneuvers might be made. An enlisted cadre for the next unit could be taken through the course with an advanced unit and while waiting for its own unit the individuals could be sent to different specialists schools. Officers might be sent through in advance of their units and stop over along the way, receiving training and fall in with their units as they pass.

The Government could, without too much expense, rent rights of way and establish camps with the necessary facilities. National Parks could be used for maneuvers and farmers could be persuaded for a consideration, to let the troops use their hills and wood lots, through which the course would run.

It would not be necessary for such a large expenditure on the night camps. Permanent kitchens and bathing facilities would be beneficial, water necessary. Sufficient ground for pitching shelter tents and picket lines would be necessary. Store houses would be necessary at least every three or four camps and telephones could be installed in each camp so that notice could be given of the number for which to draw rations. Medical and veterinary services and supply service could be set up so that they could cover four or five camps, with cars and trucks.

Courses could be set up in each corps area, but it is believed that if one were set up and well organized that it could turn out troops about as fast and more thoroughly trained than a number of small courses.

Since I am more familiar with this territory, I thought of starting a course at Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia, going north slightly east through the Smokies, turning west about at Knoxville, thence through Nashville to Fort Knox. A longer course might be started at Fort Bliss, Texas, through Tennessee to Fort Myers, Virginia. I think no cavalryman would be well trained unless he could ride through the beautiful hills of Tennessee. A course could be laid out so it would begin and end at the same place but that would take away the novelty somewhat, and have other disadvantages.

Through the middle part of Tennessee, there is now a civilian riding course for pleasure riding which is used by horsemen in this vicinity, mostly through trails on which you can ride for several days and it is reported that several successful rides have been made by groups of horsemen.

If a company can start a nut and a bolt down a production line, stationing men along the way to add gadgets, and at the end turn out a fully completed, and streamlined automobile, there seems to be no reason why streamlined cavalry could not be turned out, using the same principle.

Horseshow Terms

By LIEUTENANT COLONEL ADOLPHUS W. ROFFE, *3rd Cavalry*

In the language of the horse show ring, a number of expressions with a more or less technical meaning have come into common usage. The expressions are usually seen or heard in an abbreviated form, and could be aptly described as "trade terms."

A very large percentage of competitors and regular attendants at horse shows know and understand the meaning of these "trade terms," but many casual spectators, and occasionally competitors, do not understand them fully. Too frequently it happens that a competitor leaves the ring thinking or saying all sorts of uncomplimentary things about the efficiency of the judges, when, as a matter of fact, the competitor himself has a misconception of the rules under which the class was judged.

One of the primary objects of a horse show should be to stimulate interest in horses and riding, to encourage competition, and to foster good sportsmanship. The success of a show should not be measured by the number of entries, the number of "cash" customers, nor the social, political, or financial importance of the spectators. The real success of a show should be measured by the amount of interest created or revived in horses and riding, new competitors in the ring, especially from the younger set, and a high standard of sportsmanship.

Well aware of the risk involved in entering into any highly controversial subject, some of the expressions most often misconstrued or not fully understood, together with the classes to which they apply, are enumerated below, followed by a brief statement of their accepted meaning.

1. "Performance only to count." (Applicable to Jumping Classes.)

This is the normal condition imposed in straight jumping classes in the United States and means that the entry is penalized only by the faults incurred in negotiating the course. The faults that may be incurred in such classes are tips, knockdowns, refusals, run-outs, loss of course, and

fall of horse and/or rider. If it is also a "time" class, overtime is penalized according to the rules announced. But rushing or propping a jump and "bad manners" are not scored as penalties, unless the horse is so ill-mannered as to cause it to be ruled out as "dangerous" under the general rule of any well-regulated show.

2. "Performance and manners and way of going to count." (Applicable to green and qualified Hunter Classes.)

In such classes performance is scored as indicated in 1 above, except that ordinarily tips are not scored as faults unless of such a nature as to disturb the balance of the horse or rider, in which case they are scored on the same basis as a knockdown.

In scoring "manners and way of going" everything should be considered and scored that go to make up a safe, comfortable ride in the hunting field. This includes calmness, smoothness, boldness at the jumps, uniformity of appropriate pace over the entire course, stride, relaxation, and amenability to control by the rider. The faults that come within "manners and way of going" are boring, rushing, propping, timidity (lack of boldness) at jumps, overboldness (unsafe) at jumps, swerving over jumps; i.e., failure to approach, take, and move away from jumps on a straight line, choppy or pounding stride, any exhibition of "bad manners," i.e., balking, rearing, bolting, lunging, and stubbornness, disunited gallop anywhere on the course, irregularity or inappropriateness of pace anywhere on the course, breaking over a shoulder while making a change of direction, apparent nervousness and tenseness, and nonamenability to control of rider. In short, anything that tends to detract from an insured safe, comfortable ride in the hunting field should be scored as a fault.

Some highly competent hunter judges will penalize a hunter for failure to gallop true, i.e., with the inside lead, around a turn on the course because, in their opinion, the false gallop, like the disunited gallop, indicates tenseness, lack of suppleness, or resistance to the rider. However, this practice is not habitual among hunter judges, and is a controversial point.

3. "Conformation to count." (Applicable to a number of classes, including Model Hunter, Charger, Polo, Ladies' Hunter, Suitable to Become Hunter, Broodmare Suitable to Produce Hunters, Broodmare Suitable to Produce Polo Ponies, and practically all Saddle (gaited) Horse Classes. In addition, this requirement may be and frequently is added to the conditions of the Green and Qualified Hunter Classes discussed in 2, above.)

Conformation is an all inclusive term denoting form, size, shape, and proportion of the individual parts and the assembled whole of the equine specimen. Conformation of the horse has an exact parallel in the physique of the human. Ideal conformation is that much sought and rarely found combination of the form, size, shape, and proportion of the parts and the assembled whole which science and experience have determined to be the best combination of desired physical qualities for the purpose for which the animal was intended. The model conformation of the equine race is the "Venus" or "Apollo" of the human race.

The characteristics of ideal conformation in detail are:

HEAD: Muzzle fine, nostrils large, lips that match; face straight, broad and flat between the eyes; ears medium size, shapely and alert; eyes large and prominently set to afford vision to side and rear; lower jaw deep with ample space between right and left branches; throatlatch narrow and fine.

NECK: Long and slender, well muscled on sides, straight top line, well set onto both head and shoulders.

SHOULDERS: Long and sloping with prominent withers that go well into back.

BACK: Short, well-ribbed and well-muscled, short coupled between last rib and point of hip, symmetrical top line.

CROUP: Smooth and well rounded, well muscled, ample length between point of hip and point of buttocks, top line a continuation of the symmetrical top line of back; entire croup should convey an impression of power and endurance.

BODY: Deep heart-girth, long, well-rounded ribs which provide ample abdominal capacity, entire body smooth and well-rounded.

LEGS: Well set onto body (giving the impression of one support under each corner of the body), medium length over all, with maximum length above knees and hocks, short between knees (hocks) and fetlock joints, arm and gaskin broad, flat and well-muscled, knees and hocks should be broad, flat and smooth on anterior surface, extending well down into the lower leg (cannon bone), posterior surface should be smooth and straight; cannon bones should be thin, broad, and flat, the tendons should be smooth and straight and stand well out from the cannon bones; fetlock joints should be smooth and symmetrical (not too rounded); pasterns should be medium length with slope paralleling the slope of the shoulder; feet should be well rounded of medium size, level, and the slope of the hoof should conform to the slope of the pastern. Looking from the front, a line bisecting the front leg below the point of the shoulder, and the hind leg below the stifle should be a straight line.

CHEST: Should be broad with plenty of space between the front legs to give ample lung capacity.

THE COMPLETE ENSEMBLE: Should convey the impression that all the various parts fit, one with the others, and are properly joined together to produce a specimen of physical strength, grace, symmetry and beauty. Fortunately, science and experience coöperate with art in this instance. The animal with the most nearly perfect conformation is a creature of physical grace and beauty.

AFTERTHOUGHT: Since no two people, regardless of ability and experience, can ever entirely agree on this subject, anyone who may read the above may disagree with any part or all of what has been written here on conformation. Honest difference of opinion is one of the principal reasons why the horse game is one of the most fascinating of all sports. May it ever be thus.

Letters to the Editor

SIR:

The best argument for horse cavalry that I have heard or seen was the performance of the 101st Cavalry during the Army Maneuver at Plattsburg. The 18th Infantry Brigade in trucks went hellboring down the road to a distant objective. A squadron of the 101st sneaked in behind them and took General Short short, and how, complete with staff and car. I seen it. I spoke to him, and said he was running about in cavalry infested country, but he blew me the razz and said he was an hour in rear of his own infantry. Five minutes later they had him. On the north flank, two squadrons of the same regiment held up the 2d Brigade so long that Colonel Marley had to telephone the umpires to call them off or the maneuver would never get started. (See his remarks at the Army critique.) General Haskell, commanding I Corps, said that he got more information from the 101st Cavalry than all other reconnaissance agencies combined. That night, at 10:30 PM, I was with the 1st Battalion, 7th Field, and this same 101st was raising hell with the gun batteries, operating from thick woods. We were supporting a battalion of the 28th, or the 16th, maybe. Every time the cavalry would rip a burst of machine gun fire into a battery the umpire with the 18th would stick his head out of his tarp and order someone to go up and rule the horse cavalry out, that it was too dark for them to operate. You might send a few pamphlets to senior officers in other branches, methinks. Particularly whoever let a squadron of the 3d sit on their tails at Schuyler Falls for 30 days doing nothing but grooming and watering. If the enlisted men had to be orderlies for the umpires, why not leave the horses at Ethan Allen? They had every horse they owned on the picket line, and what troopers were available grooming three and four apiece. It was said that the horses were for the umpires to ride, but since the flag orderlies were all Coast Artillerymen, how could an umpire ride and his flag orderly walk? They both walked.

YELLOW LEG.

* * *

TO THE EDITOR:

Your most excellent periodical recently contained a piece which suggested that the present heavy machine gun be replaced by the light machine gun. To me this is a most curious suggestion in view of the following facts:

(1) The 1936 maneuvers of the 1st Cavalry Division, which the writer cited as directing his thoughts to this problem, were notable among other things for the realization by the high command that the light machine gun was most unsuitable as a cavalry weapon.

(2) The cavalry organization tests at Fort Bliss in 1938 were characterized by the *unanimous* opinion of the officers conducting the tests that the light machine gun should be abolished and its place taken by the present water-cooled gun.

There is so much unanimity of opinion that the light machine gun is an unsuitable cavalry weapon that it would appear dangerous to present the suggestion to National Guard and Reserve officers that it replace the so-called heavy gun.

The light machine gun is not light, nor is it a machine gun. It has been used as a single shot weapon, and as such does not pull its weight with the M-1 rifle. Its instability and low command make it far inferior to the water-cooled gun and the crew needed to operate it makes it most uneconomical from a personnel standpoint.

I have seen a good many tests of this weapon and have worked with it in the field to a considerable extent. Always I have been impressed with the fact that the "heavy guns" were getting around just as fast when manhandled as the light guns and that the former had something to shoot besides a promise. Also I know that a great number of officers with extensive machine-gun experience feel the same way.

I realize that in advancing over great distances dismounted the few pounds difference in weight would become quite a factor. But a situation requiring long dismounted advances is one in which cavalry should fall out in favor of the doughboys.

I can count on the fingers of one hand the officers I know who do not agree that the present light machine gun should be gotten rid of without further delay and replaced with the water-cooled gun or its equivalent.

Cavalry, to have a light machine gun which will do the job of the infantry automatic rifle, must develop an automatic weapon which can be carried on a ridden horse and which needs but one or two men for its operation.

W. W. YALE.

☆ ☆ ☆

War In Europe

War between first-class nations of the world now actually exists. As this war progresses every attempt will be made to present pertinent phases thereof within the columns of The CAVALRY JOURNAL. No attempt will be made, however, to furnish any chronological report of events, nor is it to be expected that situation maps of any type can be provided. Daily newspapers and certain weekly periodicals are far better equipped to furnish this type of information. Such references to the war as are made will be confined more strictly to analytical phases of the conflict which bring out major tactical lessons or new thoughts on the modern matériel of war, and their actual application in combat.

Political factors involved in the war will in no way be discussed in these columns so long as the war continues.

Close heed will be paid to new and advanced thought and application of means of waging war; employment of aircraft, particularly with respect to support of ground troops; tactical use of mechanized elements; use of motorization; communications and control facilities; supporting arms—all these and closely allied phases will be closely followed, and an attempt made to provide analytical observation as to actual effect on the progress of ground troops. Particular attention will be paid to the employment of highly mobile elements, and particularly the use made of horse and mechanized cavalry.

Some time may elapse before sufficiently accurate data is available upon which to base any comment on this subject.

This statement is made here to emphasize editorial cognizance of the existence of a major war, and the need of paying close attention to those significant factors which deserve our study and reflection. When such data is available, rest assured that it will be duly presented.

"PRACTICAL USE OF JOURNAL"

It is the desire of the editors of The CAVALRY JOURNAL to make it not only a readable publication but an instructive one as well. A former regimental commander told us the other day how he used it in the instruction of his officers. We think enough of the scheme to pass it on to our readers. Briefly, it is as follows:

The regimental commander selects from the many thoughtful articles available in The JOURNAL, those which he considers especially suitable for discussion, and assigns them to various officers, well in advance of the date of presentation. Probably one such discussion per week will be about right. On the day in question, all the officers assemble, preferably at the club, and listen to a discussion of the article by the officer who has been detailed for that purpose. The latter uses the blackboard or sketches if necessary, but should give the discussion without reading from The JOURNAL and preferably without notes. After giving the author's viewpoint, he should then add his own comments. A period of discussion then takes place, even the lowest ranking lieutenant being encouraged to express freely his own thoughts on the subject.

The success of this plan depends largely upon the manner in which it is conducted. The whole affair should be carried on in an entirely informal atmosphere, avoiding as far as possible the constraint of the lecture or school room.

We believe the advantages of this scheme are obvious. The speaker of the day will certainly know one article in The JOURNAL thoroughly and will get some badly needed practice in talking on his feet. All other officers present, also, will understand the subject much better than they would have from a more or less casual reading of the article. It is probable that the younger officers especially will learn, either from the lecture itself or from the discussion that follows, something that will be of lasting value to them in their profession. Not least of all will be the satisfaction felt by the editors at seeing such intelligent use being made of material gathered from widespread sources.

A word of warning. We believe that some such plan can be made the bright spot in the week—or it can become a disagreeable chore. Like so many other things, it depends upon how it is done. It might serve as a medium for a social stag gathering of regimental officers, of which it is believed they are too few in our army.

(CONTRIBUTED.)

Acknowledgment

In the July-August issue of The CAVALRY JOURNAL there appeared a very excellent article on the training of modern cavalry for war under the bi-line "Polish Cavalry Doctrine." Translation into English from Russian sources should have been credited to the Translation Section, Historical Section, The Army War College.

What Would You Do?

In the usual feature under the heading, "What Would You Do?" which appears under Notes from the Chief of Cavalry, it is regretfully announced that the good Slinkovitch has been relegated to an inactive status. He

has been replaced by Old Man Rivers, a sagacious and foxy old cavalryman who is on the alert every minute for a situation of opportunity. It is believed that the old man can be depended upon for aggressive action in every situation which is presented. The tactical sagacity of Old Man Rivers is commended to your attention.

* * *

Membership Cards

From time to time requests are received as to the availability of cards representing membership in the Cavalry Association. Due to accumulative costs for postage and other items, employment of these cards was discontinued several months ago. Unless there are cogent reasons to the contrary, future use of these cards is not at this time contemplated.

* * *

Poland

News items which have trickled out of Poland have emphasized the lack of information upon which to base definite lessons. It is believed that the time is not yet ripe to formulate positive conclusions nor is there sufficient information available upon which to formulate analytical reasoning. It is believed that the article under the title, "Poland Between Two Camps," which appears in preceding pages of this issue of The JOURNAL is of extraordinary value as an aid to analyzing what occurred in Poland and why it occurred.

* * *

Honor Roll

The following organizations occupy a place on the Cavalry Honor Roll by maintaining 100% membership in the Cavalry Association:

National Guard:

103d Cavalry
104th Cavalry
106th Cavalry (Michigan Component)
112th Cavalry
113th Cavalry
114th Cavalry

Headquarters, and Headquarters Troop, 52d Cavalry Brigade

Headquarters, and Headquarters Troop, 57th Cavalry Brigade

Headquarters, and Headquarters Troop, 24th Cavalry Division

Organized Reserves:

308th Cavalry (72% Membership, highest in that component).

Of the Regular Army commissioned personnel, 98% are members of the Cavalry Association.

The United States Cavalry Association

Organized November 9, 1885

The aim and purpose of the Association shall be to disseminate knowledge of the military art and science, to promote the professional improvement of its members, and to preserve and foster the spirit, the traditions, and the solidarity of the Cavalry of the Army of the United States.—Article III of the Constitution.

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NOTES from the CHIEF of CAVALRY



What Would You Do?

"I am very sorry I selected the wrong road, Colonel," apologized Major Jack Spavin, the S-3, "but they can't have gained very much distance."

Old Man Rivers' replaced the cork in a dingy looking bottle of Jose Cuervo's pale amber cactus juice. "Nuts, Spavin," he said, with a polite belch, (for Old Man Rivers was as much addicted to four-letter words as to four-letter tequila) "this is a pursuit. Or is it? A little more of your-left-handed Leavenworth map reading and we'll be out-run by a lot of doughboys. Just let me get out of these woods so's I can work behind a covering detachment, and I'll run over those birds with the light wagons. Driver! Full speed to the head of the column!"

The command car lurched down the long column of twos that made up Old Man Rivers' regiment. Passing Captain Paul Beltfeed, the machine gun troop commander, Old Man Rivers motioned to him to gallop to the head of the column and join the commander's group. Simultaneously came the voice of Lieutenant Klutch, of the Scout Car Platoon over the radio,—

"I'm up here near DROLL KNOLL on the SAWDUST TRAIL, Colonel," screamed Klutch over the roar of the static, "and it looks like the tail end of the doughs is heading for the bosque to the northwest of SKOAL KNOLL. But some of them, in trucks, with a motorized battery, are up on DROLL KNOLL. It looks like a delaying outfit!"

The command car skidded to a stop beside the led horses of the regimental command and staff group a few yards east of HENRY FORD. The advance guard and part of the main body had already crossed SLUSH RUN while the machine gun troop was still partly in the act of crossing.

Old Man Rivers, firmly gripping the neck of Jose Cuervo, vaulted to the saddle and waved the bottle in the face of Captain Paul Beltfeed, who, accompanied by his second-in-command, was haunching his horse to a stop before the Colonel.

"There'll be no delaying this time, Beltfeed," shouted Old Man Rivers. "There's open ground over there and I'm going to run over them right now,—"

WHAMMM!

A somewhat short, but fairly well placed salvo of 75's exploded a few yards upstream, followed by the thud of the battery itself from the DROLL KNOLL vicinity. A shrapnel slug shattered the bottle of Jose Cuervo, leaving the neck in Old Man Rivers' hand.

"Odd them beeches," cried Old Man Rivers, doubtlessly referring to the peculiar undergrowth which bordered the road. "Support the attack from the north edge of PINEY WOODS, Beltfeed. I'll attack in column of squadrons from the woods near SLUSH RUN as soon as you open fire. You can have a covering detachment from the advance guard and the rest of the advanced guard will protect the left flank. Go tell 'em I said so, Spavin (S-3). Now, hurry up, both of you. SQUADRON COMMANDERS! SQUADRON COMMANDERS!

As the troops took extended intervals and distances, and as the squadron commanders galloped up for orders, Old Man Rivers yelled, "You're the covering detachment, Lieutenant Splint, first bound edge of the woods, with your right flank on SLUSH RUN. Move out!"

As Major Jack Spavin galloped up ahead to the advance guard to relay the Colonel's instructions, Captain Paul Beltfeed began to think of the troop leading necessary to carry out Old Man Rivers' orders about supporting the attack.

Step into Beltfeed's boots, friends,

WHAT WOULD YOU DO?

See Chart.

Reserves Take Command at Fort Bliss

(Continued from page 409)

reviewed the events of the past three days. Older officers could not help but compare the heavy work and responsibility of this camp with others they had attended. One of them expressed the keynote of comparison when he related that he had been backing up to the pay table with his hand behind him every year for a long time, but he claimed he would walk straight forward and look the paymaster squarely in the eye when he took his pay this year.

The 312th Cavalry summer camp was distinctive in its amazing shortage of corpulent high ranking officers. The regiment was officered by such an array of newly-commissioned second lieutenants that captain almost became a rank of honor. The Eighth Corps Area commander established a policy that recently-appointed second lieutenants were to have first preference in making assignments for active duty. With four educational institutions in the district (University of Arizona, New Mexico Military Institute, Oklahoma Military Academy, and Texas A. & M.) all graduating Cavalry Reserve officers, there is an abundance of youthful junior officers available. The umpire staff was made up of only two field officers, both majors, and the rest first and second lieutenants. The roll call of rank left only three officers of field grade to command the war-strength regiment. Of remaining officers only three were captains. Therefore the task of running a regiment was considerably more complex than it normally would be with a better percentage of more experienced officers.

The 312th Cavalry summer camp was no place for the armchair type of officer. The schedule in plain language was tough with a full program from reveille at 5:00 AM each day until 5:00 PM. Even at this hour the day's work was not over for regimental and squadron staffs who received the special situation for the following day. These staffs had to complete plans of orders and turn them over to umpires by 9:00 PM. Umpires received an extra item in their diet in the form of night sessions to help digest the morning's maneuver. The camp ended with a total of 126 hours of actual tactical instruction showing a high daily average when days for travel were excluded.

Generally officers were pleased with the schedule despite the hard work or long hours. Objectors were so far outnumbered that their wails were of no avail. As a result of this camp it is quite certain that similar camps will be held each year with Reserve officers commanding appropriate units and Reserve officers acting as umpires.

What Would You Do?

Solution

Captain Paul Beltfeed turned to Lieutenant Beaton Zohn, his second-in-command. "The regiment is to move to assembly positions off the road to the right," he said. "I am going ahead to arrange for the covering detachment. You lead the troop along the left side of the road for about 1,000 yards to the front, or until you meet me. Have the platoon leaders at the head of the column."

Beltfeed whirled his horse in a cloud of dust and was off to the advance guard at a dead run. Finding that trusty Jack Spavin, the S-3, had already told the advance guard commander of the situation and that a covering detachment of one platoon was awaiting him, Beltfeed led the covering detachment back along the road for a short distance until the machine gun troop appeared, moving, as ordered, at the trot.

Turning to the covering detachment commander, Beltfeed ordered, "Your first bound at the gallop due north to the edge of PINEY WOODS. Move out!"

Beltfeed then allowed the machine gun troop to come close enough to signal, "SQUADS COLUMN RIGHT, MARCH." Placing himself in the center of the troop and motioning the platoon leaders to him, he said, "We support the attack of the regiment which will come from our right. When we break from cover of the woods, take the first available position in which you have a field of fire to the enemy and open fire on troop order (signal). Rejoin your platoons."

When the edge of PINEY WOODS was reached, Beltfeed directed the covering detachment to remain in place and signalled, "ACTION FRONT." When all guns were in position, he signalled, "COMMENCE FIRING."

Needless to say, Old Man Rivers and all the lads gave a very convincing demonstration that pursuing cavalry cannot afford to temporize with delaying forces, but must strike immediately at full assault strength, usually mounted, and with maximum fire power. Unless a thoroughgoing squitch is put on delayers they will withdraw, only to repeat their action in another well-chosen position.

General Hawkins' Notes

Motorized Infantry Protected by Cavalry

In March or April of this year, 1939, a comment appeared in the *German Cavalry Journal* by a Captain J———, referring to my article "The Difference is Amazing," published in our CAVALRY JOURNAL of January-February. The captain took exception to two of my statements about the German Cavalry in 1914.

I referred to the carbine used by the German Cavalry as a "popgun." The captain says it was only slightly inferior to the infantry rifle. Of course, I did not mean to say literally that the German carbine was a popgun. The expression was a figure of speech. This carbine was a high-powered rifled gun capable of killing a man at a mile. But its barrel was very short. Its sights were rather coarse. And it was not easy to fire it with accuracy. Personally, I tried shooting at a target with the French carbine, which was very similar to the German, and although I was a very good shot, I could not hit the bull's-eye at three hundred yards except by accident. I, therefore, regarded it as a very poor weapon in comparison with our old cavalry carbine or our present rifle. As I remember the French carbine, it had only three cartridges in the magazine. I am not so sure about the German carbine in this respect. Since I have always believed that a cavalry firearm should be capable of a great volume of fire in a short time, I did not believe that this weapon was adequate for modern warfare.

The second statement to which Captain J——— takes exception was to the effect that in 1914 the German cavalry advanced often preceded by a battalion of infantry in motor trucks, with a few cavalry patrols in front of the motor vehicles. I called attention to the clever manner in which these German patrols lured French cavalry squadrons into charging in close order, believing that they were going to meet German squadrons, and thus finding themselves ambushed by German machine guns and infantry. This was of course not a criticism of German cavalry, but rather of the French for failing to use covering detachments properly and for attacking in close order.

But Captain J——— says that such a statement is "amazing" because in 1914 there were no German battalions that were motorized. Perhaps they were not motorized organically as permanently motorized infantry, but there is much evidence to show that, by improvisation, some infantry battalions were transported in some kinds of motor vehicles for the purpose of supporting the cavalry, and that they did in some instances precede the main bodies of cavalry divisions except for the cavalry patrols which were out in front.

My chief authority for any statements was no less a person than General Joffre who, in a note for all armies on the subject of tactics, published at G.Q.G., on the 24th of August, 1914, makes the following statement: "The German Cavalry Divisions always operate preceded by some infantry battalions transported in motor cars. Up to date the main bodies of these cavalry formations have never allowed themselves to be approached by ours. They advance behind their infantry and then throw forward detachments of cavalry (patrols and reconnaissance) which fall back upon their infantry as soon as they are attacked. Our cavalry pursues these detachments and comes up against barrages strongly held."

There is other evidence in personal memoirs and official reports. Thus, if my statement was in error, I have much excuse. My purpose in calling attention to these episodes was not to criticise the German cavalry, but rather to point out to our own cavalry the tactical lessons to be gained by the failure of the French cavalry to use the proper methods to meet such tactics.

Infantry in trucks preceded by cavalry patrols and followed by the main body of a cavalry division, might have been a good way to establish a base of fire in advance of the cavalry so that the enemy cavalry could be checked by surprise fire and then attacked by the main body of the cavalry division. As a surprise it proved effective, but only because of the French equipment and methods of that date. At the present time, our equipment in firearms precludes the necessity of such an awkward arrangement as the Germans resorted to because of their lack of firepower in 1914.

When our cavalry meets hostile cavalry patrols, it should not launch itself blindly into the impetuous charges that were used by the French. There is not much to be gained by smashing into hostile patrols. Rather, they should be followed cautiously by our covering forces until we find out what is behind them. If it should be motorized infantry, then we have them trapped and can destroy them. Of course, if this infantry is stronger in force than our cavalry command, we can only harass them, stop them, and cause them many casualties. If we catch them before they have time to detruck and deploy we may even inflict a disaster upon them. If they are warned in time by their patrols, we can at least cause them to detruck and thus destroy their mobility. We might

then be able to bring up reinforcements from our larger cavalry formations and even our own infantry to destroy them.

But in these days we shall not find unsupported infantry out in front of their main forces. Motorized infantry may accompany cavalry in advanced missions, or in flanking operations and in exploitation of a success after a serious penetration of the enemy lines. Some persons seem to think that a motorized infantry unit even as large as a division may be sent on certain missions unsupported by other troops and relying on mechanized cavalry or other mechanized forces for its security. The success of such a venture depends on the nature of the enemy and his proximity and strength. If no enemy is encountered such a move would be successful, at least for the time being, even without any security forces whatever. But, of course, when there is any possibility of contact with enemy forces, no commander would take the risk of moving such a column without an advance guard or covering force of some kind. The question is what kind of covering force is required.

Now, as stated before, the Germans, in 1914, covered those infantry columns, which were advanced in motor cars, with cavalry patrols, and supported them closely with larger cavalry units. Therefore, the motorized infantry must have moved by bounds so as to avoid moving faster than the cavalry patrols in their front. These patrols had not only to reconnoiter the road ahead but also the flanks, so as to prevent surprise or ambush by enemy cavalry moving across country.

And so, even though we motorize a whole division, we cannot send it out unsupported on tasks in which the enemy is likely to be encountered unless its front and flanks are well guarded.

Motorized columns can be attacked not only in front but also on the flanks, and not only on the flanks near the head of the column, but also on the flanks near the middle or tail of the column. Therefore, widespread mobile elements must cover the advance. This means that much cross-country work must be done. Motorized or mechanized elements used as security detachments can themselves be surprised and ambushed by means that would not be effective against well trained cavalry. Observation from motor vehicles is difficult, especially when it is necessary to take advantage of cover and of every little hillock or mound to get a look across the country to be explored. Armored cars and scout cars can reconnoiter side roads and roads perpendicular to the line of march for some distance, but always in a more or less helpless manner if the enemy lays a trap for them. Woods, dense and large enough to conceal enemy forces of considerable size, will often be neglected because of the difficulty of movement in them by motor vehicles and of the danger to the vehicles in attempting to explore such places.

For these and other reasons, there is no getting away from the necessity of protecting an infantry motorized column by means of cavalry security detachments. Mechanized cavalry can be of assistance but cannot be relied upon alone.

Therefore, a motorized infantry column when moving unsupported towards the enemy on an independent mission must be covered by cavalry. And this means that its rate of movement must be controlled by the rate of march of the cavalry detachments. When moving behind the lines under the same conditions that permit troops to be transported in railroad trains, the matter is entirely different.

After all, no matter how much our infantry can use motor cars for transportation as an extension of the railway system for concentration of forces, or for occupation of a strategic position, or for transferring of units from one flank of the army to another, a motorized infantry column that is moving in a tactical formation to operate against an enemy must have security detachments of cavalry. Motorized infantry may move up to a defensive line to reinforce troops already there without requiring security detachments. As a support for large cavalry forces moving to cover an army or to perform other independent missions, motorized infantry can move in rear of the cavalry force or its advanced elements without special cavalry detachments being assigned for its security. In other words, motorized infantry can take full advantage of its increased mobility only when it needs no security detachments. When it does need them its mobility is reduced to that of such detachments of cavalry as may be assigned for such duty. And, as a matter of fact, in such situations that degree of mobility is quite sufficient because no column of troops can go tearing toward the enemy at the speed that motor columns are capable of making. When contact with the enemy is imminent the speed of march of tactical columns must be reduced to gain time for more information of the enemy, for a little more caution and for other obvious reasons, to say nothing of interference by enemy air force.

The apparent rapid advance of the German columns into Poland as reported by the press must be due to the policy of the Poles to fight only rear guard actions so far, without attempting to outflank motor columns by using cavalry. We don't know how the Polish cavalry is armed and trained. Nor do we know how the Germans are protecting their motorized columns. Powerful columns may have been able to move close enough to each other to prevent anything but frontal resistance by Polish rear guards. Or, there has been insufficient cavalry for the purpose; or, perhaps the Polish cavalry did not have the necessary antitank guns.

Since infantry must detruck at safe distances from the enemy, it is obvious that it must be prepared to march for considerable distance before engaging the enemy. And our infantry should be kept hard and fit by constant practice marching. This is not being done. Even in maneuvers our regular infantry rolls around in trucks and is learning to despise marching and the physical fitness that only marching can bring about.

Perhaps this, as well as lack of tactical instruction, was

what General Drum had in mind when he criticized so severely the training, or its lack, as shown by the recent maneuvers near Plattsburg.

It is peculiarly important at this time that our lack of training should have been exposed at the Plattsburg maneuvers. The first requisite for training is a sound and practical doctrine. The second requisite is the possession of sufficient ground for tactical movements. Individual training in the care and use of weapons can be had in all of our military posts with their adjacent target ranges. But collective or tactical training is impossible in the great majority of our posts. We need varied ground for the training of infantry and cavalry units in the art of using cover in offensive tactics and of proper utilization of the ground features for defensive action. Most of our military posts are mere postage stamps stuck around the country and surrounded by forbidden ground. At least six months of the year should be devoted to daily tactical training of all units from the squad up to the largest unit stationed at any post. It is not sufficient to have training grounds within twenty or thirty miles of the post. But only very few posts have even this. Training grounds for units up to the size of a regiment should be in close proximity to the post in order that the training may be a daily affair during the six months collective training season. The housekeeping in the post has to go on. Guard and fatigue details must be made. Special arrangements have to be made for units to leave the post for more than one day. The result of all this is that there is no tactical training at most posts, and only a week or two of it in a year at posts which have some training grounds available at distances involving the necessity of camping off the post for more than one day at a time.

Inclement weather is not suitable for training. And troops stationed in northern posts have very little good weather for training except during summer months when they are fully occupied in training civilian components of the army and in target practice.

There is much excuse, therefore, for the lack of tactical training, although there is none whatever for failure to train the troops in marching.

It must be admitted that even in those exceptional posts where tactical training is possible, very little advantage is taken of it except at certain posts along our southern border. This is a matter for our War Department to regulate. But first of all, as before said, it must assure a correct tactical doctrine. Then it must take steps to procure training grounds for all troops. And last but not least, it must require every Corps Area Commander to prescribe a collective training season for each post in the area and to see that every regular army unit takes full advantage of it. Post commanders should not be permitted to regard housekeeping and post maintenance as the principal objective. But rather, housekeeping should be regarded as a means to an end, and that end should be individual and tactical training.

To go back to our combination of motorized infantry and cavalry, there should be training in conducting a movement of a tactical column of motorized infantry prescribed and guarded by cavalry. The movement over nearly three hundred miles in Texas by an experimental motorized division proved nothing of a tactical nature. That was nothing more than a movement of troops by rail. It has no place in a tactical exercise. If we wish to find out what we can do with motorized infantry it should be in a tactical movement. Everybody knows that strategical movements by motor cars are in the same category as strategical movements by railroads. The motor cars merely extend the railroad system.

Our cavalry needs training in securing the march (if we call it a march) of motorized infantry. And motorized infantry needs training in moving behind cavalry and in supporting cavalry when such support is needed. Just how roads can be used for this purpose, and how the infantry can support the cavalry in cross-country movements is something that can be learned only by practice. And the combination of mechanized cavalry and horse cavalry might be included in such exercises which would reveal many principles not yet well understood.

But, as General Drum has pointed out, we need a highly trained well organized Regular Army ready to take the field at short notice, as is the case with the Navy. The Army need not be very large, but should be composed of organized divisions instead of scattered and poorly trained elements. Only thus can the Army be well trained and ready to perform its duties in any emergency.

It behooves us not to be caught as we were in 1917, wholly unprepared. Had we been prepared, not necessarily with a great army, but with a few divisions of highly trained troops, we might have avoided that war, or at least been able to contribute at once an important element in the allied armies. But we did not have enough well trained officers and noncommissioned officers even for the purpose of training the new formations which were not ready for over a year, if then. We do not expect to have to send an army to Europe again, but no one knows just where or how our troops may be needed for our national purposes. War of today needs highly trained troops. A regular army of not over three hundred thousand men, organized into highly trained and well equipped divisions of infantry and cavalry, and including Corps and Army artillery, garrisons for defense of such important points as the Panama Canal and Hawaii, an Air Force, and a reserve of National Guard Divisions, would preclude any necessity of organizing and training a new army of a million men.

But at the very least, or we might say at the very worst, we should have enough highly trained divisions to provide really competent instructors for any new army we might have to form. We cannot get these competent instructors by merely sending officers and noncommissioned officers to our service schools. They need training with high class troops. Without this training they are not competent. Such tactical doctrines or methods as are discussed in this or other military journals fall off from untrained minds like water off the backs of ducks. A man

needs training with troops to be able to comprehend tactical discussions. Too much reliance is reposed in our service schools. They are essential. But officers sent to them should have had some training with troops beforehand in order to make the most of the school course, and they must have training with troops afterwards in order to crystallize the ideas they have absorbed and to distinguish between the practical and impractical theories that are found inevitably in every school. Our higher schools, at Fort Leavenworth and the War College, have done much for the training of staff officers. The staffs of our large units may be expected to be better in the field than any staffs we have ever had before, but we cannot be so optimistic about our troop training which includes of course troop leading by officers and noncommissioned officers.

Now that the terrible reality of war has again appeared in Europe, we can appreciate more keenly the value of the practical soldier, and question more acutely the value of certain doctrines and theories that have sprung up in peacetime. And this turns me again to the practical question concerning cavalry. Cavalry is not well understood by the majority of officers in our army, or indeed in any army. It seems to take great leaders to use cavalry well in war. All great leaders in the past did so. The mediocre leaders did not.

The missions for which cavalry is useful or necessary arise from time to time. They then become apparent to the general who knows how to use his cavalry. If the cavalry has been held fit and ready for such missions, it can be used when they become necessary with every prospect of success. But if, in order to employ his cavalry and get it into action rather than have it lying around doing nothing, the general commanding a force which includes cavalry gives it useless missions or missions which are not important to the whole plan of action, he is exposing it and frittering away the strength without adequate results. And it will be exhausted or worn out before a paramount mission arises.

Although the German armies did not advance any faster than we might expect motor columns protected by cavalry to advance against opposition by enemy rear guards only, they might have been delayed much more by really numerous forces of horse cavalry supported by mechanized cavalry.

But, of course, for such service, the horse cavalry must be armed, trained and led properly. Such a cavalry one hundred thousand strong, armed and trained for both mounted and dismounted action, but relying upon firearms for both types of action instead of swords and lances, could render such important service that it is strange that only "a few voices crying in the wilderness" seem to understand.

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NOTES FROM THE CAVALRY BOARD

"The Cavalry Board invites any individual, whether or not a cavalryman, to submit for consideration constructive suggestions or ideas relating to new equipment, improvement of standard equipment, or to any problem or project under study by the Board. The Board will also welcome suggestions as to new problems that may properly be considered. Communications should be addressed to the President, Cavalry Board, Fort Riley, Kansas."

60-mm. Mortar: The Cavalry Board is testing one of the new 60-mm. mortars. Much of the firing has been completed, however other parts of the test will be delayed until pack equipment is received. Packing accessories are now being fabricated by the ordnance department, and will be so designed that ammunition may be packed on the horse in original shipping containers.

Pull-type selective single shot auto-fire trigger mechanism for BMG, Caliber .50, M2 HB: The question of the desirability of altering all caliber .50 machine guns in cavalry to provide a pull-type trigger and a selective firing control device to provide for positive single shot fire is being investigated. It is understood that a gun is being altered by the ordnance department to include these features and when completed will be furnished the Board for test.

Pitchers, syrup: The soldier who has had the experience of deluging his hot cakes, and possibly his clothes, when the top of the syrup pitcher unexpectedly popped loose, and the mess sergeant who has cursed the dribbling mouth of the present type of syrup pitcher as well as being concerned with his breakage allowance, will welcome the non-breakable (aluminum), non-drip syrup pitcher which has just been service tested by the Second Cavalry and favorably reported upon by the Cavalry Board.

Tanks, Watering, Canvas, and Sponges, Cellulose, mentioned in previous issues, are still undergoing service tests.

Training Films: "A picture is worth ten thousand words"—a fact that is being realized in modern training by the use of improved slide projectors and moving pictures. An excellent training film plan prepared by the Infantry Board covering the subject "Pitching Tents and Establishment of Bivouacs and Camps," has been received by the Board for study. Additions, in the form of interpolations, so as to make this film also applicable to cavalry training, have been submitted by the Cavalry Board. Also, matter is now being prepared for a strip film for R.O.T.C. training covering the subject "Animal Management."

Anti-gas Equipment: The matter of anti-gas equipment for horses still presents a serious problem which is the subject for continual study by the Board, while it maintains liaison with the chemical warfare service which is conducting definite research in our interest. At present the Board has on hand, undergoing service tests, fourteen horse gas masks of the newly adopted standard type, M111, embodying certain modifications over the ones previously tested by the cavalry and the field artillery. These changes involve matters of fit, serviceability and method of buckling straps while seven of the masks to be tested have had added an outlet valve in an effort to reduce the amount of moisture which collects in the mask over a period of time due to exhalations of the animal as well as to a certain amount of slobbering. In addition a Czechoslovakian mask is also being tested. This is of a canister type, is rather awkward and cumbersome and does not appear to be very promising. However the study of a canister type of mask is continuing. Research is being conducted to provide suitable protection for the horse against vesicants. Any type of covering or boots appears to be impracticable at the moment but efforts are being made to develop something in the nature of a neutralizing salve which might afford sufficient protection for a few hours at a time.

The board is expecting the arrival shortly of a few new type Service and Diaphragm Gas Masks for test.

Communications: The ever important subject of communications requires unrelenting study. Characteristics for a new pack radio set have been submitted. It is believed that the need for an ultra high frequency, light, portable set capable of transmitting up to seven miles has been established. Just as the cavalry arm is continually being confronted with the problem of weight versus mobility, so the development of such a set involves the reconciliation of power output (i.e., range) with weight. A conference early in November with signal corps technicians at Fort Knox is contemplated. The development of a panel set for communicating with aerial observers, affording considerably less weight and bulk while at the same time lending itself to more rapid communication, is showing promising results. The treatment of radio frequencies within the cavalry is being reviewed. Obviously the present chaotic condition, wherein, in certain localities cavalry organizations are using the entire width of the band available for cavalry as a whole, cannot obtain in war service. There can be but one answer, of course, and that is that the use of radio is going to have to be considerably curtailed in general, and the use of radio telephony, which requires a much wider channel, in particular.

Semitrailers: The Cavalry Board has recently passed upon the specifications for seven new semitrailers which will be procured for cavalry use in the near future. They will be used principally in the conduct of experiments in the use of portee cavalry. These semitrailers will be a great improvement over the ones now in use in the various regiments in that they will have a larger, more powerful prime mover and a greatly improved body. It is believed that a number of these units might be included in the

Quartermaster Squadron of the Cavalry Division, Horse, to be used normally as cargo carriers but to be available when needed in emergencies to portee horse units. Some observers believe that sufficient of these semitrailers should be included in the service units of the division to transport a reinforced squadron if desired.

Pyrotechnic signals: Several new types of pyrotechnic signals have recently been received by the Cavalry Board and will be tested to determine whether any of them have a value for use with cavalry units in addition to or to replace those now in use. The ones furnished for test are for both daytime and night use.

Legging top boots: The service test of the proposed new legging top boots is progressing and thus far it appears that they are much more desirable and sturdy and much more suitable for real field use than is the present issue boot. The method of closure of the new boot (buckles and straps) appears to be very satisfactory and a great time saver over the lacing method employed in the old type boot.

Cavalry Participation in First Army Maneuvers

Manassas Phase

Colonel George S. Patton, Jr., commanding the 3d United States Cavalry which participated in the First Army Maneuvers at Manassas, Virginia, in reviewing operations of the cavalry during these maneuvers, emphasized the following factors:

"The area selected for the maneuver was well adapted to bring out the potentialities of the several arms involved after contact was made. However, it was too restricted to permit cavalry or mechanization to execute their proper initial functions of reconnaissance and screening.

"The lack of ground observation and the impossibility in many cases of air observation restricted to a considerable degree the use of the supporting artillery with the cavalry. Nevertheless, particularly on the first day (August 14th), the artillery liaison groups overcame this difficulty and provided prompt and probably effective fire whenever called upon.

"It is believed that this command demonstrated the efficiency of its previous training. However, the four days' intensive work at Fort Belvoir were of an inestimable value in overcoming the inevitable tendency to crowd which is produced in regular units through training on the inadequate terrain of small army posts. This remark applies with equal force to the cavalry and field artillery.

"The high effectiveness of the cavalry light machine gun was emphasized by the maneuver because in such terrain it gives opportunity for powerful effect with limited personnel thereby insuring each troop of a large and mobile reserve to be used mounted or dismounted as circumstances indicate.

"Time and again in these exercises the vital necessity of providing cavalry with sabers was demonstrated because in close terrain cavalry can and did during the maneuvers approach unobserved with such short distances of unsuspecting enemy as to make a mounted charge with "cold steel" of inestimable value in securing a decisive result with a minimum loss of time and personnel.

"The high value of horse-drawn artillery in supporting cavalry was repeatedly demonstrated. It is believed that even better results would have obtained had the exigencies of the situation permitted the firing batteries to remain closer to the cavalry.

"The terrain was ideal for the employment of cavalry because the growing effectiveness of automatic weapons has rendered the open country, for years acclaimed as "cavalry country," less suitable than in closed country where the practically noiseless and ubiquitous mobility of individual horsemen may be capitalized.

"It is believed that, had the exigencies of the situation permitted leaving its organic scout cars with the cavalry, the efficiency of the latter would have been materially increased.

"The cavalry radio communication system is unsatisfactory. Practically all radio communication received by this command was through the field artillery liaison units using the SCR 194 sets. The officer commanding the scout car section of the reconnaissance detachment states that the radios with that unit worked satisfactorily. Due to the lack of radio communication the cavalry had to resort primarily to mounted messengers and to situation reports transmitted through the medium of liaison officers.

"Adequacy of communications. Despite the failure of the radios with the cavalry it is believed that communication for this arm is adequate, because in war the various highly specialized means of communication will not stand up and it is well to learn to operate in consonance with a prearranged plan for the attainment of satisfactory results.

"It is recommended that the present cavalry pack set be discontinued and replaced with the SCR 194 set as used by the field artillery, and also an adequate radio set for communication with scout cars and higher echelons be provided in a 4-wheel drive truck armed with machine guns. Each troop and squadron headquarters should be provided with one SCR 194 set and regimental headquarters at the ratio of one for each squadron.

"At least three motorcycles, solo, should be added to the tactical vehicular transportation of headquarters and headquarters and service troop of a cavalry regiment."

Book Reviews

WORLD IN ARMS, a study in military geography, by Major R. Ernest Dupuy, U.S.A. 103 pages, Military Service Publishing Company. Price: $2.00.

With a major war raging in Europe, Major Dupuy has provided the average reader, interested in its broader phases, source material of exceptional interest.

The book appears to have been carefully and scientifically prepared to enable a reader to grasp at a glance the meaning of the drives on land, movements by sea and lightning sallies through the air. A total of 41 simple graphic illustrations are provided with detailed explanations opposite each, which facilitates a rather prompt understanding of the military reasons for and limitations of any movement.

Each major country and area of the world is covered in very satisfactory fashion. Each country is well mapped, showing those geographical corridors which lend themselves as a primary route of invasion, all indicated by suitable symbols. Secondary routes of invasion also are indicated. Charts showing air mileage and time travel between vital centers and the closest hostile air bases are furnished. Army strength and organization are graphically represented to include army, navy, and air forces. When necessary, explanatory details are furnished covering incidents peculiar to any country or area. In an age of highly mechanized and scientific warfare being fought on three planes, land, air and below the sea. Major Dupuy has produced a book of outstanding interest and value to all who wish to follow intelligently the trend of coming events.

* * *

MILITARY STRENGTH OF THE POWERS, by Max Werner. 324 pp. Modern Age Books, New York: 95c.

In the preface to this book the publishers state, "The author of this book is a noted military authority who cannot use his own name because of the possible reflection on relatives in his native land." The volume then proceeds to ascertain and analyze the approximate strength and combat ability of the principal European powers. Published in July, 1939, it at that time appeared to overemphasize the industrial and mechanized efficiency of both the Soviet and the German armies. In the light of historical events of September, however, the chapter on Poland seems to have so accurately analyzed the military situation in that country that one is led to further reflection on Mr. "Werner's" analyses of other armies.

The book, written for lay rather than professional readers, contains an amazing accumulation of factual data, well sprinkled with remarks and opinions of a host of European military authorities. The bibliography covers newspapers, magazines, and books of several languages and indicates a rather extensive research.

The opinions of the author seem slightly prejudiced in favor of the superiority of the present Soviet Army, but he opens many channels for serious thought. His prognostications concerning political trends are far less accurate, in the light of September history, than his diagnosis of the military situations.

* * *

AIR-WAR, by W. O'D. Pierce, Modern Age Books, Inc. 216 pp. Price: 50c.

This volume is a condensation of an English edition entitled, *Air-War: Its Technical and Social Aspects*, and is another volume intended for lay rather than professional reading. The author, a young Irish scientist, presents an interesting treatise on the psychological affects of aerial combat on both the flyer and the bombarded civilian population. He presents a number of "case histories" of World War aviators and the psychological trends from the time of the action in each case to the eventual death of each. These examples are ably given, and to the scientific mind or to the student of psychological affects, form an interesting study.

The study of mass psychology of bombed civilian centers is less conclusive, but the author's study along this line, including recent bombings in China and Spain, is of interest at a time when the possibility of destruction from the air is so pertinent to a large portion of the present civilization.

On the matter of future bombings the author concludes: "When the bombs fall again in a major imperial war, the extent of death and destruction they will cause is difficult to forecast accurately. But our civilization can rest content that the best technical brains in all countries will do a thorough job. The extent of devastation caused will be their great memorial."

* * *

LET THE RECORD SPEAK, by Dorothy Thompson. Houghton Mifflin Company, 400 pp. $2.75.

This book, published in July, 1939, is a compilation of Miss Thompson's interpretation of world news in general and activities of Hitler in particular as expressed through her syndicated column, "On the Record," and various speeches made during the years 1936-1939.

Miss Thompson absorbs the news as a plant drinks water, and then, much as the plant utilizes that water for manufacturing its own variety of leaf and bloom, Miss Thompson digests yesterday's news and turns it back to us with the stamp of her own dynamic personality. She is fearless in her opinions, often cruel with her thrusts, but seems to have pierced the complexities of international politics and mapped the course that European events have taken toward war. For those who have not read her

daily columns, this book presents a collected résumé of recent European politics.

In the conclusion, written in July, Miss Thompson says, ". . . the time when such a stand could have been taken lies in the past. . . . The conquest of Czechoslovakia was the completely logical successor of the conquest of Austria; the conquest of Poland remains a completely logical successor to the conquest of Czechoslovakia; the conquest of all eastern Europe has been in the cards from the beginning." C. H.

* * *

ROAD TO EMPIRE: The Life and Times of Bonaparte the General. By Fletcher Pratt. Doubleday Doran and Company, New York. 1939. $3.75.

Beginning with the insurrection of the Sections in Paris in October, 1795, the author describes the history of General Bonaparte of the French Republican Army up to the time he seized the government as First Consul in November, 1799. Only four years of history, but during that time the foundations of the Empire were laid.

The military history is in sufficient detail to give a clear picture of the campaigns. These were the first Italian, and the Egyptian by Bonaparte, and the campaigns along the Rhine conducted by the French generals, Moreau and Jourdan.

The author pictures Bonaparte as the first exponent, in those times, of "absolute war"; that is, forcing from the enemy a profitable peace instead of merely doing a little gentlemanly fighting and settling the real issues at the peace conference tables. This was to the surprise and discomfort of Austria.

The Egyptian campaign, according to the author, was the result of a queer combination of circumstances. Bonaparte, following the Italian campaign, was uneasy lest his reputation become dim. Talleyrand had advanced the theory that England could only be defeated through India, and that Egypt was the first step. And the Directory, having more soldiers on hand than they knew what to do with, were more than pleased to get rid of forty thousand of them—and Bonaparte.

Mr. Pratt writes in a delightful manner. It's quite different, but easy to read and the tempo never drops. He calls a spade a spade and reports certain episodes for what they are worth. Josephine's part in Bonaparte's appointment as Commander of the Army of Italy, is an example. "The opposition journals said it was given on the condition that the new general relieve Barras of the mistress he was anxious to discard."

The weakness of the government put a premium on the "law of the sword." The Directory leaned heavily on the army for its support. Finally, on November 10, 1799, "the sword had been lifted once too often. Now it was master."

At the beginning of the book is a "time table of events and personalities previous to the rising of the curtain"

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(Books on horsemanship by The Cavalry School are listed with the Departmental Texts on inside of back cover.)

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

Cavalry Scout Car on distant reconnaissance. Note camouflage and local security measures.

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and a description of the French revolutionary calendar.

Fletcher Pratt makes history a very good story. Just as his *Heroic Years* and *Ordeal by Fire* delightfully picture our War of 1812 and our Civil War, *Road to Empire* pictures the rise of Napoleon, and makes an excellent story in the telling.

A HANDBOOK OF NATIONAL DEFENSE IN PEACE, by Thomas H. Healy, A.M., LL.D., Ph.D. 325 pages, Ransdell, Washington, D. C.

Although written and published in 1936, the purpose of this book appears to be as pertinent today as three years ago. The author early invites attention to the rather vast appropriations for national defense which occurred in 1936-37, and goes into the reasons behind these vast expenditures in some detail.

In discussing the causes of war one cannot help but regret that Doctor Healy approaches the subject with considerable restraint. It is believed that there are other and more definite and concise causes which bring about war, rather than racial and national animosities and infringements. A more basic understanding of the true causes of war are vital to a proper understanding of the need and imperativeness of a national defense, particularly on the part of a "have" nation.

The aims and activities of peace groups within America are adequately discussed. Many of the fundamental flaws which generally are to be found in the ordinary peace movement are satisfactorily revealed.

Altogether, it may be stated that this book analyzes the constant conflict between the needs of national defense and peace advocates which exists under our democratic form of government. This book will constitute a valuable asset in the library of any student interested in the broader political and psychological factors peace and war.

THE WESTERN HORSE, by John A. Gorman, Assistant Professor of Animal Production, University of Wyoming. 278 pages, The Interstate Printers and Publishers, 1939. Price: $1.65.

Professor Gorman has provided a volume of much interest and usefulness for those interested in the native horses of the Western United States. This book evidently was written and intended for the layman and for those owners of a favorite riding horse of Western breed: his origin, capabilities and general characteristics. Features such as training the colt, training and gaiting the pleasure saddle horse, trick training and other items add interest to this book and would be found of considerable value to those owners, particularly, who evince pride in ownership of a small stable. Bloodlines and other distinguishing elements of our Western stock are adequately covered.

ORGANIZATION ACTIVITIES

1st Cavalry—Fort Knox, Ky.

COLONEL HENRY W. BAIRD, *Commanding*

On August 2, 1939, the regiment marched from Fort Knox, Kentucky, to participate in the First Army Maneuvers in the Plattsburg area. The story of the part played by the Seventh Cavalry Brigade is the story of the units which compose the brigade and, in addition to the articles appearing in the press, will be told elsewhere by military students and writers. Suffice it to say here that the 1st Cavalry played its expected part and came back to Fort Knox with a record of which the regiment may well be proud.

The work was hard and the hardships experienced will not often be duplicated in time of peace. Contacts with other arms were of inestimable value. The outstanding fact brought home to all who came in contact with the regiment and the brigade was that there is no higher type of enlisted man in any army than those men who make up the Seventh Cavalry Brigade. Many times was this fact noted by umpires, commanders of other units, and the civilians in whose communities we camped.

The return of the regiment via the New York World's Fair was an experience long to be remembered. The trip down Broadway to the Battery, and back up Fifth Avenue, with enthusiastic spectators lining the streets and crowding the windows of Manhattan's tall buildings, the intermittent showers of paper (as well as rain), and the warm welcome extended by Mayor La Guardia and the citizens of New York were events given to few to experience.

The regiment was reviewed by Mayor La Guardia, Mr. Grover Whalen, Lieutenant General Hugh A. Drum, Brigadier General Adna R. Chaffee, and other notables in the Court of Peace the day after our arrival. Throughout our stay, elements of the regiment gave daily demonstrations at the fair, arousing great interest among the throngs of Fair visitors. Due to the kindness of the authorities, all men of the brigade were admitted to the various exhibits and special performances were given by General Motors, Goodrich, and the Aquacade.

While all ranks enjoyed our stay under the Trylon and the Perisphere, it was good to hear the strains of "My Old Kentucky Home" at reveille on September 7, 1939. The regiment took its place in column at 2:00 AM on the 8th and completed a successful march on the 13th of September. Arriving at Jeffersonville at 6:30 AM, we unloaded our tracked vehicles, which had been shipped from New York, and marched to Fort Knox where we passed in review before Major General Van Voorhis the Corps Area commander.

Back in our home station, the regiment is busy getting equipment in shape and preparing for whatever duty the future may hold in store.

* * *

1st Squadron, 3d Cavalry—Fort Ethan Allen, Vt.

LIEUTENANT COLONEL S. V. CONSTANT, 3d Cavalry, *Commanding*

On July 31st the squadron left Fort Ethan Allen at 6:30 AM to move to camp near Schuyler Falls, New York, to prepare for the First Army Maneuvers.

The squadron marched to Burlington, Vermont, where it was embarked on a lake steamer and a ferry boat for a ten-mile trip across Lake Champlain. The horses stood the trip very well. Upon arrival at Port Kent, New York, the squadron again took to the road and hiked to Schuyler Falls reaching the camp area about 1:00 PM.

The camp had already been set up by Troop B detachment which had been in the area since July 11th. Troop B had also set up the umpire camp which was to accommodate some 350-400 officers. This work meant the construction of a complete camp in the field with the additional work of setting up assembly tents for umpire's and instructional purposes.

On August 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th, officers and men of the squadron with the permission of the commanding general of the First Army attended the Lake Placid Horse Show held at Lake Placid, New York. The following is a list of the events entered and the names of the officers and men winning and placing:

Adirondack Jumper—Limited to horses owned within 150-mile radius of Lake Placid, New York.

1st—*Milly Russell*—Captain T. C. Wenzlaff.
2d—*Hailstone*—Sergeant Roy Wood.
4th—*Hightime*—Lieutenant Colonel S. V. Constant.

Troopers' Mount.

1st—*Shady Lady*—Sergeant Roy Wood, Troop A.
2d—*Jane*—Private First Class Miscik, Troop B.
3rd—*Blue Boy*—Private First Class Gormley, Troop A.
4th—*Banjo*—Corporal Hagen, Troop A.

1st Phase, Team of Three—jumped separately over a course of 8 jumps. Team score only to count.

1st—*Hightime*—Lieutenant Colonel S. V. Constant.
Milly Russell—Captain T. C. Wenzlaff.
Razor Back—Lieutenant T. B. Harrington.
2d—*Beatrice*—Lieutenant L. H. Cross.
Banjo—Lieutenant W. A. Sussmann.
Blue Boy—Lieutenant T. C. Stone.

Officers' Charger.

1st—*Hightime*—Lieutenant Colonel S. V. Constant.
2d—*Milly Russell*—Captain T. C. Wenzlaff.
3d—*Banjo*—Lieutenant T. B. Harrington.
4th—*Beatrice*—Lieutenant L. H. Cross.
5th—*Razor Back*—Lieutenant W. A. Sussmann.

Team of Three Hunters.

2d—*Hightime*—Lieutenant Colonel S. V. Constant.
Hailstone—Sergeant Roy Wood.
Milly Russell—Captain T. C. Wenzlaff.

2nd Phase, Team of Three—Unicorn over a hunter course.

1st—*Hightime*—Lieutenant Colonel S. V. Constant.
Milly Russell—Captain T. C. Wenzlaff.
Razor Back—Lieutenant T. B. Harrington.
2d—*Beatrice*—Lieutenant L. H. Cross.
Banjo—Lieutenant W. A. Sussmann.
Blue Boy—Lieutenant T. C. Stone.

Bareback Jumping—over a course of eight jumps.

3d—*Hightime*—Private First Class Dorman.
5th—*Razor Back*—Private First Class Armonaviczie.

Military Pair.

1st—*Shady Lady*—Sergeant Roy Wood, Troop A.
Banjo—Corporal Hagen, Troop A.
2d—*Come On*—Private First Class J. F. Ross, Troop A.
Blue Boy—Private First Class Gormley, Troop A.
3d—*Prince*—Private First Class Armonaviczie, Troop B.
Jane—Private First Class Miscik, Troop B.
4th—*Beatrice*—Corporal DiPalma, Troop B.
Pete—Corporal Scott, Troop B.

Military Fours.

1st—*Shady Lady*—Sergeant Roy Wood, Troop A.
Banjo—Corporal Hagen, Troop A.
Come On—Private First Class J. F. Ross, Troop A.
Blue Boy—Private First Class Gormley, Troop A.
2d—*Prince*—Private First Class Armonaviczie, Troop B.
Jane—Private First Class Miscik, Troop B.
Beatrice—Corporal DiPalma, Troop B.
Pete—Corporal Scott, Troop B.

Adirondack Hunter—limited to horses owned within 150-mile radius of Lake Placid, New York.

4th—*Milly Russell*—Captain T. C. Wenzlaff.

3rd Phase, Team of Three—single file at a safe distance over a hunter course.

1st—*Hightime*—Lieutenant Colonel S. V. Constant.
Milly Russell—Captain T. C. Wenzlaff.
Razor Back—Lieutenant T. B. Harrington.
2d—*Beatrice*—Lieutenant L. H. Cross.
Banjo—Lieutenant W. A. Sussmann.
Blue Boy—Lieutenant T. C. Stone.

Military Championship.

1st—*Hightime*—Lieutenant Colonel S. V. Constant.
Milly Russell—Captain T. C. Wenzlaff.
Razor Back—Lieutenant T. B. Harrington.
2d—*Beatrice*—Lieutenant L. H. Cross.
Banjo—Lieutenant W. A. Sussmann.
Blue Boy—Lieutenant T. C. Stone.

During the period of the maneuvers proper, the squadron ran the camp for the umpires.

When the men were not busy they were permitted to go on mounted pass and see as much as possible of the maneuver. By being a neutral it was possible to ride through the lines and learn a great deal about what was really going on.

After the maneuver was over the squadron cleaned up the area and turned in all of the equipment that had been drawn. Everything was in order and the squadron ready to leave for home on August 31st just one month after their arrival. The squadron left camp at 10:45 AM and embarked on the boats at Port Kent at 1:30 PM. All the horses rode very well and the post was reached about 4:00 PM.

The squadron is now engaged in the normal period of fall training.

The summer months brought a great change in the officer personnel of the squadron. Lieutenant Colonel Rees left on July 30th to attend the Army War College in Washington, D. C., and Lieutenant Colonel Constant took command. Captain C. C. Jadwin and Captain R. W. Barton left in June for a short leave at the end of which they are both to report to the Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Captain J. K. Mitchell now commands Troop B, and Captain T. C. Wenzlaff, Troop A. First Lieutenant E. W. Sawyer left in June for a short leave and will report at Fort Riley in time to attend the Cavalry School. Lieutenant L. H. Cross one of the six officers assigned to the squadron for training under the Thomason Act for the year 1938-1939. won his commission as a second lieutenant in the Regular Army and is again on duty with the squadron. Lieutenant Foster a R.O.T.C. honor graduate from Massachusetts State College is under orders to report to the squadron for duty. The following named lieutenants are now on duty for training under the Thomason Act: Lieutenants Benjamin, Beaton, Lippincott, Hewitt, Stone, and Ward.

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6th Cavalry—Fort Oglethorpe, Ga.

COLONEL JOHN MILLIKIN, *Commanding*

The regiment and garrison extended a welcome to the new commander, Colonel John Millikin from Boston, Massachusetts, September 16th as replacement for Colonel George Dillman, who, after a short leave of absence, has proceeded to his new assignment in San Antonio, Texas. Lieutenant Colonel John A. Weeks has been in command of the regiment in the interim.

In addition to sending its share of officers to the C.& G.S. and Cavalry School as reported in the previous JOURNAL, this regiment will lose during September, Captain H. Jordan Theis who has been reassigned to duty with the Massachusetts State College, Amherst, Massachusetts, and First Lieutenant William R. Prince, who has been detailed in the 2d Balloon Squadron with station at Fort Bragg, North Carolina.

Second Lieutenant Frank E. Glace, Jr., after an illness at Walter Reed of approximately seven months has proceeded to his home to await retirement, September 30th.

The additional duties thrust upon the stay at homes has been relieved in a measure by the recent arrival of Major Candler A. Wilkinson, Captains Gordon B. Rogers, Brendan McK. Greeley, Elmer V. Stansbury, and Charles E. Morrison and their families. These welcome additions to the social life of the garrison will be further enhanced by the arrival in the early fall of Captains William O. Heacock and Thomas F. Taylor and their families.

The following second lieutenants have arrived from West Point: David B. Goodwin, Thomas B. Bartel, William G. Dean, Howard V. Cooperider, and Benjamin M. Bailey, Jr. In addition, the following second lieutenants have been assigned and have reported for duty: Lemuel E. Pope and Richard L. Irby.

A very active summer training period for the civilian components closed on August 20th.

From June 15th until July 14th 800 C.M.T.C. trainees were encamped in the concurrent area. At the same time 46 R.O.T.C. students were here in training. Officers of the 309th Cavalry conducted the training of the C.M.T.C's.

From July 16th to 30th the 55th Cavalry Brigade (less 109th Cavalry) were here for their field duty period, followed by the 109th Cavalry from July 30th to August 13th. The 127th Engineer Squadron (Ala. N.G.) and the 105th Veterinary Company attended the encampment of the Cavalry Brigade during the period July 23d to August 20th. The following reserve units were also trained here: Between July 23d and August 20th: 313th Cavalry, 310th Cavalry, 463d Reconnaissance Squadron, and 403d Engineer Squadron.

All reserve officers on active duty at this station were quite enthusiastic and most of them expressed their desire for redetail the following year. The National Guard used over 300 of our horses and were loud in praise of the fine quality of mounts and the coöperation from the regiment.

The hunting season will open officially about October 10th. Drafts of finely bred hounds have been received from the Essex Foxhounds (through the generosity of our good friend Captain Don Carleton, now on duty in New Jersey) and from the Radnor Drag. These drafts together with the pups we managed to raise bring the entered hounds up to 17½ couples. The cubbing season has brought several good runs on fox and we expect to have good sport, both, on fox for those who like to watch hounds work and do not mind bad weather and disappointments now and then, and on drags for those who "hunt to ride."

A large new section of farm land is being added to the hunt country. The staff for the season is as follows: Master, Major H. E. Kloepfer: Huntsman, the Master: Whippers-In (honorary), Captain Murtaugh, Rogers, Greeley, and Hoffman, and Lieutenant Collins, Veterinary-Reserve; Kennel Huntsmen, Corporal Linder and Private Holcomb. The Hunt keenly regrets the loss of our good friend and staunch supporter Lieutenant Colonel Fiske, Field Master, who has been ordered to Washington.

Troops of the 6th Cavalry are participating in a regimental baseball league which gives promise of being the best season in years. Troop F and Headquarters and Service Troop are now in a deadlock for first place. Upon completion of the regular playing schedule a play-off under the Shaughnessy system will be started to determine the regimental champions for 1939.

A new softball field, equipped with modern lighting system has been installed and troops are now thoroughly enjoying this new phase of athletics. Due to the lateness in completing the lighting system for the field, not much competition is expected this year, but all are looking forward to next season at which time a fast pitch and two slow pitch leagues will be started, giving practically all members of the regiment an opportunity to participate in this sport.

The Fort Oglethorpe polo team played a series of five games at Fort Oglethorpe, Georgia, with the Governor's Horse Guards from Atlanta, Georgia, during July and August. The Fort Oglethorpe team fortunately came out *on top, winning three games and the Horse Guards two.*

The regiment during July and August lost several of their first string polo players, but it is expected to recuperate shortly as several of the officers who are to join the regiment have had polo experience. The officers that are to join are as follows: Major C. A. Wilkinson, Captain Charles E. Morrison and Captain Gordon B. Rogers, all have had previous polo experience.

Seven new second lieutenants have recently joined the regiment and it is expected to develop some of them into good polo players inasmuch as they have all expressed the desire to play polo.

We are fortunate in having Lieutenant Colonel Howell M. Estes and Captain Elmer V. Stansbury, two officers with previous polo experience, who have consented to act as referee for all games at Fort Oglethorpe.

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7th Cavalry—Fort Bliss, Texas

COLONEL WILLIAM W. WEST, *Commanding*

The regiment having just completed a most successful target season is now conducting extensive training in preparation for the coming fall Division Maneuvers to be held in the vicinity of Tovahvale, Texas.

Machine Gun Troop and Troop B each have the distinction of 100 per cent qualification. First Sergeant Wilbur P. Jackson of Troop A, a former member of the Cavalry Rifle Team, was high shot with the rifle making a score of 241. Machine Gun Troop's known distance firing was accomplished at the new Castner Range and Captain Ladue reports that the results were highly satisfactory and believes the range to be far superior to the old Fort Bliss Target Range in Dona Ana County, New Mexico. It is understood that necessary arrangements are being com-

pleted to permit the firing of all rifle, pistol, and machine gun at the new Castner Range during the next annual target season.

Having failed to receive much exercise during the month of August, the animals of the regiment, as well as the men of the regiment, will require considerable conditioning before October 2d when the Second Cavalry Brigade is scheduled to leave Fort Bliss en route to the maneuver area. Every effort is being made to permit all physically fit personnel to accompany the regiment and training in all phases of cavalry combat is being equally stressed to assure that this organization is ready to satisfactorily perform any mission assigned to its during maneuvers.

Remount training is progressing nicely under the guiding hand of Captain Ladue. Several remount polo prospects have been assigned to polo-playing officers who are devoting considerable time and effort to the developing of these animals.

Headquarters and Service Troop and Machine Gun Troop will, in all probability, move into their new quarters soon. The men in these organizations are looking forward to the move to new barracks with a great deal of enthusiasm.

The following changes in officer personnel have occurred in the regiment:

Lieutenant Colonel Edward F. Shaifer has been ordered to recruiting service at Chicago, Illinois. First Lieutenants John S. Growdon, Francis J. Murdoch, Jr., Caesar F. Fiore, Andrew J. Boyle, and Benjamin W. Heckemeyer have been assigned to duty as students at the Cavalry School.

Lieutenant Colonel Rinaldo L. Coe was assigned to the regiment on August 21st and has assumed command of the 2d Squadron.

Captain Charles H. Noble was assigned to the regiment on August 11th and has assumed command of Troop B.

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8th Cavalry—Fort Bliss, Texas

COLONEL INNIS P. SWIFT, *Commanding*

The 1939 C.M.T. Camp opened on July 6th and closed on August 4th, of which the 8th Cavalry and the 82d Field Artillery were the parent organizations. The camp included the buildings formerly used by C.C.C., R.O.T.C., and National Guard of New Mexico.

Eighty trainees attended of which fifty were cavalry and thirty field artillery, organized into one cavalry troop and one field artillery platoon.

At the end of camp a boxing tournament was held. The swimming meet was easily won by Trainee Edwin D. Selby, who won four of the five events. He is the son of Major John E. Selby, P.M.S.&T., N.M.M.I., Roswell, New Mexico. Visitors' day was held on August 3d.

During the period July 5-20, the following named lieutenants were assigned to the regiment for one year's duty under the Thomason Act:

Ira B. Richards, Jr., Rodeo, New Mexico; Alvin P. Utterback, Jr., Brackettville, Texas; Arthur K. Whitehead, Tucson, Arizona; Sidney S. Woods, Comerton, Arizona; Glenn S. Finley, Jr., Claremore, Oklahoma; Domenick G. Troglia, Bisbee, Arizona, and F. Raymond King, Tucson, Arizona.

The regiment was pleased to receive the news of the promotion of Lieutenant Colonel Jos. P. Aleshire to colonel on July 12th, and Major Clinton A. Pierce to lieutenant colonel on August 14th.

During the period July 16-29, the regiment was combined with the 7th Cavalry to form a war strength regiment known as the 312th Cavalry, to facilitate the training of Reserve officers of the 156th Cavalry Brigade. Eighty Reserve officers reported for duty, and were under the direct supervision of Lieutenant Colonel John T. Minton, Cavalry, who is unit instructor stationed in Tucson, Arizona. The morning periods were devoted to tactical exercises, while the afternoons were used for various demonstrations and instruction in troop duties.

The war strength regiment, with a battalion of field artillery attached, left the post at 7:00 PM on July 24th and went into bivouac in the vicinity of Ysleta, Texas, with the mission of reconnoitering the Rio Grande north of El Paso. The bivouac was so well camouflaged that when an airplane from Biggs Field flew over it several times the following morning the observer was unable to locate the bivouac.

At 8:00 PM on the 25th the regiment again made a night march to the C.C.C. Camp north of Ysleta and spent the remainder of the night there, and at 11:00 AM the 26th proceeded again toward Nations South Well. The entire reinforced regiment, supported by the artillery, was in action on high ground in the vicinity of Carlsbad Highway, against an outlined enemy. Bivouac for the night was made at Nations South Well, and at 9:00 AM on the 27th the regiment moved via Nations East Well to the Hueco Mountains to cover the debouchment of the remainder of the 103d Division from the pass in the Hueco Mountains. The return march to Fort Bliss was started at 5:00 PM, and the regiment arrived at 10:00 PM. Many of the Reserve officers stated that they had had a very interesting and instructive training period.

The regiment participated in a review on July 24th honoring Colonel Francis W. Glover, Cavalry, on his retirement from active service.

A regimental review was held on July 29th, the guest of honor being First Sergeant Van C. White, of Troop A, who retired on June 30th after completing 30 years of service, the last 17 years being with Troop A. Sergeant White was retired with the rank of second lieutenant. During his service in France, Lieutenant White was a member of the Army Team participating in the Inter-Allied Games in Pershing Stadium, Paris, France. Upon his graduation from the Cavalry School in 1917, his diploma was signed by Captain Innis P. Swift, Director of Horsemanship, who is our present regimental commander. In 1916 Sergeant White was a member of the Army

Team travelling throughout the East with Buffalo Bill's Wild West Show.

Firing of mounted and dismounted pistol practice was done during the first part of August, on the Winfree's Nose Range in the vicinity of the post.

Much interest has been displayed on the part of officers and men in the new calibre .22 miniature combat range recently constructed not far from barracks. An article fully describing this miniature range has been submitted to the JOURNAL.

Lieutenant Colonel Edwin E. Schwien who recently joined the regiment has been placed on temporary duty with the Umpire Detachment for the Division Maneuvers near Balmorhea and Toyahvale, Texas. First Lieutenant Frederick H. Gaston, Jr., has reported for duty, and been assigned to command of Headquarters and Service Troop. Major James S. Rodwell, recently from the Command and General Staff School, has been placed in command of the 1st Squadron.

A regimental horse show was held on August 26th which consisted of four classes, results of which were:

Class I—The Barrienspringer. (This class is a very popular class in Europe, and is usually the feature of any of the large Continental shows.) Its introduction to Fort Bliss proved quite interesting, as well as bringing out a fine performance on the part of the winners. Six post and rail jumps were spaced 36 feet apart, with a maximum height of 3 feet 9 inches. In the jump-off several of the jumps were raised to 4 feet 6 inches. Corporal Austin, Troop E, riding *Kaiser* placed first with no faults. Private Crowley, Troop F, on *Reveille;* Sergeant Sanders, Troop F, on *Stroll Along;* Private Gardner, MG Troop, on *Buddy;* placed second, third, and fourth respectively.

Class II—Thomason Officers' Jumping over a course of eleven jumps not exceeding 3 feet 6 inches was won by Lieutenant Woods riding *Reveille,* who cleared all jumps with no faults. Lieutenant King on *Hickory,* Lieutenant Whitehead on *Clonsilla,* and Lieutenant Finley on *Kane* captured the remaining three prizes.

Class III—Enlisted Men's Hacks, for men of less than one year's service, was judged by Colonel Innis P. Swift on seat, hand, and general horsemanship of the rider. First prize went to Private Moseley, Troop E, riding *Rascallion.* Private Acker, Headquarters and Service Troop, on *Harmon;* Private Eades, Troop A, on *Sadie;* and Private French, Troop E, on *Otman,* placed in that order.

All of these young cavalrymen displayed excellent horsemanship and show prospects of future Division Horse Show riders.

In the Open Jumping over a course of 16 obstacles, at a height of 4 feet, competition was very keen. Lieutenant Cole, riding *Bashful,* was highly elated to clear all jumps with no faults and captured the coveted first prize. He again displayed his excellent horsemanship when he placed second on *Colonel* in a jump-off with Lieutenant O'Brien on *Westerman,* who was then contented with third place. Corporal Austin, Troop E, on *Kaiser,* nosed out Corporal Jones, Troop A, on *Baalbec,* for fourth place after the jumps had been raised to 4 feet 6 inches.

During the first years of the 8th Cavalry the troops were stationed throughout the territories of Arizona and New Mexico protecting the scattered towns and settlements from marauding Indians. In glancing over our regimental and troop histories, one finds many accounts of encounters with the Apache Indian. The Apache roamed the hills and mountains of Arizona and New Mexico territories, under the leadership of Chief Geronimo, burning ranch homes and driving off live stock of the settlers.

For the past several days members of the regiment have been on "location" with Paramount Pictures from Hollywood, filming the picture "Geronimo."

Paramount moved in with all its paraphernalia, and Fort Bliss was a beehive of action similar to Hollywood.

Officers and men were furnished with the old time "Blue Uniform," replete with all its gold braid, red sashes, etc. With their long shaggy hair and mustaches the men surely looked the part of the old "forty-niner," of which the regiment was mostly composed at that time.

Even the horses had forgotten what a saber looked like and shied away when the rider approached with it attached to his belt. Nor did they like the carbine on the off side of the saddle.

The younger cavalrymen had no difficulty in learning the movements of the saber manual, a weapon of which they had heard, but now see only in collections of relics. Only a few minutes were required for the old-timers to again flash that famous cavalry weapon as they did in the "Old Army."

The regimental supply sergeant was so efficient in issuing of uniforms and equipment, that the Paramount representative immediately endeavored to get him to "buy out" and return to Hollywood with the company.

Colonel Aleshire, on his elevated platform, under an umbrella, with his microphone looked like a veteran director.

Everyone is now anxiously waiting the showing of "Geronimo" at the War Department Theatre, to "See yourself as others see you."

It is with regret that we see First Lieutenants Henry T. Cherry, Jr., Bruce Palmer, Jr., and Roy W. Cole, Jr. depart on leave of absence, upon the termination of which they will report as students at the Cavalry School.

Now that the summer training camps are over, the regiment is working to get men and animals in condition for the coming maneuvers of the 1st Cavalry Division to be held in the vicinity of Balmorhea and Toyahvale, Texas, during the month of October.

Officers and ladies of the regiment enjoyed a regimental dinner at Ralph Brown's Steak House on the evening of August 29th.

Second Lieutenant Ira B. Richards, Cavalry-Reserve, was relieved from active duty under the provisions of the Thomason Act, on August 30th, and accepted a commission as second lieutenant in the Regular Army on Sep-

tember 1st. Lieutenant Richards has been assigned to duty with the Machine Gun Troop.

12th Cavalry (Less 2d Squadron)—Fort Brown, Texas

COLONEL ARTHUR E. WILBOURN, *Commanding*

Since the last issue of the CAVALRY JOURNAL, the regiment has been training for the First Cavalry Division Maneuvers. It has engaged in a series of problems to test its efficiency and to point out to organization commanders where their training efforts could be best directed.

The following officers have joined us since last publication: Lieutenant Colonel Eustis L. Hubbard, Cavalry; Lieutenant Colonel Ralph I. Sasse, Cavalry; Major Ernest C. Adkins, Quartermaster Corps; Captain Clarence K. Darling, Cavalry; Second Lieutenant Michael S. Davison, Cavalry; Second Lieutenant Arthur W. Allen, Jr., Cavalry, and Second Lieutenant James LeR. Rogers, Cavalry.

We have received two new members into the regiment who were unable to produce orders from the War Department: a son to Lieutenant and Mrs. McPherson LeMoyne and a daughter to Lieutenant and Mrs. Alexander D. Surles, Jr.

In addition to the usual post social activities was the reception given by Colonel and Mrs. Wilbourn for General and Mrs. Wainwright on their visit to the post early in September. Another outstanding event was the picnic and boat outing down the Brownsville ship channel, when Colonel Wilbourn had as his guests a group of Mexican officers from the garrison of H. Matamoros, Mexico, just across the Rio Grande from Brownsville. General Leopoldo Vasquez Dorantes was the guest of honor.

The regimental commander has made frequent trips to Fort Ringgold to coördinate the progress of the two squadrons of the regiment.

Under Major Harry A. Buckley's supervision, the horse show and polo teams are shaping up nicely, and should be ready for the intense competition expected from the brigade and later from the division.

26th Cavalry—Fort Stotsenburg, P. I.

COLONEL ROBERT BLAINE, *Commanding*

During the month of June the 26th Cavalry was engaged in regular garrison training.

On June 29th the regiment started on a practice march to Manila and returned July 7th. All marching was done during the early morning hours and camp was established before 8:00 AM each day. The orderliness and efficiency with which this regiment breaks camp and march during hours of darkness is remarkable. The regiment participated in Independence Day parade in Manila on July 4th. The creditable showing made by all ranks was commented upon by high officials, both military and civilian.

On July 8th, Colonel Joseph W. Stilwell, Infantry, delivered an address to the officers of Fort Stotsenburg on his experiences in China as military attaché. His remarks were enlightening and extremely interesting.

The officers of the regiment tendered a farewell party to Colonel Dougherty on July 15th at the Stotsenburg Club. Colonel Dougherty departed on the July transport for duty at Headquarters, 2d Corps Area.

Our new regimental commander, Colonel Robert Blaine, arrived on the July transport. Colonel Blaine was with the 26th Cavalry six years ago as executive officer. The regiment is fortunate in having in command an officer who is familiar with the conditions in the Philippines.

On July 27th Fort Stotsenburg received 118 remounts and 30 mules. The 26th Cavalry is charged with the training of these animals, after which some of them will be sent to other stations in the department.

Captain L. C. Vance, Captain T. J. H. Trapnell, First Lieutenant Wm. E. Chandler, and Second Lieutenant R. B. Praeger arrived on the July transport.

OFFICERS' ROSTER OF 26TH CAVALRY

Colonel

Blaine, Robert, CO.

Lieutenant Colonels

Buchly, Walter E., Ex. O.
Finley, James R., SD—Post Exchange Officer.
Pierce, John T., SD—Post Exchange Officer.

Majors

Haldeman, William T., SD—Post P.&T. O.
Hood, John D., DS CO Camp John Hay, P.I.
Clayton, Philip C., S-3.
Hawley, Donald C., S-4.
Nelson, Frank, CO 2d Sq.
Dodd, Heywood S., CO Prov. Sq.
Blankenship, Jacob A., CO 1st Sq.
Wilson, Garnett H., S-1.

Captains

Baclig, Eustaquio S., (PS) DS w P.I. Army.
Moran, Juan S., (PS), S-2.
Burcham, Clyde A., CO MG Tr.
Burnside, Walter, CO Hq. Tr.
Vance, Lee C., Transportation O.
Bradley, William J., SD Post QM.
Forde, Harold M., CO Tr. E.
Winn, Norman M., DS HP Dept.
Trapnell, Thomas J. H., CO Tr. F.
Disney, Paul A., CO Tr. B.
Hathaway, James L., Com. O.
LaPpage, John J., SD Asst. Post Adj.
Stevenson, Hugh W., CO Tr. A.

First Lieutenants

Howze, Hamilton H., Tr. E.
Lichirie, Cornelius A., Tr. F.
Chandler, William E., MG Tr.
Bartlett, William G., Tr. A.
Arnette, Robert E., Jr., Tr. F.
Bayne, Robert H., SD, CO 65th and 66th QM. Pk. Co.

Alger, James D., CO Scout Car Plat.
Haines, Robert E., MG Tr.
Rhoades, John F., Regtl. Pk. Tn.
Walker, Charles P., Tr. E.
Second Lieutenants
Barker, Joseph R., 2d. Tr. B.
Praeger, Ralph B., Tr. A.

103d Cavalry—Tyrone, Pennsylvania

COLONEL BENJAMIN C. JONES, *Commanding*

On June 17th, the first day of the 1939 field training period, the various redesignations of units and reassignments of officers made necessary by the plan for organization of the 22d Cavalry Division were accomplished.

The regiment went through camp in much different form from that of the past ten years. It had lost all of its Philadelphia units; it had lost its troops at Bellefonte and DuBois; it had gained four rifle troops from the 104th Cavalry, one of which had been converted into Headquarters Troop and the other into Machine Gun Troop; it had gained a newly organized Medical Department Detachment.

The field training program was carried out with enthusiasm and efficiency. Units being introduced to new and strange duties entered into them with vigor and acquitted themselves most creditably. After the first few days of shaking down into new assignments, the various sections of Headquarters Troop functioned as though they had been operating in their new capacities for many months. The Machine Gun Troop proved itself as sturdy a unit with its Brownings as it had been as a rifle troop. The new Medical Department Detachment made splendid progress and performed praiseworthy service.

Beginning with tactical exercises involving rifle platoons and proceeding through similar exercises involving troops and then squadrons, the field training period culminated in a three-day maneuver in which the regiment functioned as part of the 52d Cavalry Brigade in a reconnaissance problem. The camp period passed without serious accident within the regiment; the weather was cool and pleasant; and sufficiently marked improvement was shown in all phases of cavalry training as to lead officers and men alike to feel that the 1939 field training period was the most profitable ever.

On July 1st units of the regiment returned from camp to their various home stations which are now the following: Regimental Headquarters, Tyrone; Headquarters Troop, Altoona; Machine Gun Troop, Tyrone; Medical Department Detachment, Sunbury; Band, Northumberland; Headquarters 1st Squadron, Altoona; Troop A, Clearfield; Troop B, Lock Haven; Headquarters 2d Squadron, Sunbury; Troop E, Sunbury; Troop F, Lewisburg; Headquarters 3d Squadron, Philadelphia; Troop I, Punxsutawney; Troop K, New Castle.

The following promotions and appointments made just prior to camp or just following camp, most of which were occasioned by the various redesignations and reassignments, are announced with pleasure:

First Lieutenant Jesse C. Davis to be captain, assigned to command Headquarters Troop; First Lieutenant Charles W. Roberts to be captain, assigned to Regimental Headquarters as Suppy Officer; Captain Robert E. Allen, ING, to be captain, MC, and assigned to Medical Department Detachment as commanding officer; Captain Maximo J. Tornatore, MC-Reserve, to be captain, MC, and assigned to Medical Department Detachment; First Lieutenant Theodore M. DeVries, VC-Reserve, to be first lieutenant, VC, assigned to Medical Department Detachment; First Lieutenant Robert A. Walborn, DC-Reserve, to be first lieutenant, DC, and assigned to Medical Department Detachment; Second Lieutenant Warren L. McKinney to be first lieutenant, and assigned to Machine Gun Troop; Second Lieutenant Lester A. Shull to be first lieutenant, and assigned to Regimental Headquarters as Personnel Adjutant; First Sergeant Allen K. Hile to be first lieutenant, assigned to Headquarters 3d Squadron as Adjutant; Sergeant Irvin F. Mitchell to be second lieutenant assigned to Machine Gun Troop.

Within the past year certificates of eligibility to higher grade have been granted by the National Guard Bureau to a number of officers of the regiment as follows:

Lieutenant Colonel Samuel B. Wolfe as colonel; Major Benjamin I. Levine as lieutenant colonel; Captains John H. F. Bittner and William A. E. Leitzinger as majors; First Lieutenants Hall F. Achenbach, John K. Dufton, and Frank S. Buchanan as captains; Second Lieutenants Thomas G. Lewis and Adelbert A. Arter as first lieutenants.

104th Cavalry—Philadelphia, Pa.

First Lieutenant Joseph M. Williams, Machine Gun Troop, 104th Cavalry, Philadelphia Post, shooting member of the Pennsylvania National Guard Rifle Team, at

the National Rifle and Pistol Matches, Camp Perry, Ohio, 1939.

Lieutenant Williams is the individual winner of the United States Cavalry Cup, and the United States National Guard Association Trophy, with a score of 145 out of a possible 150, as follows:

Two hundred yards offhand, 47; 600 yards prone, 50; 1,000 yards prone, 48; total, 145.

Out of the 2,000 competitors in the President's Match, Lieutenant Williams finished in twelfth place, he also placed well up in the Marine Corps Cup Match, the Leech Cup Match, the Wimbledon Cup Match, and the National Individual Match, all of which were individual rifle matches.

Lieutenant Williams is a graduate of the Advance Course, Small Arms Firing School, Camp Perry, Ohio, 1939, as conducted by the United States Army, and he has worn the United States Distinguished Marksman Badge, for rifle, since 1925.

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106th Cavalry—(Illinois Component)

MAJOR RALPH G. GHER, *Commanding*

The Illinois units of the 106th Cavalry returned to home stations on July 15th after a successful tour of field training at Camp Williams, Wisconsin.

This tour of duty was the second time the entire regiment (consisting of Illinois and Michigan components) functioned as such, the first being during the Second Army Maneuvers in Michigan in 1936. The character of the Second Army Maneuvers made it somewhat difficult for the Illinois and Michigan units to become acquainted, but the 1939 tour of duty offered an opportunity for close contact and association. Officers and men of the Illinois units are high in their praise of the Michigan component, and have expressed the opinion that all future training will see both states together as one regiment.

Colonel Harold T. Weber, commanding the regiment, was confronted with the problem of having a regimental staff divided between two states, and it was due to his splendid executive ability that the staff functioned smoothly with no overlapping of duties.

Much of the credit for the success of the tour is due Lieutenant Charles W. Hughes, Chaplain, of Detroit, who had charge of the recreation and athletics of the regiment. Chaplain Hughes organized an excursion for enlisted men to the Wisconsin Dells where five chartered boats carried them on a fifteen-mile trip covering the scenic wonders of the Wisconsin River.

The regimental CPX was quite instructive, and reflected the serious thought of Captain Frank J. Wise, S-2, who prepared the problem.

Lieutenant Colonel James G. Moniham, Major E. A. Franklin, and Major Otto R. Stillinger, regular army instructors on duty with the regiment, rendered valuable assistance.

Nine Reserve officers were assigned to the regiment for training, and performed the duties of troop officers in a very commendable manner. The following officers of the Springfield, Illinois, units participated in the Midwest Amateur Horse Show on June 3d and 4th: Captain W. A. Crookston, and Lieutenants J. T. Walker, C. N. Greenup, C. R. Bean, J. T. Temple, J. M. McCarthy, and J. Bradley.

Captain Mark Plaisted and Captain M. G. Peter functioned as judges.

While in Wisconsin, the regiment made a two-day practice march to the village of Necedah, Wisconsin, a distance of thirty miles each way. The regiment returned to Camp Williams without any casualties among horses and men. While in Necedah the band conducted a concert in the village which attracted a large crowd from the neighboring country. The citizens of Necedah extended a hearty welcome to the troops, and the president of the Bank of Necedah provided facilities for shower baths and entertainment for the officers. The mayor extended an address of welcome which was accepted by Colonel Weber.

The 107th Veterinary Company (Michigan) was attached to the regiment for the tour of duty, and under the command of Captain Harry C. Cotton, this company won a place in the hearts of the Cavalrymen.

With the exception of the Veterinary Company, the regiment functioned alone, which was quite a change from the usual tour of duty while attached to the 33d Division in Camp Grant, Illinois, consisting of 10,0000 troops.

The troops in Illinois are discussing with interest the official reports regarding the new allotment of cavalry to this state, consisting of the Division Headquarters Troop and the Reconnaissance Squadron (mcdzd) as well as a number of members of the staff of the 23d Cavalry Division. There is considerable speculation as to the future training of the regiment and it is felt that the days of training with an infantry division are over.

* * *

111th Cavalry—New Mexico National Guard

COLONEL CHARLES G. SAGE, *Commanding*

Following the retirement on July 7th of Colonel Clyde E. Ely, Lieutenant Colonel Charles G. Sage was placed in command of the 111th Cavalry, promoted to colonel and federally recognized as of July 23d. Colonel Ely was retired with the rank of brigadier general, having served for more than twenty-five years in the New Mexico Guard. He had commanded the 111th Cavalry for six years. Colonel Sage has been an officer in the 111th Cavalry for more than eighteen years. He was a lieutenant of field artillery during the World War.

Effective September 1st headquarters of the 111th Cavalry were moved from Silver City to Deming, home of the new regimental commander. Other changes effective that date were: Captain Oliver B. Witten, Deming, from Regimental S-4 to S-1; Captain Eugene B. Baca, Santa Fe,

from Regimental S-1 to commanding officer Troop B; Captain Alphonso Melendez, Santa Fe, from commanding officer Troop B, to Regimental S-4; First Lieutenant Claud W. Stump, Deming, from Adjutant 2d Squadron to Regimental Personnel Adjutant.

Major Harry M. Peck, Albuquerque, veteran officer of the New Mexico Guard, was promoted July 23d to be lieutenant colonel of the 111th Regiment. On September 1st Captain Albert F. Marth, commander of Headquarters Troop, Albuquerque, was promoted to major and assigned to command the 1st Squadron, formerly under Colonel Peck. First Lieutenant James H. Hazelwood was promoted the same date to captain, and assigned to command Headquarters Troop.

The 111th Cavalry held its annual field training at Camp Maximiliano Luna, Las Vegas, August 6-20, carried out an intensive program that included reconnaissance, counter-reconnaissance, night marches, and defensive and offensive operations. Most of these exercises were two-sided, one reinforced squadron opposing the remainder of the regiment.

The highlight of the training period was the platoon leadership contest, which saw two platoons of each rifle troop take the field for two days. A musketry exercise, marching, camping, reconnaissance, attack by armored vehicles, airplanes, and dismounted groups and the reconnaissance of a village were features of this test. The competition was close in every phase. First Lieutenant Lucien S. Wells, Cavalry-Reserve, leading a platoon of Troop K to top honors. Next year's program probably will include a follow-up of this platoon test, which proved very popular and provided some excellent training for all concerned.

The 111th Cavalry horse show, annual feature of the regiment's field training period, was carried off successfully again this year, although it had been reduced to a one-day affair. A number of civilian entries competed and the crowd was treated to some thrilling and interesting exhibitions. Unfortunately rain interfered with the afternoon session, causing spectators and contestants considerable discomfort—but the show went on in spite of this handicap.

Lieutenant Henry R. Pacheco, Troop B, Santa Fe, won the point-to-point race, the prize for which was the personal saber of the late Colonel Norman L. King, former commander of the 111th Cavalry.

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112th Cavalry—Dallas, Texas

COLONEL CLARENCE E. PARKER, *Commanding*

On June 30, 1939, two new troops for this regiment, I and K, authorized by the War Department, were mustered into federal service. The home station for Troop I is at Texarkanna, Texas, and for Troop K at Abilene, Texas.

The officers who have received federal recognition to date to lead these two new troops are as follows:

Troop I—Captain Roy W. Davis, commanding; First Lieutenant Sam L. Hunnicutt, and Second Lieutenant Roy Lilley.

Troop K— First Lieutenant Clyde E. Grant, commanding and Second Lieutenant John L. Minter.

The regiment welcomes our new additions and feels that it is very lucky in obtaining such fine officers for the new troops.

Both troops have a very high type of enlisted personnel, and could have doubled the authorized strength, at the time of muster.

Major McCord McIntire, who recently received his promotion as major, will command the new 3d Squadron and First Lieutenant Reeves R. Houghton, who was recently appointed first lieutenant and called back from the inactive list, will be the adjutant. "Congratulations, Mac and Reeves."

Mac states that with a little time he will have the best squadron in the regiment, and judging from his excellent work as S-2-3 of the regiment during the past four years, this might be no idle boast. Maybe the older squadron commanders had better keep on their toes, eh what?

The regiment completed a most successful two weeks field training period on August 22d. In fact many old-timers were heard to remark, that despite the heat, that was 100 degrees or above every day of the training period, this year's camp was the best they had attended to date, as far as training results were concerned.

During the first week of camp the training consisted of field exercises for small units, where leadership qualities of the commanders were stressed. These exercises commenced with the squad and progressed up to include the troop.

The leadership test for small units conducted by the regiment during the past armory training period proved its worth in this field training period as the leadership ability of junior officers and noncommissioned officers was a marked improvement over last year's field exercises.

The field exercises for the second week consisted of a free maneuver with the squadrons of the regiment operating against each other, as divisional cavalry attached to an infantry division. Each squadron was reinforced with machine guns and sufficient trucks to enable it to supply itself in the field.

The brigade prepared the directive and general situation for the maneuver, but the regimental command and staff were given the responsibility of preparing the special situations and the actual control and conduct of the maneuver.

This was excellent training for all concerned, especially for the squadron commanders and the additional officers, from the troops of the regiment, attached as S-3 and S-4 to the squadron staffs.

All units of the regiment participated in the maneuver, played the game hard, despite the terrific heat, and executed the missions assigned in a most satisfactory manner. The excellent manner in which the 2d Squadron, commanded by Major W. P. Cameron, executed its mission

of delay and defensive action is worthy of special mention. Major Cameron never forgot the principle of mass, and had his squadron well in hand ready to strike where his information seeking units disclosed the enemy's main effort would be made.

On the last day of the maneuver, the 1st Squadron, commanded by Major Dunlap made a march over country that a civilian remarked he did not think a goat could negotiate, which proves the fact that: *"On all kinds of terrain and in all kinds of weather the good old horse is still the most mobile thing on the battlefield."* In this particular situation, which might happen in any war, mechanization would have been useless.

At a very impressive regimental ceremony held in Pyron Hall on July 15th the prizes were presented the winners of the competitions held in the regiment during the 1938-'39 armory training period. These consisted of the Leadership Test for Small Units for all troops, the Squad Test for the Medical Detachment, and the Individual Test for the Band.

General Pyron, the brigade commander, Colonel Cheney, the senior instructor, 56th Cavalry Brigade, and Colonel Parker, the regimental commander, were the principal speakers. They all congratulated the winners, stressed the value of competitions, to keep up interest during the armory training period, and remarked on the fine results produced by the competitions.

Colonel Parker, as the winner's name was called, presented the cash prize and Major John B. Dunlap, presented an appropriately engraved button to each winner, which he very kindly purchased out of his own pocket.

Somebody remarked that when First Lieutenant Manley E. Hood led his winning platoon up to the platform to receive the large cash prizes for winning the Leadership Test for Small Units, that he was a mighty proud-looking lieutenant. Well, Lieutenant Hood has a right to be proud of his platoon, as winning that test was something to be proud of.

They say "Bo" Phillips, commanding Troop F, was like a father at graduation when his boys stepped up to get their diplomas. He had a grin a mile wide.

Colonel Joseph A. Atkins, officer in charge of National Guard affairs, Eighth Corps Area, honored us by his presence during the entire field training period. This gave all the officers a chance to meet and know Colonel Atkins which would not have been the case had he only stayed the usual two days. The whole brigade was delighted to have him with us and hope he can arrange to come again next year.

During the 1939-'40 armory training period a test will be conducted to determine the best all around troop in the regiment. All troops will compete.

This will be called the Pyron Trophy Test, named after our beloved brigade commander, and patterned after the Goodrich Trophy Test that was conducted for the Regular Cavalry a few years ago.

The purpose of the test is: To encourage attendance at drills and schools: To better the personal appearance of officers and enlisted men at all formations: To promote more interest in proper care of horses, equipment, armories and grounds: To further the training of the troops of the regiment by testing the individual proficiency, the squad proficiency, the platoon proficiency and finally, the general combat efficiency of the troops as a whole: To keep all troops of this regiment continually "on their toes" during the entire period of armory training.

In order to keep the troops on their toes at all times, no warning orders will be issued as to the date or time any particular troop will be inspected or tested by the instructor or his assistant.

The weights assigned in general scoring system are shown below:

Attendance	5%
Appearance	5%
Administration	5%
Care of horses, equipment, stables, armories	10%
Individual proficiency	5%
Squad proficiency	20%
Platoon proficiency	10%
Troop proficiency	15%
Leadership, officers and noncommissioned officers	25%

The winner will be the troop securing the highest percentage during the entire 1939-40 armory training period.

An individual prize will be awarded to each member of the winning troop and an envious troop trophy presented to the troop as a whole. This will be competed for each year until a troop has won it three successive times when it becomes its permanent property.

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123d Cavalry (Kentucky National Guard)—Fort Knox, Kentucky

LIEUTENANT COLONEL JOHN A. POLIN, *Commanding*

Three weeks of strike duty in the mountains of Eastern Kentucky, just prior to the camp period, served to put both men and officers in good condition for field training at Fort Knox, June 25th to July 9, 1939. The animals, having had two weeks' duty with the 107th Cavalry, were also in excellent condition. All unserviceable horses in the regiment

On Parade at Advanced Rifle

Lieutenant Steve J. Meade on **Linda Lou**

having been replaced by the new allotment of remounts.

The general improvement in the horses was noticeable throughout the entire training period. Many compliments were heard about the appearance of the horses during the Governor's Regimental Review and Horse Show. In the jumping events several entries tied with perfect scores in both the Officers' Class and Enlisted Men's Class. The only complaint on horses came from the Band Master who had some difficulty, and in fact staged quite a rodeo act, before he was able to find remounts on which he could mount the kettle-drums and base horns.

The highlights of the 1939 field training were:

(a) The fine records made in combat firing, small arms firing and mounted pistol firing.
(b) The two-day maneuver, tactical problem and bivouac.
(c) The demonstration for Major General Pedro Aurelio DeGoes Monteiro, the Chief of Staff of Brazilian Army, on July 4th.
(d) The formal mounted guard-mount ceremonies.
(e) The use of the mounted band at all ceremonies.
(f) The Governor's Day Program on the second Friday.

Brigadier General Adna R. Chaffee, commanding general of Fort Knox, gave the 123d Cavalry the greatest cooperation and assistance from the regular troops and offered us all facilities of the post during the two weeks we were there. This, together with the aid of our fine staff of regular army instructors, made this one of the best training periods in the history of the regiment.

Only one event in the year brought sadness and disappointment to the regiment. That was the sudden resignation of the only commanding officer the regiment has ever known. Colonel Henry J. Stites left the guard at his own free will after thirty years of unselfish service, the last ten of which were directed to perfecting the 123d Cavalry under his command. Colonel Stites' resignation represents a distinct loss to the National Guard as a whole and this regiment in particular. At the regimental field day, Friday, July 7, 1939, in presence of the entire command and many of his friends who had gathered for the occasion, Colonel Stites was awarded his "Thirty Years Faithful Service Medal," by the Honorable A. B. Chandler, the governor of Kentucky. The new commanding officer of the regiment, Lieutenant Colonel John A. Polin, then presented him with a gold saber as a remembrance from the officers of the regiment. As he leaves the service, Colonel Stites carries with him the love and admiration of every officer and man in the 123d Cavalry.

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124th Cavalry—Houston, Texas

COLONEL CALVIN B. GARWOOD, *Commanding*

The 124th Cavalry Regiment has won a Pershing trophy for the fourth consecutive time. This is the only regiment that has ever won this trophy every year since it has been offered. Upon the bulletin board in regimental headquarters is posted a commendation from Major General H. J. Brees, Commander of the VIII Corps Area. Colonel Garwood is particularly proud of this marvelous achievement.

On June 29th two new troops were ushered into this regiment. Troop I at Corpus Christi, commanded by Captain Tarlton Stafford, an ex-B trooper of the 112th, and Troop K, at Seguin, Texas, commanded by Captain W. K. Miles, a former war-time officer. These troops were enlisted and mustered in within one week from the official notification and are showing definite progress so that they will be in splendid shape by federal inspection. Congratulations to these two fine new troops. This squadron will be commanded by Major Jule R. Smith, formerly plans and training officer of this regiment.

According to our instructor, Lieutenant Colonel R. E. Willoughby, the field training of the 124th Cavalry was of great benefit. The problem consisted of two squadrons opposing each other being gradually brought together and ending in a fire fight. The squadron administration and supply was delegated to the separate squadrons, the squadron sergeant majors acting in the capacity of squadron supply officers. These positions were taken by Sergeant Levy of the 1st Squadron and Sergeant Tanner of the 2d Squadron.

On July 14th the brigade paraded for Governor W. L. O'Daniel who was a visitor at our camp. Following the parade, a regimental review was held for Master Sergeant David M. Jansma who was attending his last camp. Sergeant Jansma was in the reviewing stand accompanied by Mrs. Jansma and all officers of the 124th Cavalry, while the troops passed in review, commanded by Sergeant Joe Gurka of Troop E, Brenham, Texas. Sergeant Jansma has been sergeant instructor in Houston for sixteen years and will retire in 1940.

General Knox, the adjutant general of the state of Texas, was a visitor at camp and proved a very fine cavalryman, riding with the troops on the maneuver. We enjoyed his visit very much, and hope he will be back with us again.

In line with the policy of Colonel Garwood, maneuver

orders were written as a result of the combined recommendations of the various staff members, coördinated by the executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel Harry H. Johnson.

With our two new troops, which round out the best regiment of cavalry in the National Guard, Colonel Garwood is setting the sights higher for the standards of this regiment this year.

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62d Cavalry Division
305th Cavalry—Philadelphia, Pa.

COLONEL VINCENT A. CARROLL, Cav.-Res., *Commanding*

The active duty training of the regiment commenced early in July when Lieutenants Forrest Riordan and Harry T. Rosenheim were attached to the 462d Armored Car Squadron and reported for duty with the 1st Cavalry, Mecz., at Fort Knox, Kentucky. Both of these officers reported that the tour of duty was exceedingly interesting and instructive and expressed their appreciation of the efforts of Captains Sells and Dunn of the 1st Cavalry and of Major Yetton, who commanded the 462d Armored Car Squadron.

The regiment held a pre-camp dinner at the Anchorage on August 16th. Plans were laid for the active duty training at Fort Belvoir, Virginia, August 27th to September 9th. Over thirty officers had received their orders and were looking forward to the tour with high spirits.

The following is from a letter just received from the base of operations of the regiment relating the activities of the first week in camp:

"Fort Belvoir, Va., Sunday, Sept. 3d.

"The camp is so full of radio news flashes, it is difficult to keep one's mind on the business at hand here. The declaration of war by England must surely mean real business.

"Here is a brief resume of the events in camp this week:

"Sunday, 8/27/39—Physical examinations including fingerprinting for the F.B.I.; the camp at Belvoir is in splendid condition; permanent buildings; concrete floors for all tents; and troop streets well surfaced.

"Monday, 8/28/39—A reconnaissance ride under Colonel Wilson, who is senior unit instructor. Major Bell is in command of our regiment. The 61st and 62d Cavalry Divisions are both here and unite in training.

"Tuesday, 8/29/39—Platoon drill with rotating commanders. Finally Captain Naftzinger was chosen to organize a troop, the only captain to command it. (Hot stuff!) In the afternoon Major Towne conducted a dismounted combat problem—a good job. Everyone was exhausted by this time.

"Wednesday, 8/30/39—A squadron consisting of the officers of both cavalry divisions was organized under command of Major Bell for a tactical problem. Troop A, composed of men from the 62d Cavalry Division, was commanded by Captain Naftzinger. We finished with a dismounted attack. Colonel Palmer said that it was well done, but did not like the solution; he wanted a mounted action of some kind.

"Thursday, 8/31/39 and Friday, 9/1/39—Cavalry action in coöperation with ten light tanks in an effort to break through the engineer's defense of Fort Belvoir produced a lot of action. We had rotating commanders. Lieutenant Howley commanded a platoon composed entirely of 305th officers, part of a troop under Captain Irby of the 306th. On Friday afternoon, after the battle, we fired the light and heavy machine guns and the cal. .30 machine gun. No scores were kept, but most of the officers seemed to do well.

"Saturday, 9/2/39—We fired the mounted pistol course today and the following scores were recorded:

"Second Lieutenant Willis, 26; Major Streicher, 24; Second Lieutenant Iredell, 24; Captain Meehan, 23; Second Lieutenant Eaker, 23; Second Lieutenant Scarlett, 23; Captain Naftzinger, 22; First Lieutenant Weimar, 22; Second Lieutenant Walsh, 22; First Lieutenant Davisson, 21; First Lieutenant Crist, 21; Second Lieutenant Greenfield, 21; Major Towne, 19; Captain McKinley, 19; Captain Love, 19; First Lieutenant Renninger, 19; First Lieutenant Rife, 19; Second Lieutenant Walton, 19; Captain Young, 18; Captain Shaver, 18; Captain Morrow, 18; Captain Allen, 18; First Lieutenant Howley, 18; Second Lieutenant Freeman, 18; and Second Lieutenant Gutman, 18.

"Captain Watson developed an infected eye and has not fired. In fact he is in the hospital today.

"There has been talk that Colonel Wilson has been assigned to command the 14th Cavalry at Fort Des Moines, Iowa. If this is correct, it certainly will be a loss to the regiment."

For further activities see the next issue of the CAVALRY JOURNAL and be sure to get in your subscription if you have not already done so.

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306th Cavalry—Baltimore, Maryland

COLONEL MATTHEW F. JAMES, *Commanding*

The regiment was assigned the training of the C.M.T.C. this summer. Major Vernon J. Blondell was in command for the first two-week period and Major Edward A. Kane commanded for the last two weeks of this training. Other officers who served at this camp were: Captains Ernest J. St. Jacques and Carroll Wright; First Lieutenants Roue L. Hogan, Frederick P. Magers, and Paul E. Mitchler; Second Lieutenants William P. Cassedy, Merton E. Church, William S. Covington, James A. Dixon, Richard Hume, Gilbert B. Layton, Richard W. Loheed, Thomas E. Jarman, Jr., and Ford E. Young, Jr. Although the schedule required everyone concerned to work from early morning to late at night, all were in accord that this was the most enjoyable and instructive C.M.T.C. camp that has been held.

During the second period of training from August 27th to September 9th the regiment was commanded by Lieu-

tenant Colonel Wm. H. Skinner. Colonel Matthew F. James was again unable to train with us. Others who trained during this period were: Captains William I. Irby and Thomas H. Mundy; First Lieutenants Graham Dukehart, Josef E. Gellerman, and Kenneth S. White; Second Lieutenants William E. Burton and Charles H. Dunphy. The high point of the training was a maneuver by horse cavalry and light tanks against combat engineers. The use of the horse and mechanized team was clearly demonstrated and working in close coördination make a formidable opponent.

It was a great pleasure to have Lieutenant Colonel Edward B. Harry, formerly a member of the regiment attached for training.

Our unit instructor, Lieutenant Colonel Joseph L. Philips, attended both periods of training with the regiment.

Captain Ernest J. St. Jacques was recently promoted from first lieutenant and Second Lieutenant William E. Burton was transferred to the regiment from the field artillery.

308th Cavalry—Pittsburgh, Pa.

COLONEL GEORGE H. CHERRINGTON, *Commanding*

These notes are written while twenty-one of the officers of the 308th Cavalry are in fourteen days' active duty training at Cavalry Camp, Fort Belvoir, Va. It was a pleasure to arrive at Belvoir to find the camp facilities tremendously improved by permanent brick buildings—kitchens and mess buildings, administration building, post exchange, wash houses with hot and cold showers, concrete floors for all tents and permanent sheds over the picket lines. The buildings are well built and attractively designed, gravelled walks and drives dispel fears of mud-producing rains, and grounds cleared of underbrush make the whole camp most attractive. The training schedule, with an emphasis on tactics, is interesting and worth while and the administration of the schedule and the camp itself is operating more smoothly than ever previously. In addition to the twenty-one officers at the regular summer camp, the 308th had two field officers ordered to the First Army Maneuvers and one troop officer ordered for fourteen days' active duty at Fort Knox, Kentucky.

At this writing the Cavalry Reserve officers at Fort Belvoir have just completed a most interesting maneuver, prepared and supervised by Colonel Bruce Palmer, Cavalry. In this operation the cavalry force was constituted of Reserve officers of the 61st and 62d Cavalry Divisions making up a squadron of two troops with enlisted machine gun personnel and four armored cars from the 3d Cavalry and six infantry tanks attached from the 66th Infantry at Fort George G. Meade. The enemy was composed of 450 officers and men from the Engineers, Engineer Reserve officers and enlisted personnel from the 5th Combat Engineers. The engineers were in prepared position to prevent tanks being moved to loading docks on the Potomac River. The mission of the cavalry was to clear the way for the tanks to the docks. Unit instructors and other Regular Army officers acted as umpires and advisers. At the conclusion of the problem the participating Cavalry Reserve officers agreed they had gained valuable experience not only in missions accomplished but also making and observing mistakes.

The biggest event of the month of August, aside from active duty training, was the reporting of our new unit instructor, Major Leslie F. Lawrence, who comes to us from Fort Knox, Kentucky. The regiment cordially welcomes Major and Mrs. Lawrence to Pittsburgh and we sincerely hope we can make their stay most pleasant. We should say that Major Lawrence got off on the right foot with us were it not for the fact that he had only been in Pittsburgh a few days when he evidently got off on the wrong foot; he unfortunately slipped and broke a bone in his ankle, preventing his going to camp with us, to our regret.

Another hospital case was Lieutenant A. B. Thomas who was trying out his new horse, *Rincon*, or was *Rinky* trying Tommy out? Anyway *Rincon* proved he had some good bucks in him—but at that Lieutenant Thomas got himself in shape so that his camp orders were not cancelled, and now he's riding right along with the regiment with no evident distress.

The regular Wednesday night and Sunday morning rides at the 308th Cavalry Post at Aspinwall have this summer covered a carefully planned schedule of drill and tactical problems covering subjects on the active duty training period schedule and prepared by officers of the regiment. This method has been so successful, instructive, and interesting that it is now proposed to be continued during the coming inactive duty training.

New improvements at the post include a mounted pistol course, an archery course enjoyed by officers and their families, a public address system with a fine selection of appropriate military music—and more jumps. It is said that whenever any member of the 308th Cavalry sees a loose telephone pole or likely looking stick of timber lying about he immediately rounds up a detail, including Lieutenant Bill Pfahl and his pet, the little 308th O.D. pick-up truck, and they go to building more jumps.

The string of horses is being built up and added to so that now we have sixteen horses, all privately owned by members of the regiment, making a good looking turnout when we all leave the stables in uniform at one time.

309th Cavalry—Atlanta, Ga.

COLONEL A. G. CONOLEY, *Commanding*

The officers of this regiment received their active duty training the past summer by duty in the C.M.T.C. at Fort Oglethorpe, Ga., June 13th to July 17th. Seven officers served throughout the camp and forty-four others received their two weeks' training in one of three overlapping periods. This duty proved to be most interesting and instructive.

The national standard and regimental standard of the regiment, which were just received last year were formally presented by a very colorful ceremony in an "Escort to the Standards." Following this the C.M.T.C. regiment was paraded; Colonel A. G. Conoley reviewing the troops.

Major James C. Fargo, 309th Cavalry, Aiken, South Carolina, has been recently assigned to the regiment and to command the 1st Squadron.

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313th Cavalry—Culver, Indiana

COLONEL ROBERT ROSSOW, *Commanding*

The officers of the 313th met at Culver Military Academy on Sunday, July 16th, to honor our instructor, Major E. A. Williams, who is leaving to report to his new station at Washington, D. C.

The committee in charge of arrangements consisted of Lieutenant Russell V. Ritchey, chairman; Captains Kenneth I. Hittle, treasurer; Louis Fletcher and C. W. Moores, arrangements. Officers who attended were Colonel Robert Rossow, regimental commander; Major C. A. Whitney, commandant of Culver Cavalry School and regimental S-3; Captains L. Stone, William J. Manby, and William Schideler, and Lieutenants McGregor, C. H. Daghuff, Jr., Wm. Middleton, H. A. Killner, Jr., George Buskirk, Robt. Shimmin, Paul Futz, A. Osborne, R. W. Arnold, J. Graham, George Schuttler, and D. J. Kingman.

The activities for the day included a two-hour cross-country ride in the morning on the mounts of the Black Horse Troop, swimming for an hour and then the dinner in honor of Major Williams at the Maxinkuckee Inn. Boat riding in the afternoon, inspection of the academy buildings and a review of the corps of cadets ended the activity.

Major Williams will be missed, not only by his fellow officers, but also by countless numbers of friends he has made through his work in the Indiana Saddle Horse Association. He was always in the field visiting the various riding clubs and added much toward the promotion of horseback riding throughout the state. All who know him wish him the best of luck in his new post.

The regiment held its summer training at Fort Oglethorpe, Ga., from July 23d to August 5th. The camp consisted of 23 officers from the 313th, six from the 314th (Ohio) and two from West Virginia. Equitation, horsemanship, squad, platoon, troop drill, and conferences on various subjects occupied most of the first week's training schedule. Dismounted pistol firing at both 15 and 25 yards, mounted pistol firing and both heavy and light machine gun firing occupied the early part of the second week. On Wednesday of the second week a 35-mile tactical ride was taken, the last seven miles back to camp being made under cover of darkness. Of the four groups starting back at dark, three succeeded in arriving back in the allotted time and at the proper assembly point. The fourth group after covering a lot of territory arrived back in camp about an hour after the rest. A regimental CPX, which involved both offensive and defensive action, occupied the rest of the week. At 1 PM, Friday, August 4th, pay call was sounded and the officers left soon after for their home stations.

Monday evening, July 31st, a regimental party was given in the camp area with various officers of the 6th Cavalry in attendance. The officers and ladies of the 6th Cavalry entertained the regiment Tuesday evening, August 1st, with a buffet dinner and dance, which was thoroughly enjoyed by all.

The departure from camp was with regrets. Many new friendships were formed. Not enough praise could be given to the entire personnel of the 6th Cavalry for the manner in which they looked after our many needs. It was the unanimous opinion that we had all been at the best training camp we had been privileged to attend.

The regiment congratulates its executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel L. S. N. Phillips, on his graduation from the Command and Staff School this spring. Congratulations also to Captains Schideler and Moores on their well earned promotions. Welcome to Lieutenants Arnold and Schreiber on their joining the regiment.

We await our new unit instructor and the fall training program full of pep and ready to go.

May it be said that there was 100% membership in the Cavalry Association among those officers who were in camp. Need any more be said as to the spirit manifested in the cavalry by the officers in attendance?

* * *

315th Cavalry 1939 Training Camp

Early in June of this year, the map of New England became strangely distorted in the eyes of some hundred and fifty Cavalry Reserve Officers who suddenly decided that all roads must lead at long last to the Field Artillery

Regimental Staff, 315th Cavalry.



Major Leonard Nason gets the 315th Cavalry lined up for "Squadron Attack."

Range which lies fifteen miles east of Fort Ethan Allen, Vermont. For the 315th Cavalry, with sufficient numbers of assigned and attached personnel to officer an *entire brigade*, was once more under orders from the President to be employed upon active duty for an all too brief fortnight of training.

All things considered, the 1939 rendezvous of the "315th Horse" may be set down in the annals of the regiment as the eminently successful and constructive period of its instruction. Almost perfect weather throughout the two weeks made it possible to carry out a carefully planned training schedule without resort to even a single substitution because of "inclemency." Moreover, the generous and unstinting coöperation extended at all times by Colonel Roy W. Barker, FA, Commanding Officer of Fort Ethan Allen, and the officers and men of the 7th Artillery and the 3rd Cavalry who had been detailed to the Artillery Range proved invaluable from every standpoint, and was a source of gratification to every Reserve Officer present.

This year's tour of duty will unquestionably stand out in bold relief in the training of the regiment by virtue of the effective emphasis on automatic weapons. Never at any previous camp for Cavalry Reserve Officers in the First Corps Area, even in the days of the now defunct 158th Machine Gun Squadron, has such a comprehensive course of instruction in the mechanical intricacies and tactical employment of machine guns been made available. Thanks to the efforts of Major Thomas J. Heavey, Cavalry, adjutant of the 2nd Military Area and acting regimental instructor, ample supplies of calibre .30 ammunition were provided and every officer had an opportunity to do sufficient firing so that he could really get acquainted with the light and heavy machine guns. Also, most of us for the first time had the chance to appreciate the actual potentialities of the .50 calibre weapon against tanks and mechanized Cavalry, and by firing a few rounds apiece, to realize its astonishing accuracy.

But from the viewpoint of our tactical training as Cavalry officers, the outstanding contribution to our store of military knowledge is a far better understanding of the characteristics and tactical use of the light machine gun which, after all, is the real backbone of Cavalry fire power. Unquestionably, we can now approach the extension course lessons and map problems in our training on inactive status far more intelligently and with increased capacity for visualization as the result of Major Heavey's demonstrations and intensive instruction in the employment of the light machine gun.

By early afternoon of Sunday, June 11th, a good hundred reservists had already reported at the former CCC camp near BM 985 on the NASHVILLE-LEE RIVER ROAD. At 3 o'clock began the usual round of physical examinations, and various Medicos, all highly inquisitive gentlemen, displayed notable interests in regard to weight, blood pressure, sugar, albumen, and other definitely personal matters. As a group we seem to have been chronically healthy, for only one man fell by the wayside. A second contingent, some forty in number, all newly fledged second lieutenants from the graduating classes at Norwich University and Massachusetts State College,

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were delayed by their respective Commencements, and did not arrive until two days later on Tuesday when their fortnight's training began.

Although essentially a unit camp of the 315th Cavalry, now allocated exclusively to Massachusetts, the eighty odd officers of that regiment were reinforced by a delegation of thirty from the 316th Cavalry, which is drawn from the other five New England states. In addition, another thirty or so were ordered to duty from the 3rd Cavalry RAI, the 158th Brigade, and the Corps Area Service Command. Thus, with some one hundred and forty in attendance, this camp goes on record as the largest Cavalry group training as yet held in the First Corps Area for reserve officers, and probably the largest in the country.

For the period of training, a provisional regimental organization was established. Lieutenant Colonel Harold C. Thomas, Cav-Res. of Hartford, Connecticut, formerly of the 315th Cavalry and now assigned to the Corps Area Service Command, was the senior Reserve Officer present and assumed command. Major Herbert Sears Potter, regularly assigned as executive officer of the 315th, continued to exercise that function during the camp period. Other staff officers included Captain E. H. Springford, S-1; Captain G. Donald Meserve, S-2; Captain Allen Davis, S-3; and Major Louis H. Bell, S-4. The three squadrons were commanded by Major John E. Davisson, Major Leonard H. Nason, both of the 315th, and Major John Brainerd, 316th Cav. in the order named.

It was a matter of regret to the regiment that Major Howard S. Patterson, the present commanding officer, was unable to attend the 1939 camp.

Three officers from the Regular Cavalry, Lieutenant Colonel Lucien S. Berry, Lieutenant Colonel Harrison Herman, and Major Thomas J. Heavey, were ordered to camp as instructors, and to their advice and guidance may be attributed no small part of the satisfactory results accomplished. Colonel Berry served as camp commander while Major Heavey was adjutant. Incidentally, the ground work was so thoroughly laid out in advance that the duties of the regimental staff, except for the executive and the adjutant, were hardly more than nominal.